"As the ‘big three’ social media platforms Facebook, YouTube and Twitter increasingly lose their relevance for young users, other social media, especially Instagram, step up to fill this space. Our research showed that hate groups and extremists wishing to influence minors or young adults with t
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heir ideologies follow their target group to those platforms. It is a welcome step that Instagram joined the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online in 2018. Due to the increasing significance of this network and its relevance for children, future research on hate speech online should consider Instagram on a par with Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. As the social media with the broadest audience strengthen their moderation and removal policies to tackle hate speech, extremists and hate groups are looking for alternative solutions. They find these in networks which do not enforce their community guidelines as strictly or advocate a far-reaching free speech approach specifically allowing hate speech on their platforms. Those platforms are very diverse and appeal to different audiences in different countries. In some countries, dedicated websites are set up in order to facilitate the use of networks operated abroad and to mediate possible language barriers." (Conclusion, page 11)
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"Digitale Kommunikation spielt in unserem Alltag eine immer größere Rolle. Vor allem Jugendliche nutzen insbesondere das Internet zum Austausch mit Freund*innen als Informationsquelle und zur Unterhaltung. Extremistische Akteure wissen das und nutzen Internet-Plattformen und -Dienste zur Kommunika
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tion, zur Rekrutierung neuer Mitglieder, zur Verbreitung von propagandistischem Material, zur Agitation und zur Vernetzung untereinander. Sie profitieren dabei von einer (größtenteils) unkontrollierten, schnellen und kostengünstigen Informationsvermittlung nahezu in Echtzeit und über Ländergrenzen hinweg sowie einer (vermeintlichen) Anonymität. Laut Verfassungsschutz nutzen extremistische Akteure das Internet um zu mobilisieren und potentielle Anhänger*innen hinzuzugewinnen." (Einführung)
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"The most extreme damage inflicted by social media can be seen in South Sudan. As documented in the chapter by Theo Dolan, social media in South Sudan has contributed to hatred and conflict among ethnic groups. Many investigators, including UN investigators, have warned that South Sudan's social med
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ia are triggering violence against ethnic groups. Since the beginning of the civil war in late 2013, social media has fuelled waves of hate speech that have provoked deadly violence and ethnic conflict in South Sudan, including massacres and other atrocities. In that sense, social media has become a new variation of the "hate radio" phenomenon that flourished in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide … Social media is also emerging as a powerful way to harass and intimidate the opponents of a regime or a political party. In this sense, it adds another weapon to the arsenal of a powerful regime that already has multiple weapons at its disposal. A regime can mobilize its supporters to use social media in a targeted way against its foes, or it can use its financial resources to create a fake army of fictional users on social media. In either case, it is tilting the playing field against its enemies. A targeted attack through social media can be more effective than the telephone threats or messages often deployed in the past. The use of social media can be more intimidating because it belittles the targeted person in front of a much bigger audience. The presence of this audience means that the attack is more damaging, more difficult to ignore and has the potential to mobilize large numbers of people against the victim … While social media is often used for anti-democratic purposes in Africa's authoritarian states, it has also been used as a force for reform, accountability and justice. It has helped to safeguard the fairness of elections. It has allowed greater scrutiny of potential threats, such as vote-rigging or violence, allowing citizens to be alerted when there is still a chance to prevent the worst abuses. It has put a spotlight on corruption and political wrongdoing, allowing activists to mobilize pressure on governments to resolve these long-neglected problems. In some cases, as it did in the Arab Spring, social media has played a role in toppling an authoritarian state. When an election was called in the small West African state of Gambia, where the dictator Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years, opposition candidates had little access to state-controlled media. So the main opposition party created more than a dozen WhatsApp groups, allowing it to communicate with voters. Other forms of social media also proliferated. A leading independent group, the Gambia Youth and Women's Forum, discussed election issues on a public Facebook group with 55,000 members. The government blocked access to WhatsApp and eventually extended the shutdown to the entire internet, but Gambians used virtual private network (VPN) technology to bypass the shutdown. The opposition won the election and Jammeh was forced to flee the country." (Pages 419-423)
