"For more than 30 years, investigative journalism has been playing a role in Russian society much bigger than it has ever had in traditional emocracies. Gorbachev’s reforms started with Glasnost (‘Openness’), when many journalists became household names. The problem was that there were no stan
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dards for that new Russian journalism. This hit Russian journalists badly in the 1990s, when the pro fession of investigative journalism became very dangerous. This was exploited by the Kremlin in the 2000s: Putin, the new president did not tolerate any criticism of his actions, and a new narrative was romoted – that independent investigati ve journalism could not exist, and those journalists were just paid by outside actors to attack the Russian state. In 2008, the country got a new president, Dmitry Medvedev. His push for digitalization of government services led to an unexpected development - new methods of digital investiga tions emerged, along with new teams and renewed interest among the general public. But when Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012, the tide turned against journalists. Matters worsened year by year, and 2021 saw the harshest repressions against investigative journa lists to days – they were pushed out of profession and out of the country by any means necessary, the most effective tool being the wide and unscrupulous usage of the Foreign Agent Law." (FNS)
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"Während in Russland immer mehr unabhängige Medien der staatlichen Kontrolle unterworfen und als „ausländische Agenten“ gebrandmarkt werden, nutzen die russischen Staatsmedien die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in Deutschland, um ungehindert Desinformation zu verbreiten. Nach acht Jahren Berich
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terstattung von RT DE und Sputnik/SNA ist ein kritischer Punkt erreicht, auf den die Verantwortlichen für Medien reagieren sollten. Während der Corona-Krise ist mehr als deutlich geworden, dass RT und SNA eine politische Agenda verfolgen, die darin besteht, das „System“ und damit die Demokratie in Deutschland anzugreifen und die autoritäre Herrschaft in Russland als bessere Alternative zu propagieren. Schon im März 2020 warnte das Innenministerium, dass RT Deutsch „die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung“ durch „gezielten Falschmeldungen“ bedrohe [...] Die russischen Staatsmedien – insbesondere in Russland – schaffen ein Feindbild „Westen“, mit dem sie die Menschen nicht nur in Russland, sondern auch in den westlichen Staaten verunsichern oder zum Widerstand mobilisieren. Das Schüren von Ängsten vor einem Krieg und die überzogene Darstellung vom dekadenten, gottlosen Westen sind dabei zwei zentrale Narrative. Dieses Feindbild wird seit Frühjahr 2021 vor allem mit den Grünen in Verbindung gebracht, die angeblich kriegerische Absichten gegenüber Russland verfolgen und dem Klimaschutz als „neuer Religion“ frönen. Die Berichterstattung zu den Bundestagswahlen hat gezeigt, dass das erste Ziel war, eine Grüne im Kanzleramt zu verhindern. Gegen Annalena Baerbock wurden unbelegte Vorwürfe wie nationalsozialistisches Gedankengut erhoben, um sie zu diskreditieren." (Fazit, Seite 24)
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"In the late 2010s, the Internet overtook television as the most popular media format in Russia. It was also the time when Russian-speaking YouTube went political: well-known bloggers started producing political content, opposition politicians became the most popular YouTubers, and finally mainstrea
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m journalists migrated to the platform, a move precipitated by Covid-19 isolation when the demand for Russian-speaking content on YouTube skyrocketed. Therefore, it came as no surprise that when the war started it was YouTube that became the main battlefield for independent Russian journalists, including those who had moved out of the country. However, YouTube was also used by Russian propaganda for years with great effect. For that reason, the Russian government was hesitant to block YouTube, unlike other global platforms that Kremlin censors blocked immediately after the war started. That provided time for Russian users to adapt and install censorship circumvention tools. The other platform that was not immediately blocked was Telegram, and Russian journalists didn’t miss that opportunity to talk to their audience either." (Summary, page 4)
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"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun
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g für die Freiheit . Als entschiedener Gegner der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine setzt er von Europa aus seine Arbeit gegen den russischen Eroberungskrieg und wider die Putin-Diktatur fort. Im Impulspapier berichtet Parkhomenko über den Überlebenskampf des unabhängigen Journalismus unter den totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen in Russland." (https://shop.freiheit.org)
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"The topic of the war in Ukraine dominated the media during the first three months of the war and completely marginalized all other topics. The most foreign actor reported on most in the media was Russia, while the countries of the West, the US, the EU, and NATO were far less noticeable. Although th
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e initial open support for Russia has softened since the beginning of the war, the media continue to report in favour of Russia, and against the West. Television stations with national coverage (especially their morning news programmes), as well as parts of the daily press, are at the forefront of supporting Russia. Internet portals have a more balanced approach. Among state officials, President Vucic has monopolized the discussions of the war in Ukraine, and he is the person most credited in the media for establishing Serbia's neutral stance on this issue. Disinformation in the media is placed in such a way as to present Russia in a positive light, and the West negatively. Disinformation was most prevalent on internet portals and the printed edition of Vecernje novosti, the daily Informer, and television stations Pink and Happy." (Key findings)
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"Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine im Februar 2022 nutzen Rechtsextreme die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen für ihre Propaganda. Dabei lassen sich sowohl pro-ukrainische als auch prorussische Positionierungen beobachten. Insbesondere werden gezielt Desinformationen und Versch
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wörungserzählungen verbreitet. Eine zentrale Plattform stellt Telegram dar: Rechtsextreme und verschwörungsideologische Akteur:innen können hier ungestört ihre Propaganda betreiben, meist ohne Löschungen befürchten zu müssen." (Seite 2)
