"The study is comprised of three main parts: a desk study of available and accessible material – reports, documents and media material; a qualitative study comprising over 200 interviews with ordinary people, experts, and persons with direct experience with radicalization leading to violent extrem
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ism (RVE); and a quantitative component consisting of national surveys of people’s information consumption habits. For the desk study, the effort was made to gain as broad a picture as possible, that is, to cover all five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, predictably and unfortunately, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan proved difficult cases to study in full. For both the qualitative and quantitative field research activities, for several reasons, only the first three countries were included. As a result, this study is able to report most robustly on these three countries and propose observations regarding Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan only to a limited extent. Based on the desk study, the drivers of extremist sympathies as established in existing research have been political grievances (injustice from state structures; identity-based discrimination; oppressive political regimes, etc), economic difficulties (unemployment; indebtedness; poverty; and desire for quick and greater income) and ideological motivations (resentment of false values; striving for the singularly just and true life; for reward in a perceived afterlife). To these push and pull factors are added a range of enabling factors, such as migration, young age, gender (women), and means of communication. All these drivers of RVE need to be treated with caution, as stressed by various authors and suggested by evidence gained in field research. A general observation, gained from the desk research and supported by evidence in both qualitative and quantitative field studies, was the difference among the countries in degree of control over the information space, or the degree of hegemony over public discourse. Of the three most fully studied countries, hegemonic discourse was the strongest in Tajikistan, followed by Kazakhstan, and the least in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan, analyzed to a limited extent, would be closer to the extreme of Tajikistan, whereas Turkmenistan was too closed to make reasonably robust observations." (Page 3)
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"Die Medien und die breite Öffentlichkeit zeigen sich oftmals verwundert über die Perfektion der IS-Propaganda. Dabei wird übersehen, dass der Medienkrieg des Pseudo-Islamischen Staats auf einer ‚Großen Erzählung', einer ‚Meistererzählung' basiert, an der dschihadistische Organisationen se
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it beinahe 40 Jahren arbeiten. Die Entwicklung der dschihadistischen Propaganda lässt sich in fünf Phasen unterteilen. Die erste fällt mit dem 1979 bis 1989 gegen die Sowjetunion geführten Afghanistankrieg zusammen. Mehrere in dieser Zeit erschienene Filme setzen den von Abdallah Azzam, dem ‚Vater des modernen Dschihad', theoretisch begründeten Märtyrerkult ins Bild. Die zweite Phase umfasst den Bürgerkrieg in Bosnien von 1992 bis 1995: die Videopropaganda wird professionalisiert und erstmals werden Muslime außerhalb dschihadistischer Kreise erreicht. Die dritte Phase, 1996 bis 2002, fällt in die Jahre des zweiten Aufenthalts Bin Ladens in Afghanistan und Pakistan und kulminiert in den Anschlägen des 11. September 2001. Al-Qaida versucht vorzugeben, die einzig wahre muslimische Glaubensgemeinschaft zu sein. Die vierte Phase nimmt ihren Anfang mit der US-Invasion im Irak 2003 und dauert bis etwa 2007 an. Sie zeichnet sich durch eine Globalisierung der Propaganda, eine starke Präsenz im Web und das Auf treten des sogenannten ‚Pop-Dschihad' aus. Die fünfte und bis heute andauernde Phase beginnt 2010 und fällt mit zwei entscheidenden Entwicklungen zusammen: der durch die Entstehung des Web 2.0 bedingten massenhaften Nutzung der sozialen Netzwerke und dem wachsenden Einfluss des Dschihadismus im Zuge der Umwälzungen in der arabischen Welt." (Seite 147)
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"Efforts to fight the spread of disinformation have had mixed results. Self-regulation by online platforms such as Twitter or Facebook puts a great deal of power in their hands, with potentially negative effects on independent news outlets that depend on social media for their outreach. State regula
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tion, meanwhile, raises concerns of censorship. There is a danger that methods intended to reduce disinformation, implemented clumsily or without sufficient regard for their effects, will actually exacerbate the anti-establishment feeling that drives disinformation in the first place. Just as the disinformation problem can, to a great extent, be traced back to wider structural faults in the political system, the solution, too, must be partly structural. There must be a shift in commercial practices to disrupt the commercial motivations driving disinformation, make online platforms more fair, transparent and open, and reduce the pressure on media outlets to compete for attention." (Executive summary)
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"Based on ethnographic research on Islamist buzzers – social media political operators tasked with making particular online conversation subjects trend – in Indonesia, this article details the process of how the proliferation of insensitive message in both the online and offline realms plays a r
