"In modern warfare, digitalization has blurred the line where civilian ends and military begins. Embedded in the participative warfare theoretical paradigm, this article looks into how the information and communication technologies (ICT) enable civic resilience under the conditions of the foreign ar
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med aggression. Specifically, the authors explore how smartphones and smartphone applications empowered the Ukrainian civil society in the aftermath of the Russian full-scale invasion of 2022. Based on an online survey and semi-structured interviews, the article highlights how the device and its features not only allowed civilians to adapt to living in conditions of
a constant threat, but also to respond and support the defence from the rear. The authors conclude that, while the smartphone becomes an ‘online resilience hub’, acquiring many new functions like a mobile office, an online volunteer (frontline logistics and procurement) hub, an air-threat warner, a first-hand news source and so on, its security provision functions are not unconditional and may turn to the opposite, depending on the physical circumstances on the ground as well as the virtual information battlefield." (Abstract)
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"Nations use media to disseminate stories about their culture, history, and values. This study explored Russian public-diplomacy efforts by examining news content exported to its neighbors, Ukraine and Georgia, from February 2021 to July 2021, approximately one year before Russia’s invasion of Ukr
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aine. We looked at pro-Russia media that targeted Russian-speaking Georgians and Ukrainians showing that Russian public-diplomacy messaging was not so much about Russia, as it was about anti-Western frames. Local pro- Russia media in Ukraine and Georgia repeated these anti-Western frames in their news coverage. These anti-Western frames provide insight into the messaging before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, thus contributing unique insights into public-diplomacy messaging for theorizing soft and hard power." (Abstract)
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"On March 9, 2022, the maternity and children’s hospital number 3 in Mariupol, Ukraine, was bombed as part of Russia’s full-scale war efforts in Ukraine. However, Russian statealigned media promoted a different narrative: namely, that the bombing itself, as well as the victims on site, were fake
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. Thus, combining concerns of war, gender, and disinformation, I analytically unfold the state-aligned news media coverage of the Mariupol case in Russia within the framework of multimodal critical discourse analysis. The analysis demonstrates how female agents are stripped of victimhood and symbolically annihilated across the material, introducing the concept of false agency. Meanwhile, the experts in the coverage are solely male and predominantly Russian, pointing to an intersectional and unequal divide based on gender and nationality. Moreover, the analysis illuminates how fact-checking is used as a deliberate tool to legitimize the disinformative coverage within the discourse of information warfare in Russian state-aligned media." (Abstract)
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"Inhaltsanalysen über die Darstellung von Konflikten in den Medien werden häufig durchgeführt, um den Vorwurf der Einseitigkeit empirisch zu überprüfen. Dies wirft die normative Frage auf, wie die Forderung nach einer ausgewogenen Bewertung, d. h. einer Gleichverteilung positiver und negativer
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Bewertungen zwischen Kontrahenten, als Qualitätsmaßstab rechtfertigt werden kann und wie dies fallbezogen, d. h. kontextabhängig geschehen muss. Diese Frage wird am Beispiel von Inhaltsanalysen zum russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine diskutiert. In einer qualitativen Metastudie von 22 Inhaltsanalysen wurden zunächst induktiv acht Annahmen zur Rechtfertigung der Anwendung des Maßstabs für diesen Fall ermittelt. Vier davon beziehen sich auf das Verhältnis der Medien zu ihrer Umwelt: zur journalistischen Profession, der Medien untereinander sowie zum Publikum und zur Politik. Vier weitere Begründungen sind vom Verhältnis der Medien zum Krieg als Thema abgeleitet: zum normativ „richtigen“ und „falschen“ Handeln der Kontrahenten, zur Antizipation negativer Folgen, zum Framing des Kriegs als Machtkonflikt (statt als Konflikt um Werte) und aus der Position des Werterelativismus. Die Forderung nach einer ausgewogenen Bewertung war in den Studien häufig mit der Kritik an einer angeblich zu negativen Sicht der russischen Seite verknüpft. Die Diskussion der Fundstellen zeigt, dass die Argumente zur Rechtfertigung einer ausgewogenen Bewertung für den vorliegenden Fall nur begrenzt oder gar nicht tauglich sind. Damit kann die Studie zeigen, dass das Problem der „False Balance“nicht nur im Bereich des Wissens, sondern auch des Wertens zu finden ist. Außerdem ist „False Balance“ damit nicht nur ein Phänomen im Journalismus, sondern auch in der Wissenschaft." (Abstract)
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"The article is interested in the role of humour employed in memes on X by the government of Ukraine in the war following the invasion by Russia in 2022. It brings insights from cultural and humour studies as well as psychology into politics and shows how and what kind of humour the government aroun
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d President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a professional comedian, uses in their meme communication via social media in order to communicate with the public, seek global legitimacy and support, as well as depict and attack the enemy. It shows that the government uses a broad set of different humour types, styles and theories while completely avoiding self-deprecation as a humour style and humour which corresponds to relief theory. While this absence may not seem surprising at first in a situation of war in which there is a need to maintain tension towards the enemy, to galvanize support and avoid emphasizing own faults which might make it appear weak, the void of such forms of humour should be reconsidered. While this absence may not seem surprising during a war – a time in which there is a need to maintain tension towards the enemy, to galvanize support and to avoid emphasizing one’s own faults so as not to give the appearance of weakness – the void of such forms of humour should be reconsidered. The article calls for further research on the benefits and limitations of laughter in war. It argues that both relief theory and self-deprecation can be effective tools of crisis communication as these forms of humour can contribute to the portrayal of confidence and strength, while also providing a means of dealing with the difficult and traumatic experiences the population is facing in times of war." (Abstract)