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"This document looks into the human rights violations committed against two specific groups who play important roles for the enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly. The first group – public assembly monitors – performs a watchdog function by recording how rigorously the authorities observe
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their human rights obligations in the context of public assemblies. The other group – media workers – ensures that society is informed about public assemblies and concerns that have brought people to the streets, and reports on how the protests have been handled by the authorities. The report documents a pattern of unlawful obstruction of journalists’ and monitors’ work during street protests, and severe reprisals against them including arbitrary arrests, use of unlawful force, detention and heavy fines." (Back cover)
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"It did not take long after the first Russian tanks rolled across the border into Ukraine for the Russian government to tighten its censorship laws. The Duma (parliament), the media supervisory authority Roskomnadzor, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice joined forces to com
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bat any media that might threaten the Kremlin’s control over how the ›special operation‹ in Ukraine is viewed. Rushed through, the new laws target allegedly ›false information‹ and set out both large fines and custodial sentences of up to 15 years. Numerous independent media websites were blocked, and at least 150 journalists were forced into exile by a wave of repression. Yet their voices have not been silenced – they have found new ways and formats, even in other languages and from other countries. How do independent journalists manage to provide truthful, critical reporting under conditions of wartime ensorship? Which channels do they use to ask questions that the Kremlin does not want to hear, and give answers that Roskomnadzor would not allow? Where do they find scope for free reporting? How do users get around blocks online? An insight into a media andscape divided into two worlds: before and after February 24, 2022." (Abstract)
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"The research findings suggest that disaster and entertainment journalism currently may not contribute much to the audience’s awareness and commitment to ecology. Current coverage of environmental issues in Ukrainian news media as perceived by survey respondents reveals that news media may divert
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public attention away from real environmental problems, while those that threaten large-scale and often irreversible consequences are only seen to be taking second place. Respondents mainly received media texts of limited value, which did not provide comprehensive information, so they may have prevented an adequate understanding of complex environmental processes, phenomena, and events. Therefore, it is time to change the current situation. This study suggests that serious changes should be made in news media coverage of environmental issues in Ukraine. An important step in this context is to increase environmental science communication in Ukrainian news media, which means improving the scientific level of environmental content, providing the public with scientifically correct, reliable, relevant, evidence-based, and socially important information based on scientific findings and data." (Conclusion)
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"Key findings and recommendations on the main communication, community engagement and accountability (CCEA) barriers and gaps:
Finding 1: There is strong rhetoric from international agencies to support local/national CCEA and work on more inclusive partnerships – but progress has been slow
Finding
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2: Significant gaps in the CCEA capacities of local and national agencies constrain activities
Finding 3: Language and terminology are key barriers to participation and inclusion of local organisations
Finding 4: Marginalised groups need specific CCEA considerations
Finding 5: Information is needed for refugees returning to Ukraine
Finding 6: Non-Ukrainian refugees need specific CCEA considerations
Finding 7: Engagement is needed with host communities" (Pages 6-10)
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"Wiktor Chrul ist Anfang März aus Russland geflohen, ein potentieller Job hat ihn auch für einige Tage nach Aachen geführt. Der Universitätsprofessor und Journalist sieht die Gefahr, dass er in seiner Heimat hart bestraft wird – weil er die Wahrheit sagt. Wo Wiktor Chrul in den nächsten Tagen
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sein wird, weiß er nicht. Vielleicht Bochum, vielleicht Luxemburg, vielleicht auch Vilnius. Der Universitätsprofessor sucht nach einem Job, in Europa, in den USA, Hauptsache nicht in Russland. Als Spezialist auf dem Gebiet Medienethik kann und will er schließlich nicht verschweigen, was wirklich in der Ukraine geschieht. Doch genau das müsste er, wollte er weiterhin sicher in Russland leben. Deshalb hat er das Land Anfang März verlassen. Auf seiner ungewissen Reise hat er auch einige Tage in Aachen verbracht. Multimedia-Volontärin Svenja Stühmeier hat sich mit ihm zum Tag der Pressefreiheit über die Situation der Medien in Russland unterhalten." (Einführung)
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"The spread of disinformation around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects wider challenges related to the shift in how information is produced and distributed. Platform and algorithm designs can amplify the spread of disinformation by facilitating the creation of echo chambers and confirmation bi
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as mechanisms that segregate the news and information people see and interact with online; information overload, confusion and cognitive biases play into these trends. A particular challenge is that people tend to spread falsehoods “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth”; this is particularly the case for false political news. For example, one study found that tweets containing false information were 70% more likely to be retweeted than accurate tweets. Another study found that false information on Facebook attracts six times more engagement than factual posts. In addition, feedback loops between the platforms and traditional media can serve to further amplify disinformation, magnifying the risk that disinformation can be used to deliberately influence public conversations, as well as confuse and discourage the public. The flow of – and disruption caused by – Russian disinformation has significantly increased since Russia's invasion in February 2022. In turn, Ukraine’s response to the Russian disinformation threat has built upon progress made in strengthening the information and media environment since 2014 and in establishing mechanisms to respond directly to information threats. These include efforts to provide accurate information, ensure that media organisations can continue operations, and policy efforts to combat the threats posed by Russian state-linked media." (Page 2)