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ole in mobilizing those sympathetic to religious fundamental-ism. As this research shows, the interviewed buzzers were one of the driving forces behind the massive success of the fundamentalist Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) as they mobilized people to participate in the organization’s political rallies between 2016 and 2017. Driven by altruistic volunteerism and sense of community, these actors go beyond their duty as click-farmers. They maintain regular contact with sympathizers and convincing them to revive broken weblinks, hang banners on streets as part of astroturfing campaigns and gather masses to attend offline events. Detailing the activity and spatiality of buzzers in crafting new online and offline spaces as part of their innovative bottom-up propaganda management, this research concludes that right-wing political mobilization and radicalization are not simply the product of ideology but are catalyzed by technically and socially tedious, mediated messaging campaigns." (Abstract)
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"Ce guide, conçu à partir d'une collecte des données sur l'expression de la haine en ligne sous toutes ses formes, et de leur analyse, propose des modules simples à comprendre afin d'accompagner celles et ceux qui le souhaitent dans la création d'un réseau virtuel d'échange pacifié. Les reco
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mmandations présentes ici ne se limitent pas à l'expression de la haine en ligne mais abordent toutes les formes de violences qui peuvent exister car c'est en prévenant la violence ordinaire qu'il est possible d'enrayer la violence idéologique, principal terreau de la confrontation meurtrière entre les peuples." (Préface, page 9)
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"The primary questions driving this assessment are: What are the principal drivers of extremism in Mauritania? What are the principal social fractures that have been, or could be, exploited by extremists? The table below displays the overall main drivers of VE in Mauritania, as well as the five subn
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ational assessment sites (Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, Trarza, Hodh el-Gharbi, and Assaba). Poor governance and relative deprivation are among the most pervasive push factors identified in this assessment, while ideology and social media are the main pull factors [...] The second main assessment question is: What is the role of the Mauritania media landscape within the context of VE? Section 4 addresses this question through a thorough assessment of the overall media landscape in Mauritania. We found that the Mauritanian media has the potential to be a key actor in efforts to counter VE in Mauritania. However, it needs a lot of capacity building and professionalization in order to be effective." (Pages 8-10)
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"This review seeks to inform United States Agency for International Development (USAID) evaluation of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming in Asia and globally by exploring two research questions: 1. Under current conditions, is it possible to develop a model or methodology to test the rel
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ationship between CVE programming and extremist violence? 2. What high-level outcomes other than violence reduction might be linked to CVE programming? What approaches could be used to measure such outcomes? USAID defines violent extremism (VE) as “…advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic, and political objectives.” In practice, the threat posed by religiously motivated violent extremist groups has drawn primary concern. Violent religious extremism can and often does function in combination with aggrieved ethnic identity groups pursuing communal advantages. VE’s defining elements include a desire to reorder society in line with a given ideology and the interests of the group proclaiming the ideology, pursuit of sociopolitical and economic objectives, and a willingness and capacity to use violence as a tactic to pursue these objectives. How individual and community incentives and risk factors, structural conditions, enabling factors, and external triggers interact to produce extremist beliefs, support for VE actors and actions, recruitment into a violent extremist organization (VEO), or violence itself is not fully understood. Correspondingly, CVE programs occur in diverse settings and encompass a variety of interventions and intermediate outcomes. The amount of USAID financial investment in CVE programming in a given country is often small relative to the scale and complexity of the VE problem and its drivers, limiting the change to which a program can aspire and for which it might reasonably be held accountable." (Executive summary)
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"The Islamic State's media strategy allows for a message that has been crafted by a handful of IS propaganda agents to be disseminated by a few primary distributors, who in turn can reach thousands of unaffiliated sympathizers, and therefore millions of Twitter users. By means of a conclusion, this
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chapter offers four short considerations on countering some of the different actors involved in the process. First, given the highly centralized nature of IS media production, which is most likely spearheaded by a handful of well-trained, technologically savvy and talented individuals, IS media production efforts would be very sensitive to the removal of these individuals [...] Second, although there is some anecdotal evidence that banning social media accounts is an effective way to curtail the activities of unaffiliated sympathizers, relying solely on social media companies to combat the spread of extremist material on their platforms not only raises questions regarding free speech, but would also give these companies the power to control public knowledge and discourse [...] Third, and on a related note, none of the so-called "lone wolf" attacks in Western countries were perpetrated by individuals who were actively involved in disseminating IS propaganda. In fact, it may well be that distributing jihadist material is an alternate mode of participation for individuals who are unwilling to engage in actual violence [...] Finally, although the Islamic State's military defeat appears imminent, one of the greatest mistakes of the "War on Terror" was the belief that the destruction of al-Qaeda's training camps and leadership would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated movements and its ideology." (Conclusion)