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"Carole Grimaud propose une plongée au cour de la complexité des processus de réception médiatique dans un contexte où la perception et l'interprétation des informations sont soumises à une incertitude palpable. À travers une approche interdisciplinaire, cet ouvrage explore les dynamiques so
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us-jacentes à la formation des représentations et des croyances chez les récepteurs. En s'appuyant sur une étude qualitative approfondie, cette recherche analyse les influences exercées par les médias, les processus cognitifs impliqués dans le traitement de l'information et les mécanismes de régulation cognitive et métacognitive, offrant ainsi une vision nuancée des réactions du public face à la surmédiatisation de la guerre en Ukraine. Ce livre donne des clés de compréhension essentielles pour appréhender les enjeux de la réception médiatique en période de crise." (Description de la maison d'édition)
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"Political technology' is a Russian term for the professional engineering of politics. It has turned Russian politics into theatre and propaganda, and metastasised to take over foreign policy and weaponise history. The war against Ukraine is one outcome. In the West, spin doctors and political consu
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ltants do more than influence media or run campaigns: they have also helped build parallel universes of alternative political reality. Hungary has used political technology to dismantle democracy. The BJP in India has used it to consolidate unprecedented power. Different countries learn from each other. Some types of political technology have become notorious, like troll farms or data mining; but there is now a global wholesale industry selling a range of manipulation techniques, from astroturfing to fake parties to propaganda apps. This book shows that 'political technology' is about much more than online disinformation: it is about whole new industries of political engineering." (Publisher description)
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"A Saudi-led coalition of states initiated an on-going-armed conflict in Yemen on 26 March 2015. Meanwhile, Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Though no two armed conflicts are exactly alike, there is reason to compare US media coverage of the two because: (1) civilians have been victims of
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both conflicts; (2) both conflicts have undermined food security; (3) the US has provided military support to a party to each of the conflicts; and (4) the conflict in Yemen is in the Global South whereas the conflict in Ukraine is in the Global North. This article comparatively analyses US media coverage of the conflicts in Yemen and Ukraine, via New York Times headlines, by documenting the number of stories and their placement; assessing the types of media frames used; reviewing headlines for attribution of responsibility; and conducting a content analysis to identify the descriptive and normative terminology used. We find extensive biases in coverage and framing, rooted in peripheralism, culturalism and differential geopolitical US positioning. This results in reduced coverage of the war in Yemen, shielded in neutral language and lacking responsibility attribution—serving to devalue the suffering of victims and condemning the crisis to be functionally forgotten." (Abstract)
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"First of all, following a reform in 2020 that reorganised Ukraine’s districts, merging many of them to form larger ones, the situation on the map is not critical. There are indeed "unhealthy districts", but the overall situation is better than it could be. With the exception of the temporarily oc
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cupied territories, most districts are "healthy" or "partially healthy". One of the limitations of this study is that there was no immersion at the amalgamated hromada level. We believe that the situation would be worse on closer examination. Secondly, it is clear that districts with oblast centres are always "healthy". Each oblast centre has at least one independent editorial team – a regional branch of the public broadcasting company Suspilne and Ukrainian Radio. These meet the criteria of our methodology, being independent and covering most of the critical information needs. And that is the nature of centres of public life, due to the number of people living there and the logic of journalistic activity. In general, the names of settlements that are far from the centres (district towns, villages) receive fewer mentions in the media (and media research). In the 11 oblasts covered by this study, we found 879 editorial teams that are definitely functioning at present. The average number of operating editorial teams per oblast is 60-70, with 10 or fewer of them being what we consider independent. The majority of independent editorial teams were found in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts (14 and 13 respectively). The Kharkiv district (the area around and including the city of Kharkiv) is the "healthiest" of all the districts we studied, with 7 independent editorial teamsLuhansk and Dnipro oblasts have the least number of independent media outlets (3 and 7 respectively). In the case of Luhansk Oblast, many media outlets have simply ceased to exist due to the temporary occupation. Therefore, all the media outlets that actually serve the critical information needs of Luhansk Oblast residents are currently operating as internally displaced outlets outside their home oblast." (Overview of the oblasts)
