"The article analyzes the QAnon phenomenon and the anti-vaxxer movement of COVID-19 deniers as typological manifestations of conspiratorial “alternative rationality.” A number of hypotheses have been proposed: during a pandemic and a parallel infodemic, conspiracy thinking quickly becomes transb
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oundary; all conspiracy theories share certain features; they are discursive (according to Foucault) and underlain by the question of power; growing public distrust of the government is one of the fundamental reasons for the popularity of conspiracy theories. The article proves that the transboundary nature of information contributes to the global spread of conspiracy theories, but they cannot be universalized because they have local specifics in each country (region)." (Abstract)
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"Reported here are findings from a study of the frequency and content of messaging on various themes on Russian television. The goal of this approach is not necessarily to re-create Russians' viewing habits, though one might reasonably assume that more frequently mentioned topics are more likely to
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have been viewed or noticed. Rather, the frequency and distribution of topics over time reveal the extent to which state-controlled television presented a coordinated campaign. In the absence of reliable public opinion data in war-time Russia, such an approach further suggests insights about the ways that Russians were prepared for and reacted to the onset of war. Despite Russia's insistence that its invasion was motivated by longstanding concerns-genocide and fascism in Ukraine-the findings show that Russian television only paid brief attention to those concerns and quickly re-focused on other themes. Rather, the priming of the public for war began over a month prior to the invasion with the spread of "war talk" on television broadcasts." (Page 1)
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"In the light of recent emergencies in Europe and around the globe—including COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine—the spotlight has shifted towards the scarcity of Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) research applied to health emergencies. RCCE nurtures the sense of empowerment among c
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ommunities since it ensures that individuals and communities are part of the solution creation, thus they take informed decisions to protect their health and in turn, contribute to emergency control. Therefore, RCCE can play an important role as core public health intervention across health emergency preparedness and response. However, its tremendous impact, is still underestimated and not widely common. This viewpoint showcases the RCCE measures applied to the Ukrainian emergency to ensure that Ukrainian refugees access health services in host countries, based on their needs and concerns." (Abstract)
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"The 2022 Europe and Eurasia Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) sees the addition of the five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) to the study, bringing the total number of countries examined to 18. With VIBE, IREX strives to capture a moder
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n and evolving media space where people are simultaneously producers, transmitters, consumers, and actors in the information that influences their lives and environments [...] For countries in Europe and Eurasia (E&E) included in this year’s publication, country-level scores were, again, mainly split into two VIBE classifications: Somewhat Vibrant (North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and Slightly Vibrant (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Serbia). Azerbaijan held the lowest score in E&E, putting it in the Not Vibrant classification. In Central Asia, this year’s study put Kyrgyzstan the Somewhat Vibrant category, while Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan were Slightly Vibrant. While Uzbekistan’s score characterized it as Slightly Vibrant, Turkmenistan joined Azerbaijan in the Not Vibrant classification." (Executive summary)
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"Multifaceted, uncensored, promoting democracy - that is the internet, many people had long hoped. But from today's perspective, this is not true - or only partially. Because the big digital platforms and the world wide web are both: media of freedom and control. In many places, they support civil s
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ociety, but often they also pose a massive threat to it. On the one hand, civil society organisations, activists and bloggers use digital tools to organise their work and make it more efficient: Through them, they disseminate reports and campaigns and exchange information. On the other hand, governments restrict freedom of expression and the press through online censorship: They block access to certain websites or platforms or shut down the internet entirely and monitor activists and journalists with digital technologies, often made in Europe. Policymakers, platforms and civil society face major challenges: They have to negotiate and decide how to deal with hate on the web and in social media without compromising freedom of expression. How more people, especially in the Global South, can get better access to the internet. And, how the data collection frenzy of the big tech companies and the dangers posed to democracy by Facebook & Co can be contained. Civil society voices call for more human rights based regulation and containment of digital capitalism." (Summary, page 6)
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"Vielfaltig, unzensiert, demokratiefördernd - das ist das Internet, hofften viele Menschen lange. Doch diese Attribute passen aus heutiger Sicht nicht - oder nur teilweise. Denn die großen digitalen Plattformen und das World Wide Web sind beides: Medien der Freiheit und der Kontrolle. Sie helfen d
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er Zivilgesellschaft vielerorts, gefährden sie aber oft auch massiv. Denn einerseits nutzen zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, Aktivist:innen und Blogger:innen digitale Tools zur Organisation und Effizienzsteigerung ihrer Arbeit: Sie verbreiten über sie Analysen und Kampagnen und tauschen sich darüber aus. Andererseits schränken Regierungen weltweit durch Online-Zensur die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit ein: Sie blockieren den Zugang zu bestimmten Webseiten oder Plattformen oder sperren das Netz ganz und überwachen Aktivist:innen und Journalist:innen gezielt mit digitalen Technologien, oft Made in Europe. Die Herausforderungen an Politik, Plattformen und Zivilgesellschaft sind groß: Sie müssen aushandeln und entscheiden, was dem Hass im Netz und in den Sozialen Medien entgegengesetzt werden kann, ohne dass die Meinungsfreiheit eingeschränkt wird. Wie mehr Menschen gerade im Globalen Süden einen besseren Zugang zum Internet bekommen. Und wie sich die Datensammelwut der großen Tech-Konzerne und die damit für die Demokratie von Facebook & Co. ausgehenden Gefahren eindämmen lassen. Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Stimmen mehren sich, die mehr menschenrechtsorientierte Regulierung und eine Eindämmung des digitalen Kapitalismus fordern." (Zusammengefasst, Seite 6)
