"Trust in the media varies across the region, with citizens in BiH, Serbia and North Macedonia divided in around half of those that trust and half of those that distrust the media, and a higher number of citizens in Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania having trust in the media. The highest trust is expre
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ssed by citizens in Kosovo (64% of citizens trust and 35% distrust the media) and the lowest in BiH (48% of citizens that trust, compared to 49% that distrust the media). Similarly, trust in the public service broadcaster varies across the region, being the highest in Kosovo (76%) and the lowest in BiH and Montenegro (in BiH between 32% for RTRS and 43% for RTVFBiH, and 48% in Montenegro). In some countries of the region, there is a clear division of trust-distrust in the public service broadcaster indicative of an ethnic and/or political divide." (Page 19)
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"The legislative framework for the regulation of hate speech in BiH is fragmented and unaligned with European standards, and there are few cases of its processing. Ways to combat disinformation mainly rely on self-regulatory frameworks and fact-checking platforms, and there are no comprehensive stra
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tegies to combat disinformation. Given the large presence of hate speech and disinformation, especially in the online sphere, which can affect the democratic processes in the country, it is necessary to improve the legislative, regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks and ways of their application. Bosnia and Herzegovina is obliged to adopt appropriate solutions in accordance with international conventions, recommendations of international bodies and standards of the European Court of Human Rights." (Conclusion, page 21)
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"The 2021 Europe & Eurasia Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) publication stands on the shoulders of IREX’s almost 20 years of the Media Sustainability Index (MSI), which was last published in 2019. Through VIBE, IREX aims to capture a modern era where many people around the world are simultaneo
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usly producers, transmitters, consumers, and actors of the information that shapes their environments and their lives. At the start of the VIBE project, IREX engaged with USAID in an extensive methodology development process, the result of which is this VIBE 2021 publication. A senior methodology consultant with an extensive background in monitoring and evaluation led the development process, which involved expertise from USAID in Washington and overseas, and peer reviews by U.S. and European media and information experts. Building on the MSI’s strengths, the VIBE methodology relies primarily on information from country experts who complete a VIBE questionnaire, provide scores for 20 indicators1 (which are averages of panelists’ scores on supporting sub-indicators), and evidence to justify their scores; they then contribute to a panel discussion led by a moderator. In light of the global pandemic of 2020 and 2021, almost all panel discussions were held online. In a new feature of VIBE, IREX introduced a strength of evidence (SoE) rating to each indicator, which is meant to increase transparency about the potential subjectivity of some indicators (and especially indicators measuring newer concepts or newer sources of information). For each expert-opinion indicator, moderators assigned a SoE rating—Weak, Somewhat Weak, Somewhat Strong, or Strong—based on the quality of evidence informing each indicator, the confidence of panelists in their scores, and the level of consensus across the panel." (Executive summary, page 8)
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"The current report illuminates the scope, means, and reach of Russia’s sharp power influence through the phenomenon of media capture. It traces the regime’s malign impact on good governance and democratic development in eight Southeast European countries (EU members: Bulgaria and Croatia, as we
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ll as EU aspirants: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo). An understanding of the Kremlin’s media influence has been developed based on the assessment of: (1) the instruments that Russia deploys to expand its influence over public discourses; (2) the channels and narratives of Russian disinformation utilized to sway views of the West and its key institutions, the EU and NATO; (3) the impact of Kremlin narratives on societal perceptions; (4) the amplification of Russian media influence through a convergence with the disinformation activities of other authoritarian states, particularly China. The cross-country regional comparison reveals several key similarities in Russia’s media capture tactics. The Kremlin typically deploys informal instruments of influence. These are manifested in the cultivation of opaque local oligarchic networks, rather than through traceable ownership of SEE media companies. To amplify the impact of these informal tools, Russia has also leveraged the dependence of media outlets in the region on advertising revenue from Russian-owned or dependent companies to exert pressure on their editorial policy. In addition, Russian state-owned propaganda outlets make their content freely available for republishing in local languages, which facilitates the uptake of pro-Russian media content." (Executive summary)
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"From August 2020 until August this summer, we recorded almost 800 cases of digital rights violations in eight countries of south-eastern Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. Violations took place not just on TikTok, but also on F
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acebook, Twitter and Instagram and were also spread via Viber and WhatsApp. Our report shows that vulnerable groups, including women, minority groups, LGBT +, Roma and Jewish communities, minors and migrants, are particularly exposed to online attacks. Similarly, political and religious tensions, which still continue to mark the cultural and political life of our societies, also surged, further polarising society. All of this suggests that what happens in the virtual space is not much different from the “physical world”. Ongoing tensions and cultural controversies are simply migrating from one place to another and prevention or protection mechanisms are far from successful. It comes as no surprise that the two most common violations this year were “pressure because of expression and activities on the internet” and “manipulation and propaganda in the digital environment”. Journalists were most frequently the target of online threats in two countries – Serbia and Hungary. In both countries, pro-government social media accounts were involved in smear campaigns against independent journalists." (Foreword, page 4)
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"The book depicts and reflects the media change by concentrating on five main topics: the development of the media market, the relationship between media and politics, the establishment of public broadcasters, the status of the journalistic profession and the role of digitalisation and the internet.