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"In the evolving landscape of communication technology, the interplay between media and collective identity becomes crucial due to its ability to shape the socio-political dynamics of nations. This article aims to address the role of collective identity construction in Russian state media, arguing t
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hat it is a highly manipulated process in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that aims to shape the way the events are perceived by the Russian population. Through narrative analysis, the article aims to explore how the subject of Russian collective identity is constructed in the political talk show Evening with Vladimir Solovyov during the timeframe of one and a half years starting from the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The identified narratives constitute a complex structure that contributes to the construction of a particular Russian collective identity. While addressing different themes, overall, they shape public perceptions towards uniting individuals around particular ideas beneficial to the state and legitimising the actions of the Russian regime." (Abstract)
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"This volume addresses the concept of “(in)nocent lies” in the media – beyond the concept of misleading information online, this extends to a deliberate effort to spread misinformation, disinformation and conspiracy theories – and proposes a critical approach to tackle the issue in related i
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nterdisciplinary fields. The book takes a multidisciplinary and international approach, addressing the digital divide and global inequality, as well as algorithmic bias, how misinformation harms vulnerable groups, social lynching and the effect of misinformation on certain social, political and cultural agendas, among other topics. Arranged thematically, the chapters paint a nuanced and original picture of this issue." (Publisher description)
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"Key findings: Critical role of local media in addressing specific population needs, compared with national media which is increasingly seen as painting a false picture of reality. Audiences on the frontline feel excluded from national discourse. Ukrainians (57%) use local Telegram channels more tha
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n traditional media sources: only 34% often follow national media, and 38% often follow local media. Audiences express a deep need for positive news, such as culture, sports, leisure, and “dream projects.” Strong demand for inclusive dialogue between authorities and citizens, particularly on the use of public funds and tracking reconstruction projects. Internally displaced people (IDPs) and Russian-speaking Ukrainians are not perceived as potential sources of local tension." (Page 2)
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"During the six months of the gender-based disinformation study (January 1 – June 30, 2023), the following trends were revealed: A total of 42 cases of gendered disinformation were identified, of which 24 were homophobic and 18 were sexist or attacked women based on moral criteria. In most cases,
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the target of homophobic or gendered disinformation was the West, while false content related to Ukraine was predominantly homophobic. In connection with internal socio-political processes in Georgia, disinformation was directed against politicians, persons associated with them, journalists, and civic activists, who, in addition to disinformation, were targeted in discrediting campaigns." (Key findings, page 8)
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"Hate speech is more complex and diverse on social media. It spreads at high speed and can impact behaviors beyond the borders where it originates. Hate is ubiquitous, interactive, and multimedia. It is available 24/7, reaching a much larger audience. On social media, haters can be anonymous and fin
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d support from individuals with the same aggressive mindset. This is just a brief characterization and certainly presents many theoretical gaps that need improvement. This book explores the nature of hate speech on social media. Readers will find chapters written by 21 authors from 18 universities or research centers. It includes researchers from 11 countries, prioritizing a diversity of approaches from the Global North and Global South – Brazil, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA. The analyses herein involve the realities in an even larger number of countries, given the transnational approach of some of these studies." (Preface, page 13)
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"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. D
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iplomatic channels are an integral part of FIMI incidents. Russia's diplomatic channels regularly serve as enablers of FIMI operations. They are deployed across wide range of topics. China also uses diplomatic channels, mostly targeting the US. Impersonation techniques become more sophisticated. Impersonations of international and trusted organisations and individuals are used by Russian actors particularly to target Ukraine. Print and TV media are most often impersonated, with magazines seeing their entire style copied. FIMI actor collusion exists but is limited. Official Russian actors were involved in 88 analysed FIMI incidents. Chinese actors were involved in 17. In at least 5 cases, both actors engaged jointly. FIMI is multilingual. Incidents do not occur in just one language; content is translated and amplified in multiple languages. Incidents featured at least 30 languages, 16 of which are EU-languages. Russia used a larger variety of languages than Chinese actors but 44% of Russian content targeted a Russian-speaking populations, while 36% targeted English-speaking populations. FIMI is mostly intended to distract and distort. Russia (42%) and China (56%) mostly intend to direct attention to a different actor or narrative or to shift blame ('distract'). Russia attempts to change the framing and narrative ('distort') relatively more often (35%) than China (18%). FIMI remains mostly image and video based. The cheap and easy production and distribution of image and video material online makes these formats still the most commonly used." (Executive summary)
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