"As highlighted above, the development and refinement of counter-terrorism policies and practices by social media and technology companies has come about as a function of the evolving nature of terrorist and extremist entities’ exploitation of said platforms. The challenges highlighted above, name
...
ly, the distinct institutional purposes, the impacts of private companies acting as determinants of freedom-of-expression norms, and the disparate treatment of Salafi-Jihadist content compared with extreme right-wing content are a sample of the kinds of ethical dilemmas that are raised by the changing character of counter-terrorism activity. As these practices continue to evolve, it is important that the state continues to retain its role in expressing and representing community norms and as an accountable actor in the policing of freedom of expression. Ensuring that an increasingly diverse body of extremist content is responded to with equal vigour, and provided with equally limited tolerance, is a key role for the state. The increased presence of private-sector technology companies as controllers and owners of key public and political discourse infrastructure presents a number of substantial risks to the traditional roles that the democratically accountable apparatus of the state played in ensuring civil political discourse was both enabled and protected. As technology plays an increased role in politics and in political discourse, it is essential that the ethical challenges that are raised by these changes are considered and incorporated into policy thinking, both within government and within private-sector technology companies." (Conclusion, pages 125-126)
more
"This discussion paper seeks to give an overview of the key aspects that need to be taken into consideration to address the occurrence of hate speech on social media, be it through concrete regulations by social media companies, counter efforts and legislations or preventive educational measures. Th
...
e paper is divided into three sections: part 1 focuses on definitions of hate speech and associated legal frameworks, part 2 reviews and addresses tools and techniques for monitoring hate speech online and discusses measurements of the prevalence of online hate speech and part 3 discusses potential counter and preventive measures." (Page 2)
more
"This document reports an increase in so-called “hate speech” posts on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although dissimilar, such an increase can be observed in the transparency reports of the different platforms and the surge in content moderation since M
...
arch 2020. During the same period—as a result of the lockdown measures adopted in most countries around the world—platforms increased the use of AI tools for content moderation. Therefore, we can’t fully say whether the interannual growth is linked to increased posts or changes in monitoring systems." (Executive summary)
more
"The list of terms included in this lexicon, as well as their proposed meaning and contextualization, are not static. Instead, the lexicon is a ‘snapshot’ (in time and space) of how hateful language is used, perceived, and understood by those who contributed to the research process in Ethiopia b
...
etween March and September 2020. How these terms are understood — their meanings, usage, and the assessment of their harmful nature — may evolve or change over time. The non-static nature of hateful language is in line with the sometimes abrupt changes that can occur in the context of conflict and the evolution of language over time in any society, including in Ethiopia. There is a significant subjective dimension to hateful language, and context can change the meaning of language used. The results of the research laid out in this lexicon should be approached as such." (Purpose, page 2)
more
"Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) bring a wide range of skill sets to the problem of digital disinformation. Some organizations focus on digital media literacy and education; others engage in advocacy and policy work. Another segment has developed expertise in fact-checking and verification. Other
...
organizations have developed refined technical skills for extracting and analyzing data from social media platforms. This research yielded several clear observations about the state of CSO responses to disinformation and, in turn, suggests several recommendations for paths forward. • Prioritize Skill Diffusion and Knowledge Transfer. Civil society organizations seeking funding for counter-disinformation initiatives should emphasize the importance of skill diffusion and knowledge-transfer initiatives. The siloed nature of disinformation research points to a growing need to blend technical expertise with deep cultural and political knowledge. • CSO researchers lack sufficient access to social media data. Survey respondents identified insufficient access to data as a challenge. Sometimes data are not made available to CSOs; in other instances, data are made available in formats that are not workable for meaningful research purposes. Unequal access to the data that private companies do provide can exacerbate regional inequities, and the nature of data sharing by social media platforms can unduly shape the space for inquiry by civil society and other researchers. Funders, platforms, and other key actors should develop approaches that provide more consistent, inclusive data access to CSOs. • Duplicative programming hampers innovation. CSOs drawing on similar tools, approaches, and techniques to meet similar goals pointed to three main factors preventing more specialized, innovative initiatives: lack of coordination, lack of specific expertise, and lack of flexible funding. Community building and collaboration among relevant organizations deserve more investment, as do initiatives that partner larger, established organizations with smaller or growing ones, or pool efforts, skill sets, and expertise to encourage diverse research by design rather than by coincidence. • Relationships with tech platforms vary across regions. Surveyed CSOs often held simultaneously skeptical and positive opinions about their relationships with social media companies. Some receive preferential access to data and even funding for their work (raising concerns about independence), while others report a lack of responsiveness from company representatives. In the Global South and Eastern Europe, many CSOs expressed concern that platforms failed to meaningfully engage with them on issues of critical concern. • More flexible funding and more diverse research are both necessary. To encourage greater platform accountability across varied geographic contexts, CSOs and their funders should draw on the perspectives of specific, under-analyzed communities." (Executive summary, page 3-4)
more
"Disinformation undermines human rights and many elements of good quality democracy; but counter-disinformation measures can also have a prejudicial impact on human rights and democracy. COVID-19 compounds both these dynamics and has unleashed more intense waves of disinformation, allied to human ri
...