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"Julia Ebner verfolgt hauptberuflich Extremisten. Undercover mischt sie sich unter Hacker, Terroristen, Trolle, Fundamentalisten und Verschwörer, sie kennt die Szenen von innen, von der Alt-Right-Bewegung bis zum Islamischen Staat, online wie offline. Ihr Buch macht Radikalisierung fassbar, es ist
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Erfahrungsbericht, Analyse, unmissverständlicher Weckruf. Als Extremismusforscherin stellen sich ihr folgende Fragen: Wie rekrutieren, wie mobilisieren Extremisten ihre Anhänger? Was ist ihre Vision der Zukunft? Mit welchen Mitteln wollen sie diese Vision erreichen? Um Antworten zu finden, schleust sich Julia Ebner ein in zwölf radikale Gruppierungen quer durch das ideologische Spektrum. Sozusagen von der anderen Seite beobachtet sie Planungen terroristischer Anschläge, Desinformationskampagnen, Einschüchterungsaktionen, Wahlmanipulationen. Sie erkennt, Radikalisierung folgt einem klaren Skript: Rekrutierung, Sozialisierung, Kommunikation, Mobilisierung, Angriff." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"The evidence amounts to a persuasive refutation of the commonly held beliefs that radio had widespread, direct effects and that hate radio was the primary driver of the genocide and participation in it. That said, the evidence suggests radio had some marginal and conditional effects. RTLM broadcast
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s instigated certain attacks, particularly in and around the capital. The survey research shows statistically significant correlations between radio incitement and higher levels of violence among perpetrators. From that, it might be deduced that RTLM catalyzed some key agents of violence in some locations. Qualitative analysis additionally shows that a minority of the survey genocide perpetrators believed radio coordinated elites and signaled that authorities wanted the population to fight "the Tutsi enemy." In sum, then, the positive evidence of radio media effects is that radio instigated a limited number of acts of violence, catalyzed some key actors, coordinated elites, and bolstered local messages of violence. Based on these findings, it is plausible to hypothesize that radio had conditional and marginal effects. Radio did not cause the genocide or have direct, massive effects. Rather, radio emboldened hard-liners and reinforced face-to-face mobilization, which helped those who advocated violence assert dominance and carry out the genocide." (Page 123)
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"Policy discourse about disinformation focuses heavily on the technological dimensions of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, this myopic focus on technology has led to insufficient attention being paid to the underlying human factors driving the success of state-sponsored disin
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formation campaigns. Academic research on disinformation strongly suggests that belief in false or misleading information is driven more by individual emotional and cognitive responses — amplified by macro social, political and cultural trends — than specific information technologies. Thus, attention given to countering the distribution and promulgation of disinformation through specific technological platforms, at the expense of understanding the human factors at play, hampers the ability of public diplomacy efforts countering it. This article addresses this lacuna by reviewing the underlying psychology of three common types of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and identifying lessons for designing effective public diplomacy counter-strategies in the future." (Abstract)
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"The cases discussed in this chapter have demonstrated how disinformation and rhetoric that is spread through social media in the developing world often meets the Benesch criteria for dangerous speech. It comes from influential sources, which can include family and friends who share it. It plays on
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audience fears by persuading them that members of their group are being attacked by a rival group. It sometimes dehumanizes other groups and issues direct calls for violence against them. It happens where there are longstanding ethnic tensions and grievances. And where the media landscape is weak or suppressed, social media becomes a primary source of information, making it an especially influential means of transmission. There are several characteristics shared by developing countries, particularly those with a recent history of conflict and/or government repression, that make them more vulnerable to dangerous speech spread by social media. This includes low media or digital literacy, a lack of available alternative media and the prevalence of untraceable messaging platforms such as WhatsApp." (Conclusion)
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"In the months before Myanmar's national elections in November 2015, Khin Oo says she began to engage directly with Facebook users to dispel rumours and misinformation that, in her view, propagated hate and inflamed intercommunal tensions. She posted "right speech" and "right information" by comment