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"On April 3, 2022, Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party won a fourth term in national elections, cementing its dominance with a two-thirds majority that will allow it to continue traveling what critics of the party and many others would describe as the path of centralizing power and rolling back democrat
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ic safeguards. International observers characterized the elections as free but raised serious concerns about their fairness. These included blurring the lines between the government and the ruling party in campaigning, which amplified the advantage of the ruling coalition, the absence of a level playing field, and lack of balance in campaign coverage in the press, on television, and on billboards. Fidesz’s effective control over large sections of the media, undermining the independence of the judiciary and public institutions, and curbing of civil society has received considerable attention from international media and international observers. However, its misuse of people’s personal data, which helped the party reach voters in new, opaque ways, has received relatively little scrutiny. This report examines how data-driven campaigning in Hungary’s 2022 elections exacerbated an already uneven playing field and undermined the right to privacy. It also documents new forms of misuse of personal data collected by the government and used for political campaigning by Fidesz in the 2022 elections." (Summary)
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"This strategy paper answers the following question: What can the donors, media NGOs, and the management of professional media both in exile and in Belarus do to maintain the quality and the reach of Belarusian independent journalism?" (Executive summary)
"An international survey reveals that Internet users' trust on the Internet has dropped significantly since 2019. That is among the key findings of a 20-country Ipsos survey released by The New Institute in Hamburg, Germany. Only six in ten (63%) Internet users on average across the 20 countries sai
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d they trust the Internet. That is down 11 points since a similar survey was conducted in 2019. The singular exception is Japan, which showed a 7 percentage-point increase in trust. But Japan is the rare exception, as the findings reveal that Internet trust shrunk by double-digits in India (-10 points), Kenya (-11), Sweden (-10), Brazil (-18), Canada (-14), the United States (-12), and Poland (-26)." (Publisher description)
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"The results of this dissertation suggest that most Russians are aware, at least to some degree, of the biases of state media. Nonetheless, they still consider these sources to provide valuable information. This, in part, stems from beliefs about the access these news outlets have to information and
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some distrust in available alternative sources. It is not the case that Russians are generally active supporters of the kinds of censorship that state news outlets deploy. However, concerns about censorship must be traded off against news consumers' other priorities. In some circumstances, news audiences will even prefer a degree of censorship if information is framed as a threat to social stability. Overall, state news outlets have succeeded in producing a product that many Russian news consumers genuinely value, even if the contents are subject to bias and distortion. Russian news audiences and the content of state media to be interesting, important, and relevant. It encourages positive emotions such as pride and hope. It a rms those who are deeply attached to their Russian identity and feel positively about their leaders." (Abstract)
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"The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa
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. How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions.
First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend.
Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities.
Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like private military companies (PMCs) and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments." (Executive summary)
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"WeChat, launched in 2011, has rapidly become the most favoured Chinese social media. Globally available, equally popular both inside and outside China and widely adopted by Chinese migrants, WeChat has fundamentally changed the ways in which Mandarin-speaking migrants conduct personal messaging, en
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gage in group communication and community business activities, produce and distribute news, and access and share information. This book explores a wide range of issues connected to the ways in which WeChat works and is used, across the world among the newest members of the Chinese diaspora. Arguing that digital/social media afford a great degree of individual agency, as well as a collective capacity for sustaining an 'imagined community', the book shows how WeChat's assemblage of infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, technical capabilities, content and sense of community has led to the construction of a particular kind of diasporic Chinese world, at a time marked both by China's rise, and anxiety about Chinese influence in the West." (Publisher description)
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"Drawing on cases from revolutionary France to the Russia of Vladimir Putin, the international authors probe the nature and agency of local blasphemy accusations, the historical and legal framework in which they were expressed and the violence, both physical and symbolic, accompanying them. In doing
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so, the volume reveals how cultures of blasphemy, and related acts of heresy, apostasy and sacrilege, were a companion to or acted as a trigger for physical action but also a form of how violence was experienced. More generally, it shows the importance of religious sensibilities in modern society and the violent potential contained in criticism or ridicule of the sacred and secular alike." (Publisher description)
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