ghts and democracy setbacks. Effective responses to disinformation are needed at multiple levels, including formal laws and regulations, corporate measures and civil society action. While the EU has begun to tackle disinformation in its external actions, it has scope to place greater stress on the human rights dimension of this challenge. In doing so, the EU can draw upon best practice examples from around the world that tackle disinformation through a human rights lens. This study proposes steps the EU can take to build counter-disinformation more seamlessly into its global human rights and democracy policies." (Abstract)
more
"As of July 2021, Telegram had 550 million active users worldwide – more than the individual user bases of Twitter, Snapchat or Discord. It is the fifth most-popular messaging app after Facebook-owned Whatsapp and Messenger, and WeChat and QQ which dominate the Chinese market [...] For this paper,
...
I looked at Telegram’s policies and functionalities to help understand what made it so attractive to misinformation actors both in the Ukraine, which has a long history of Telegram engagement, and Brazil, Spain and Germany where it has had more of an impact in recent years. According to the journalists and digital researchers I interviewed about investigating misinformation and disinformation on Telegram, there are ways to address the issue, both on and off the platform: by investigating movements and their political or financial interest, by producing more responsible journalism, through clearer communication from governments, and through the continued moderation efforts on other social media platforms." (Pages 7-8)
more
"A significant number of the surveyed citizens consider the media in Serbia under the control of political groups at both ends of the spectrum. At the same time, many of the surveyed citizens think that the media is free to collect and publish information on all the relevant issues. These findings r
...
eflect the media reality in Serbia: after twenty years of reforms, the country has managed to create a system in which the freedom of the media implies (only) that our media freely report on issues relevant to the option whose interests they represent. Both the media workers in the focus group and the surveyed citizens agree that propaganda and hatred are ubiquitous in the media. The media instrumentalizes hatred based on gender, national and other stereotypes in order to realize the particular interests of the groups to which they are loyal for ideological or financial reasons. But as the media workers warn, the media is also abusing the hatred rooted in society to increase circulation, viewership, or reach, and again, in the end, to make a profit. The position of women journalists in Serbia is especially difficult. As many as 95% of the surveyed citizens agree that women journalists are exposed to attacks, threats, insults and harassment because they do their job well. The journalists and editors in the focus group do not see gender prejudices and stereotypes as a cause of attacks but rather as a tool to discredit female journalists. Not their work—because that is difficult to discredit—but rather female journalists personally, where attacks are dominated by discourse strategies stemming from classic misogyny." (Conclusion, page 25)
more
"Laying out the core elements of a progressive prevention infrastructure, this paper makes the case for placing human rights as the central goal of prevention work. We highlight both the major damage done to prevention through violations of fundamental rights in the name of fighting terrorism and ex
...
tremism, as well as the profound harms to human rights resulting from extremist mobilisation. As such, we argue that preventing extremism – defined in terms of supremacist ideologies which run counter to universal rights – must at its heart be seen as an exercise in safeguarding human rights, rather than merely preventing violence. While focusing on the UK policy context, this paper also takes stock of international developments, including the implications for prevention of an increasingly emboldened, mainstreamed and transnational extremism threat emanating from a broad ideological spectrum in the US, across Europe and beyond." (Executive summary, page 4)
more
"From August 2020 until August this summer, we recorded almost 800 cases of digital rights violations in eight countries of south-eastern Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. Violations took place not just on TikTok, but also on F
...
acebook, Twitter and Instagram and were also spread via Viber and WhatsApp. Our report shows that vulnerable groups, including women, minority groups, LGBT +, Roma and Jewish communities, minors and migrants, are particularly exposed to online attacks. Similarly, political and religious tensions, which still continue to mark the cultural and political life of our societies, also surged, further polarising society. All of this suggests that what happens in the virtual space is not much different from the “physical world”. Ongoing tensions and cultural controversies are simply migrating from one place to another and prevention or protection mechanisms are far from successful. It comes as no surprise that the two most common violations this year were “pressure because of expression and activities on the internet” and “manipulation and propaganda in the digital environment”. Journalists were most frequently the target of online threats in two countries – Serbia and Hungary. In both countries, pro-government social media accounts were involved in smear campaigns against independent journalists." (Foreword, page 4)
more
"The Philippines is one of the first countries where the potential for online disinformation threats to undermine democratic processes, especially during elections, was noticed [...] This report takes a deep look at an online survey that Internews conducted, explores the cultural and emotional dimen
...
sions of disinformation and how they form part of the broader political transformations taking place in the Philippines, examines how the Philippine disinformation ecosystem fits into the regional landscape, looks into financial incentives and legislation, and formulates a set of strategic and programmatic recommendations to better tackle the issue of disinformation in the Philippines." (https://internews.org)
more
"After a recent contested election, the Central African Republic finds itself in a precarious situation. Violence around the election combined with the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 and destructive flooding have caused the humanitarian emergency to reach its worst state in five years. Meanwhile
...