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The publication provides a chronological background and outlines the characteristics of the media landscape in each of the ten countries monitored by the KAS Media Programme: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Romania and Serbia. Furthermore, the authors - media experts from the respective countries - address the following key questions, considering the fact that some countries have already joined the European Union: What is the state of the media today? What is their contribution to democracy, how viable are they, what has been achieved? - Important questions for all media experts in the region, but also for everyone who is interested in the media change in South East Europe. “The result is a broad historical overview that impressively documents how differentiated and how fast the change has taken place. It is closely linked to the social transformation process as a whole, which has not yet been completed in any of the countries”, says Hendrik Sittig, Head of the Media Programme South East Europe of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. "Moreover, it must unfortunately be said that the hope that accession to the European Union would be accompanied by rapid alignment with the other EU countries has not been fulfilled." (https://www.kas.de)
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"The agenda for transition after the demise of communism in the Western Balkans made the conversion of state radio and television into public service broadcasters a priority, converting mouthpieces of the regime into public forums in which various interests and standpoints could be shared and delibe
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rated. There is general agreement that this endeavor has not been a success. Formally, the countries adopted the legal and institutional requirements of public service media according to European standards. The ruling political elites, however, retained their control over the public media by various means. Can this trend be reversed? Instead of being marginalized or totally manipulated, can public service media become vehicles of genuine democratization? A comparison of public service media in seven countries (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) addresses these important questions." (Publisher description)
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"Misinformation is a lucrative business in several Eastern European countries, reliant on advertising revenue, and pulling in cash from a variety of other sources including government subsidies, crowdfunding, tax designations, donations and sales of merchandise. The Business of Misinformation projec
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t, run by the Center for Media, Data and Society (CMDS), set out in its first phase to map the misinformation business in six countries: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. Our researches identified the individuals and businesses that own local misinformation websites and their links to institutions, parties and other individuals." (Publisher description)
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"This rapid literature review explores the role that media in the Western Balkans plays in issues of gender (in)equality. The countries discussed are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia [...] While there is a body of literature that discusses a
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ccess of men and women to media spaces (e.g. airtime and news headlines) and moreover media portrayals of gender groups within the region, there is very limited research on barriers to gender equality within the media sector itself and on media initiatives aimed at promoting gender equality. As such, the barriers section in this report also draws on discussion of gender equality in the region generally; and on issues with the media in the region generally. There are implicit linkages that can be made, however. For example, the persistence of gender inequality and traditional patriarchy throughout the region influences how the media operates and in turn is reflected in the media ..." (Summary, page 2)
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"Disinformation is an endemic and ubiquitous part of politics throughout the Western Balkans, without exception. A mapping of the disinformation and counter-dis in for mation landscapes in the region in the period from 2018 through 2020 reveals three key disinformation challenges: external challenge
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s to EU credibility; disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic; and the impact of disinformation on elections and referenda. While foreign actors feature prominently – chiefly Russia, but also China, Turkey, and other countries in and near the region – the bulk of disinformation in the Western Balkans is produced and disseminated by domestic actors for domestic purposes. Further, disinformation (and information disorder more broadly) is a symptom of social and political disorder, rather than the cause. As a result, the European Union should focus on the role that it can play in bolstering the quality of democracy and governance in the Western Balkans, as the most powerful potential bulwark against disinformation." (Abstract)