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"This review presents the existing research on the role of the Internet in radicalization processes. Using a systematic literature search strategy, our paper yields 88 studies on the role of the Internet in a) right-wing extremism and b) radical jihadism. Available studies display a predominant inte
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rest in the characteristics of radical websites and a remarkable absence of a user-centred perspective. They show that extremist groups make use of the Internet to spread right wing or jihadist ideologies, connect like-minded others in echo chambers and cloaked websites, and address particularly marginalized individuals of a society, with specific strategies for recruitment. Existing studies have thus far not sufficiently examined the users of available sites, nor have they studied the causal mechanisms that unfold at the intersection between the Internet and its users. The present review suggests avenues for future research, drawing on media and violence research and research on social identity and deindividuation effects in computer-mediated communication." (Abstract)
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"Strategic communications for the purpose of countering violent extremism have become widespread in recent years, especially given the communications revolution which has amplified the messages of violent extremists and those that wish to counter them. Despite this, there is little-to-no research wh
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ich collects message data and analyses its design in a systematic way. In this article, we collect data from 10 social media multi-message campaigns and undertake an exploratory analysis of their design using a methodology developed from Ingram’s “Linkage-based” framework for countering militant Islamist propaganda. Our findings include: a prevalence towards highlighting the atrocities of violent extremist groups rather than strategies which challenge their competence; a priority to messages which seize the narrative agenda; differing emotional or rational pulls depending on the language in which the message is delivered; a range of different tactics employed depending on the target audience; as well as a wide range of deployments of different themes of positive and negative messages. We offer a number of possible explanations for these findings, before undertaking a cluster analysis of the data to aid the construction of Weberian “ideal type” campaigns, which offer a contribution to the field for the purposes of future research and exposition." (Abstract)
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"Recent studies suggest that empathy induced by narrative messages can effectively facilitate persuasion and reduce psychological reactance. Although limited, emerging research on the etiology of radical political behavior has begun to explore the role of narratives in shaping an individual’s beli
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efs, attitudes, and intentions that culminate in radicalization. The existing studies focus exclusively on the influence of narrative persuasion on an individual, but they overlook the necessity of empathy and that in the absence of empathy, persuasion is not salient. We argue that terrorist organizations are strategic in cultivating empathetic-persuasive messages using audiovisual materials, and disseminating their message within the digital medium. Therefore, in this paper we propose a theoretical model and analytical framework capable of helping us better understand the neurocognitive process of digital radicalization." (Abstract)
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"Der sogenannte Islamische Staat nutzt in seiner Kommunikationsstrategie vor allem eine Form von direkter Zielgruppenansprache über eigens produzierte Videos und Nachrichtenkanäle. Die Verwendung von massenmedialen Multiplikatoren ist zwar weiterhin ein wichtiger Bestandteil zur Verbreitung von An
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gst, die der Terrorismus evozieren will; allerdings eröffnet diese Möglichkeit der direkten Kommunikation eine völlig neue Ansprache der Rezipienten. Bei der Verbreitung über traditionelle Massenmedien muss seitens der Terroristen eine ausgleichende Berichterstattung in Kauf genommen werden – das klassische Medien-Framing. Dagegen können bei direkter Ansprache relevanter Publika strategische Kommunikator-Frames und Narrative gesetzt werden. Über die Wirkung von Propaganda wird nach wie vor debattiert. Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob diese Botschaften grundlegend anders auf Rezipienten wirken als Medienberichte, in denen ebenfalls ideologische Botschaften kommuniziert werden. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird in einem experimentellen Design die Wirkung terroristischer Kommunikationsinhalte auf die Emotionen der Rezipienten untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen unter anderem, dass strategische Kommunikator-Frames negative Emotionen verstärken können. Politisches Wissen und Themeninteresse können jedoch diese Reaktionen und damit die Hauptwirkungskomponente des Terrorismus – die Angst – reduzieren." (Abstract)
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"The report is split into three chapters: chapter one looks at over one hundred different campaigns, highlighting effective and successful campaigns, and the evaluations of them where possible. Those that are not evaluated can be used as inspiration. The categorisation of the different campaigns was