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ing on other users' comments and posts to correct misunderstandings and challenge errors and misinformation. Khin Oo is one of several Facebook commenters or social media activists I spoke with in 2015 and 2016 who identified themselves as working to counter hate speech. Some are Muslim, but some are not; in fact some are monks worried about protecting their religion. Many are youths and students, but some are older, in their 30s and 40s. They all, however, collectively feel the weight of the future of their country. They desperately want to take action against online hate speech and the spread of misinformation. These individuals, almost all of whom asked to remain unnamed, describe their work as "sharing" new points of view and "talking about different ideas". A review of some of the posts and comments they have distributed and collected, however, shows they are much more intentional and strategic about their actions." (Page 379)
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"Thorben Prenzel stellt in seinem Buch die Triple-A-Methode vor, die eine einfache Handlungsanleitung für den Alltag bietet. Diese verständliche Schritt-für-Schritt Anleitung hilft Ihnen, gekonnt die richtigen Argumente zur richtigen Zeit anzubringen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
"In recent years, the Danish cartoons affair, the Charlie Hebdo murders and the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris have resulted in increasingly strident anti-Islamic speeches by politicians. This raises questions about the limits to freedom of expression and whether this freedom can and should
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be restricted to protect the religious feelings of believers. This book uses the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to provide a comprehensive analysis of the questions: whether legal prohibitions of religious hate speech violate the right to freedom of expression; and, whether such laws should be used to prosecute politicians and others who contribute to current debates when they use anti-Islam rhetoric. A well-known politician who uses such rhetoric is Dutch politician Geert Wilders. He has been prosecuted twice for hate speech, and was acquitted in the first case and recently convicted in the second. These prosecutions are used to illustrate the issues involved in drawing the line between freedom of expression and religious hate speech. The author argues that freedom of expression of politicians and those contributing to the public debate should not be restricted except in two very limited circumstances: when they incite to hatred or violence and there is an imminent danger that violence will follow or where it stops people from holding or manifesting their religion. Based on this, the author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights should decide, if it is asked to do so, that Wilders conviction for hate speech violates his freedom of expression." (Publisher description)
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"This report focuses on the interactional dynamics between anti-Muslim extremists and radical Islamists in Germany and beyond. It reveals ideological underpinnings, approaches to mobilization and communication patterns, which all prove to be analogous on both sides, and it places emphasis on the rec
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iprocity of hate that may serve to intensify processes of individual and group radicalization. Our study presents the first systematic analysis of the interplay between both forms of extremism that plays out on different places on the Internet. It provides direct evidence showing that Islamist and far-right movements converge at different levels and mutually amplify one another. The analysis focuses on measuring the online interaction between extremist content, individuals and events. Overall, over 10,000 Islamist and far-right Facebook posts and over one million German anti-Muslim tweets between 1 January 2013 and 30 November 2017 were analyzed for this study. Additionally, we conducted three months of ethnographic research into encrypted pro-IS and pro-Al-Qaeda groups on Telegram as well as into far-right chat groups.
Key Findings
Radical Islamism and anti-Muslim racism, which manifest themselves in the form of far-right extremism and right-wing populism exhibit a symbiotic relationship. In the context of glocal interaction patterns, the far right operates as a national sphere of resonance for international jihadism. Both negate and dismantle basic democratic values such as the inviolability of human dignity and religious freedom. What’s more, racism against Muslims paves the way for radicalization through Islamic fundamentalists. We identified three key patterns that reveal common worldviews and argumentative resemblance: First, the demonization of enemies based on a clear distinction between friend and foe. Second, the victimization of one’s own group as both sides take advantage of the alleged discrimination of their own group and the constructed dominance of the other. Third, conspiracy, which is the basic explanation provided for why the respective milieus do not share their exclusionary claim to truth. The alleged systematic blindness caused by the Jews or fake news are needed to balance the dissonance between claims and reality as well as to contribute to demonizing other groups." (Executive summary)
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