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"Independent media outlets in the Western Balkans are facing major challenges to their financial sustainability. With the exception of some of the largest broadcasters with national coverage and the most visited online media, the majority of media outlets across the region are not sustainable busine
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sses. In particular, local media outlets, media engaged in niche reporting and/or those critical of the government are unable to generate sufficient advertising revenues. Media outlets in the region operate within a dysfunctional media system. Their revenues are shrinking, and a larger number of media outlets compete for increasingly thin pickings. Meanwhile, political interference and corrupt advertising practices deepen their woes. Media outlets are further disadvantaged by the radical changes in media consumption habits and advertising flows. As a result, independent journalism is sustained on only a small number of platforms that are committed to pluralism, democratic debate and democratic processes. Media ownership in the Western Balkans lacks transparency, and ownership of media outlets is often used as a way of influencing the public and/or the government, in line with the particular political and business interests of their owners. In addition, there is a strong tendency towards the concentration of power in the hands of few dominant players in areas such as media production, distribution, advertising and related businesses (in BiH, Serbia, and Montenegro, mainly the United Group and Telekom Srbija). By acquiring the rights to virtually all premium content, these dominant groups are making it highly challenging for other media outlets to secure a reasonable share of advertising income. The advertising market is affected by three dominant issues: the continuing economic crisis and the shift of advertising budgets to regional and global media and to online communication platforms; corrupt advertising, instrumentalised for the promotion of particular political and other interests; a lack of credible audience data." (Conclusions, page 40)
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"All six reports find that misinformation is prevalent, yet the channels used for distribution of such content are somewhat different. The misinformation landscape in Serbia, for example, is dominated by mainstream media outlets. Small misinformation websites simply cannot compete with “misinforma
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tion giants” like the tabloid newspaper Blic. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, mainstream media are also the main sources of misinformation. Among the alternative sources of misinformation, the most common are “anonymous, for-profit websites offering no true journalistic value.” The mainstream media in Hungary are also known as propaganda and misinformation channels. In addition to them, however, the Hungarian report uncovered large independent networks of misinformation websites. In Slovakia, misinformation websites are run by “multiple independent entities” whereas in Moldova, misinformation is spread through mainstream media and, distinctively, through Russian misinformation websites." (Introduction, page 1)
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"The 2019 Europe and Eurasia Media Sustainability Index (MSI) saw another improvement in the combined average score for the 21 countries studied: In 2018, the combined average score was 1.84, and in 2019 this increased to 1.86. In comparison with the previous year’s study, there were modest gains
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at the regional level in Objectives 1 (Freedom of Speech), 2 (Professional Journalism), and 3 (Plurality); the largest increase happened in Objective 5 (Supporting Institutions), which moved from 1.99 in 2018 to 2.04 in 2019. Objective 4 (Business Management) saw a slight decline, reflecting the financial and economic challenges media across Europe and Eurasia continue to experience. At the country level, Armenia moved into the highest ranking position (by overall score) of all countries studied by the MSI with an overall score of 2.60 – powered by, in the words of the chapter’s author, “[a] momentous revolution, dubbed “velvet” by its leader, Nikol Pashinyan, [that] changed the Armenian political landscape, turned the media world upside down, and made 2018 a truly unprecedented year in Armenia’s modern history.” Following Armenia, the top five highest ranked countries included Kosovo (2.53), Albania (2.49), and Montenegro and Romania (tied at 2.45)." (Executive summary, page ix)
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"The websites creating misinformation content in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classified into four categories based on their financial and/or political motivations and the extent to which they provide valuable journalistic contributions. The majority of misinformation websites are motivated solely
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by profit which they generate via Google AdSense. Established media outlets engage in misinformation practices either to compete for readers' attention or on behalf of their political patrons. Two relatively secretive websites have established themselves as influential leaders in misinformative propaganda, primarily preoccupied with benefiting their political patrons rather than obtaining profits. Due to secrecy and lack of regulation, it is extremely difficult to establish the financial background of these websites." (Main findings, page 1)
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