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difficult, therefore within the chapter itself the campaigns have been categorised into 12 different topics, however in the bibliography they are categorised by the country that they originated in. In order to visualise how many campaigns fell into two different categories, the campaign crossover table was created. It is important to note that some of the campaigns in the table may also have fallen into a third category as well, but this has not been displayed. Chapter two identifies training resources and articles that lay out the current state of thinking on the following six different topics: counter/alternative narratives, disinformation resources, good/best practices, current thinking, educational resources and toolkits, and finally, resources discussing online radicalisation. Chapter three provides summaries and key takeaways from the three round table discussions we conducted in Brussels, London and The Hague [...] Finally, as a result of the knowledge gathered in this report, the conclusion and recommendations lay out the necessary components for building a successful, effective, and impactful campaign, in the hopes that it will be informative and useful for future campaigners and trainers." (Introduction)
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"Conflict in Yemen plays out along various fault lines—regional, sectarian, class, political, tribal, and ethnic—which are reflected in the hateful language employed on and offline to incite violence. The sectarian aspect of conflict in Yemen is relatively new, as prior to 2011, “religious coe
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xistence and intermingling was taken for granted by most Yemenis and seen as a normal feature of everyday life.” But with the outbreak of conflict after the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, “sectarian discourse has become more heated, reorganizing Yemeni society along sectarian lines and rearranging people’s relationships to one another on a non-nationalist basis.” Furthermore, the social and political dynamics in Yemen have fostered a permissive environment for hate speech. According to information gathered from a community meeting held in Sana’a in 2015, “many leaders have normalized and legitimized antagonistic, exclusionary rhetoric to consolidate their power and dehumanize their enemies.” In terms of access to online networks, despite a weak telecommunications sector relative to other Middle Eastern countries, an estimated 90 percent of the Yemeni population has access to the internet through mobile phones and, as of 2015, 93 percent of internet users are on Facebook and 92 percent utilize WhatsApp. The heavy saturation of these online communications networks highlights a growing need to understand and address the hate speech being spread within Yemen’s complex context. PeaceTech Lab’s work on hateful speech aims to identify and contextualize the particular terms and phrases that have the potential to lead to violence. This project identifies relevant terms through on-the-ground information gathering and examines their origins, context, and usages in a particular country environment. To successfully monitor and counter hateful speech, we must first identify specific terms and the social and political context that makes them offensive, inflammatory, and potentially dangerous. The research also seeks to identify alternative terms that might be used to mitigate or replace this language and thereby contribute to building peace. Finally, this report is intended as a resource for individuals and organizations involved in monitoring and combatting hateful speech as well as those involved in conflict prevention and mitigation so that their work can be more effective." (Introduction)
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"PeaceTech Lab’s work on hate speech aims to identify and contextualize the particular types of language that are likely to cause violence. This project identifies relevant terms through on-theground information gathering and examines their origins, background context, and use in a particular coun
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try environment. To successfully monitor and counter hateful speech, we must first identify specific terms and the social and political context that makes them offensive, inflammatory, or even potentially dangerous. The research also seeks to identify alternative terms that would mitigate or replace this language and thereby contribute to building peace. Finally, this report is intended as a resource for individuals and organizations involved in monitoring and combatting hateful speech so that their work can be more effective." (Introduction)
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"This report — Social Media and Conflict in South Sudan II: A Lexicon of Hate Speech Terms 2017-2018 — follows on its predecessor which was released in December 2016 after three years of civil war in South Sudan. It identifies key terms being used in the conflict, as well as new terms, context,
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and dynamics in South Sudan’s conflict over the period of 2017-2018." (Introduction)
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"South Africa’s upcoming general election marks 25 years of multi-racial democracy: a milestone which has us reflecting on how far the country has come - and how far it has to go. Despite real and lasting achievements, problems of massive economic inequalities, disparities in land ownership, and h
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igh unemployment persist and are exacerbated by issues like migration and the climate crisis. It’s within this context that hateful language has spiked; certain politicians and members of the public have pushed anti-immigrant rhetoric while others have called for the expropriation without compensation of white-owned land, leading to fears that the chasms between and among South Africa’s political, social, and economic classes will only grow larger. In response, PeaceTech Lab partnered with South Africa’s Media Monitoring Africa to examine the origins, context, and influence of hateful speech in the country. [This publication] pairs social media analysis with in-depth qualitative research to help everyone - from civil society activists to government officials - in their efforts to address the surging problem of hate speech." (Publisher description)
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