, the CAR government has been accused of engaging in Russian-backed disinformation campaigns targeting domestic civil society, French diplomats and the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA), threatening key relationships. Even as the long-simmering issue of hate speech continues to draw fault lines through the country, efforts to combat these campaigns have focused primarily on challenging fake news rather than addressing the underlying fear and prejudice that spoilers use to stoke conflict." (Introduction)
more
"Across the case studies we identified three broad categories for the classification of content, which will be unpacked in greater detail in the following section: 1. Instructional material which contains guidance on operational aspects of terrorist and violent extremist activity. This includes guid
...
ance on the manufacture and perpetration of attacks, as well as guides on combat drills, fitness and non-violent activism such as sticker campaigning. 2. Ideological material which is designed to specifically further a violent extremist or terrorist world view. This includes key texts and lectures which provide the theoretical underpinning for a terrorist or violent extremist cause, and which provide explanation around why the world is a certain way. 3. Inspirational material designed to reinforce a violent extremist or terrorist mind-set. This includes a wide range of content which is designed to elicit a reaction or response in the radicalised mind. This includes material intended to provoke hatred towards a particular group of people or promote pride and support for a particular cause. Notably, this category of content is the least well-defined in the existing literature." (Page 7)
more
"This book conceptually examines the role of communication in global jihad from multiple perspectives. The main premise is that communication is so vital to the global jihadist movement today that jihadists will use any communicative tool, tactic, or approach to impact or transform people and the pu
...
blic at large. The author explores how and why the benefits of communication are a huge boon to jihadist operations, with jihadists communicating their ideological programs to develop a strong base for undertaking terrorist violence. The use of various information and communication systems and platforms by jihadists exemplifies the most recent progress in the relationship between terrorism, media, and the new information environment. For jihadist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, recruiting new volunteers for the Caliphate who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause is a top priority. Based on various conceptual analyses, case studies, and theoretical applications, this book explores the communicative tools, tactics, and approaches used for this recruitment, including narratives, propaganda, mainstream media, social media, new information and communication technologies, the jihadisphere, visual imagery, media framing, globalization, financing networks, crime - jihad nexuses, group communication, radicalization, social movements, fatwas, martyrdom videos, pop-jihad, and jihadist nasheeds." (Publisher description)
more
"Building trust in public health authorities and epidemic response takes time and is an ongoing process. However, in the short term, mistrust can be mitigated by responding in contextually appropriate ways through meaningful community engagement: 1. Use social science to understand the socio-economi
...
c, political and historical context [...] 2. Adapt communications to respond to the concerns of different groupsof people, using trusted sources and platforms [...] 3. Establish dialogue and create feedback systems [...] 4. Include diverse groups and listen with an open mind [...] 5. Be transparent, consistent and open, particularly about uncertainty, controversy and mistakes [...] 6. Offer compelling narratives that build a sense of capability and motivation to act." (Pages 3-4)
more
"This case study examines social networks as the modern intersections of radical discourse and political extremism. But, as this research will show, extremist content in social networks, even that which has telegraphed violent hate crimes, is seldom communicated in textbook forms bigotry or provocat
...
ions of violence. Today, the true challenge for social networks like Facebook and Twitter is addressing hate speech that reads more like fear mongering and identity politics, and thus, does not get flagged by monitors. From accounts dedicated to inciting fear over the “threat of immigrants” or “black crime,” to groups that form around hashtags declaring that a “#whitegenocide” is underway. These narratives represent the more ubiquitous versions of hate culture that permeate these popular spaces and radicalize cultural discourses happening there. This case study explores how such rhetoric has the same capacity to deliver messages of hate, and even incite violence, by investigating six hate crimes from 2019 that were preceded by social media diatribes. The comparative analysis will show how these examples mostly featured nonviolent expressions of cultural paranoia, rather than avowals of violence or traditional hate speech, thus making them harder to detect by programs seeking out such threats in plain sight. The research then examines the user policies of leading social networks to assess whether their guidelines on hateful and violent content are purposed to address the kinds of language that were espoused by these violent extremists. The study considers the strategies being employed by social networks to expose hateful content of all forms, and the need for more prominent counter narratives." (Abstract)
more
"Social media companies face an increasingly urgent ethical dilemma about the use of their platforms by Taliban officials and supporters." (Introduction)