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"During the monitoring period (February 24 – April 24) the following tendencies have been identified: Out of the 160 false information and manipulative content, mainly disseminated in Russian and Georgian sources, the largest share (49.4%) was directed against Ukraine, followed by disinformation a
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gainst the West (28.1%). Part of the false and manipulative content was aimed at justifying Russia’s actions (16.3%). In order to evade Russia’s responsibility for human casualties, the Kremlin’s propaganda has resorted to the tactic of “whataboutism” – in response to accusations, the Russian side has been arguing that the Ukrainian side was the one killing the civilian population and that the population was endangered not by Russian troops but by the actions of the Azov Battalion and other so-called ‘Nazi groups.’ The denial of Russian responsibility for the military intervention in Ukraine was also bolstered by deliberate disinformation, reinforcing the idea that Ukraine was fabricating information about the victims (Mariupol blogger story, Bucha Massacre). Visual manipulations, including those related to the pandemic, were often used for this purpose [...]" (Key findings)
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"The aim of this research was to study media consumption habits among different age groups and geographical areas, as well as the public's vulnerability to various disinformation and manipulative narratives disseminated in Georgia. The first part of the research concerns media literacy competencies,
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namely media consumption habits, the ability to identify and verify false information, while the second part deals with perceptions of disinformation in relation to 3 thematic areas (Russian intervention in Ukraine, current events/ identity-related issues in Georgia and health). The research was conducted in 7 Georgian cities throughout the month of September, namely Akhalkalaki, Batumi, Gardabani, Zugdidi, Tbilisi, Telavi, and Kutaisi, conducting face-to-face interviews with 140 respondents." (Introduction, page 3)
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"This study examines the framing of media and information literacy issues in media projects financed by the Latvian Media Support Fund and discusses the professional quality of media and information literacy (MIL) related content with project beneficiaries and media experts. The study uses the ideol
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ogical model of literacy, linking it with the meta-journalistic approach to explore changes in MIL-related journalistic professional epistemology. Employing the three datasets (journalists and editors’ survey, framing analysis of MIL-focused media content, and qualitative semi-structured interviews), the research concludes that MIL representation in the commercial media is mostly superficial, and the audience is not offered the range of MIL competencies appropriate for the contemporary understanding of the notion. MIL content in the media is represented using educational, warning, and formal MIL framing." (Abstract)
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"This Media Landscape Guide was produced in January 2022. It provides a snapshot of the media at this time in Belarus. It provides an analysis of the recent shocks to the media landscape and an overview of the different types of media and information sources available for Belarusians: digital media
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platforms, social media and messaging platforms, television, radio, and print. It covers the main and most popular media outlets." (Introduction, page 4)
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"This paper is the summary of the results of a research project lasting over six months, covering domestic and foreign hidden malign influence activities pursued through the so-called "grey zone" media in three countries - the Czech Republic, Serbia and Hungary -, during a period of heightened inter
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national tensions related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Political Capital has assessed in numerous studies how the Kremlin or the Hungarian hybrid political regime has used their extensive media empire to conduct active measures or political smear-campaigns in service of political or geopolitical goals. In this study, we set out to understand the inner workings of clandestine disinformation campaigns carried out by mostly anonymous media actors to conduct or influence political campaigns, specifically in the run-up to the Czech, Serbian and Hungarian elections, and destabilise the region in general after the outbreak of the war." (Page 2)
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"Existing literature recognizes growing threats to press freedom around the world and documents changes in the tools used to stifle the independent press. However, few studies investigate how independent media respond to state pressure in an autocracy, documenting the impact of tactics that stop sho
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rt of shuttering alternatives to state media. Do independent outlets re-orient coverage to favor regime interests? Or does repression encourage more negative coverage of the regime instead? To shed light on these questions, we investigate how the abrupt removal of independent outlet TV Rain from Russian television providers influenced its coverage. We find that shortly after providers dropped TV Rain, the tone of its political coverage became more positive and its similarity with state-controlled Channel 1 increased. However, these effects were shortlived. Additional evidence suggests that subscription revenue contributed to the station’s resilience. These findings add to our understanding of media manipulation and authoritarian endurance." (Abstract)
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"Recently several European countries shifted to illiberalism and made attempts to dominate the media and political narratives. The question we raise is how media populism in Hungary contributes to the buttressing of the regime by discrediting protests. We offer a four-level media analysis. First, we
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ask whether the pro-government media is characterized by so-called selection bias. Second, we focus on framing bias relying on ideas presented by the protest paradigm. Third, we highlight the tone of disdain that characterizes numerous pro-governmental utterances. Finally, we point out the significance of iconic frames. Contrary to our expectations, we found no selection bias, but there was a clear framing bias in progovernmental media, which was made harsher by the derogatory tone of pro-governmental media and the dog-whistling produced by iconic frames. By identifying how media populism operates, our aim is to offer a way to grasp democratic backsliding by concentrating on the media." (Abstract)
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"Structured along two broad themes and providing empirical examples for how socio-technical changes and political responses interact, the first part of the book looks at the current use of cyberspace in conflictual settings, while the second focuses on political responses by state and non-state acto
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rs in an environment defined by uncertainties. Within this, it highlights four key debates that encapsulate the complexities and paradoxes of cyber security politics from a Western perspective – how much political influence states can achieve via cyber operations and what context factors condition the (limited) strategic utility of such operations; the role of emerging digital technologies and how the dynamics of the tech innovation process reinforce the fragmentation of the governance space; how states attempt to uphold stability in cyberspace and, more generally, in their strategic relations; and how the shared responsibility of state, economy, and society for cyber security continues to be re-negotiated in an increasingly trans-sectoral and transnational governance space." (Publisher description)
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"The findings described in this memo strongly suggest that "softer" strategies of media cooptation are more effective than harsher, more coercive approaches to media control. In Russia, where the Kremlin has-until very recently-used a combination of commercial pressure and political influence to pus
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h media owners and editors towards cooperation, the result has been a media system in which even those Russians who prefer independent media have broad exposure to the Kremlin's messaging. Moreover, as the Vedomosti case demonstrates, softer repressions against uncooperative media outlets seem to afford the Kremlin an opportunity to capture the attention of a large portion of those outlets' audiences. By contrast, the heavier hand wielded by authorities in Minsk has helped create a highly polarized media system, in which oppositional media-despite massive repression- capture more audience attention than state-linked media, and consumers of independent media have very little exposure to state messaging. Attempts to stifle independent media outright only suffice to put oppositional audiences even further out of the reach of the state." (Conclusions, page 8)
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"In late February 2022, Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which sent shockwaves around the world. As the world responded with sanctions against Russia, Moscow increased its public relations campaign to justify its invasion and recast the narrative in the media and on the inter
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net. The Malaysian government’s initial responses were mixed, with the Prime Minister refraining from naming Russia as the aggressor but ultimately voting to support the UN resolution to condemn the invasion. Malaysian social media were abuzz with discussions on the conflict, with different groups articulating both condemnation and support for Russia. The research in this paper, using digital ethnography, examines pro-Russian sentiments and unpacks them for possible explanations for why such views prevail amongst Malaysians. Four key themes emerged from our analysis. These were: perceived Islamist solidarity, pervasive animosity towards Western hegemony, preference for neutrality and pacifism, and the delegitimization of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy." (Executive Summary)
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"This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram’s public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization o
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f platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram’s role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram’s performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram’s aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types." (Abstract)
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"Combating illegal parking and drinking in public is the raison d’être of Russia’s best-known law-and-order youth initiatives, StopKham and Lev Protiv. These initiatives enforce and promote neotraditional morals amongst young people by challenging alleged offenders on camera and uploading the e
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ntertaining, humorous and often violent video clips to YouTube. I argue that their practices encapsulate flexible authoritarianism, in which the regime incentivises citizens to take initiative while expanding repressive measures against dissenters. Not only do these enterprises reflect the regime’s goals back at itself, they also popularise a new ideal of heroic masculinity that fuses patriotism with entrepreneurialism." (Abstract)
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"Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Beiträge in russischen staatlichen Medien über Impfkampagnen im Westen haben eine negative Konnotation. Die Übertreibung der negativen Folgen einer Impfung mit Präparaten von BionTech/Pfizer und Moderna sowie die Überzeichnung der angeblich massenhaften Unzufried
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enheit sind dabei die wichtigsten Narrative der russischen regierungsfreundlichen Medien. Die russische Medienpolitik hinsichtlich der Berichterstattung über westliche Impfstoffe entspricht der allgemeinen staatlichen Linie des Kreml, Russlands herausragende Stellung in der Welt und die Unzulänglichkeiten des Westens hervorzuheben." (Schlussfolgerungen, Seite 4)
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"The movement that mobilized to oppose Alyaksandr Lukashenka in August 2020 was notable for its ability to bridge divisions of social class, geography, age, and identity. Almost uniquely among post-Soviet revolutionary movements, the Belarusians who rose up were not divided from those who did not al
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ong clearly discernible sociodemographic, ethnic, linguistic, or regional lines. They were, however, separated by one very stark barrier: the one separating the country’s two distinct media systems, one controlled by the state, and one independent. Drawing on an original survey conducted in September 2020, just as the protest movement was reaching its peak, this article finds that respondents’ choice of news media was the strongest and most consistent predictor of their political opinions. Media, then, appear to have served not merely as aggregators of and conduits for social processes generated elsewhere, but as the producers of social and political force in their own right." (Abstract)
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