"[This publication] outlines how organised disinformation campaigns or Information Operations have become the latest variable to impact the quality of elections in the kingdom [...] Drawn from past evidence, the report identifies four forms of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns that are likely
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to impact the quality of the 2023 elections. First, the creation and dissemination of one-sided pro-establishment campaigns. Second, the online harassment of those who hold alternative political views. Third, the spread of disinformation to distort the election process. Fourth, the use of disinformation to polarise and divide society. Together these state-sponsored actions stand to decrease electoral integrity and shape the outcome of the 2023 general election. To address the impact of state-sponsored disinformation and other forms of disinformation, this report recommends the following multi-stakeholder action: call for a cease to Information Operations; identify, monitor and call out agencies and actors who engage in and endorse disinformation; review the country’s regulatory framework to ensure that its provisions are on par with international standards and support electoral integrity; and improve fact-checking mechanisms and provide digital literary to Thai people." (Executive summary)
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"Since its Joint Communication on Hybrid Threats, the EU has publicly recognized the risks to its security posed by non-traditional means aimed at undermining its legitimacy. The propagation of disinformation including misleading political advertising serves as a key example of how the Commission’
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s perception of the EU’s vulnerability to hybrid threats in times of geopolitical instability is shaping its regulatory policies. This article uses the framework of regulatory mercantilism, which argues that in conditions of perceived vulnerability, a state-like actor will reassert regulatory control based on a security logic in areas previously characterized by self-regulatory regimes. This article considers the Commission’s 2019–2024 priorities, and how the spheres of technology, security, and democracy policies are intersecting as a response to hybrid threats. As a result, online platform governance in the EU is being substantially restructured with a move from systems of selfregulation to co-regulation backed by sanction as a means of combating hybrid threats online. The Commission’s “taking back control” from platforms in the context of a digital sovereignty agenda serves as an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy, which sees the Commission seek to promote regulatory strength in response to perceived vulnerability." (Abstract)
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"Social media have led to profound transformations in the media ecosystem and new communication dynamics. Such platforms have become a competitive source of information and played a decisive role in facilitating the dissemination of false or misleading content, with a particular impact on recent ele
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ctions. This study analyses the formats and the spread of disinformation during Brazil’s 2018 election on social media, considering the countermeasures adopted that year by the platforms to reduce its circulation. Disinformation occupies a central space in the public debate in Brazil, where there is massive use of social media. Based on a content analysis of the 153 false or misleading narratives most shared during the campaign period, the results show that contents changed formats to overcome platforms’ countermeasures. Results also highlight a majority of images and a blend of false and accurate information that reshape the phenomenon definition and suggests the inefficacy of current regulations." (Abstract)
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"Through this research we gained insight into tactics employed by state-backed social media disinformation. With that goal, we explored user interactions with inauthentic Twitter accounts. We used multiple procedures to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by t
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he Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We found that users were overwhelming supportive of the IRA accounts, a fact that calls into question the standard representation of these accounts as “trolls.” Users were particularly supportive of the accounts that pretended to be part of a particular ideological group (on both the left and right), supporting arguments that a strategy of building connections with like-minded people was central to the IRA campaign. This strategy seems to work—on days that the Russian accounts received more support they also received more engagement." (Lay summary)
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"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media
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and online campaigns to be deployed by political parties, sometimes at an expense of authenticity, to reach out to these young voters. However, legal and non-legal measures implemented to date have yet to effectively address disinformation. Hence, youth and other voters remain potentially exposed to the risk of online manipulation during the election. This baseline study identifies the risks from 5 recurring patterns of disinformation related to: sexual orientation and promiscuity; corruption; electoral integrity; women politicians and foreign interference. The 2022 Johor Bahru State Election confirms this trend. To mitigate disinformation and build trust in the electoral system and process, Asia Centre has complied some recommendations for key stakeholders in educational institutions, the election commission, government, media, NGOs, political parties, technology companies and youth groups who can implement them as practical safeguards to ensure that first-time and other voters are not subjected to manipulation through disinformation campaigns." (Conclusion, page 34)
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"The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) Inform, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) Empower, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electora
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l process; and (iii) Respond, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects. For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) chatbot – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court’s action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” prebunking actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates). The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners’ media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation. Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints." (Presentation, page 5-6)
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"This report examines the characteristics and consequences of influence operations in the 2022 presidential election in the Philippines. The report makes three main claims: a) the term "influence operations" provides a broader frame to identify personalities, platforms, and practices that hack publi
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c attention, mobilize publics, and influence electoral out; b) influence operations build on cumulative impacts of longitudinal disinformation; c) The main consequence of influence operations in 2022 is the creation of parallel public spheres or two separate information ecosystems aligned with hardened political identities. The document concludes with pathways forward as the nation seeks to rebuild today's distorted public sphere." (Executive summary, page 7)
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"Internet shutdowns in Africa are becoming increasingly widespread, particularly when governments face competitive or contentious elections. They have also come to symbolise a widening fracture between competing conceptions of the global Internet and its regulation. Governments in Africa are justify
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ing shutdowns as able address misinformation and disinformation, protect the election process, and ensure national security. International organisations, NGOs, and social networking platforms condemn these as an inadmissible form of censorship and information control, an abuse by political actors seeking to silence critics or manipulate elections. This article offers an alternative reading on internet shutdowns by placing them in the historical context of the wide range of information controls around elections, many of which are widely regarded as being acceptable and legitimate mechanisms to support competitive elections. By offering this context, we can ask what is new about shutdowns and whether they can ever be regarded as a proportionate response to real concerns of social media and election manipulation. We conclude by highlighting the inequalities of online content moderation as an often-overlooked factor in driving the use of shutdowns, and the failure of social media companies to effectively address misinformation and disinformation in Africa, particularly around elections." (Abstract)
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"Le présent livre blanc passe au peigne fin le parcours trépidant de la HAAC pendant cette campagne inédite au Bénin et dans le monde. Il retrace et analyse les activités menées par la HAAC dans le cadre des communales de 2020, en pointant singulièrement la période de campagne électorale qu
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i fut exclusivement médiatique. C’est un ouvrage de référence qui vise à faire la promotion des expériences de la HAAC en matière de gestion de campagne médiatique des élections, et notamment de cet aspect nouveau de campagne électorale exclusivement médiatique. Cet ouvrage pourrait inspirer plus tard la HAAC ellemême et les instances de régulation des médias qui seraient amenées à faire face à des expériences similaires." (Preface, page 7)
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"Africa's Voices Foundation in partnership with Rift Valley institute (RVI)'s Somali Dialogue Platform implemented a 3-month project between February 8th - May 7th 2022. The project promoted public dialogue around elections so as to understand citizens' perspectives on Somalia's national elections.
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It also amplified citizen voices in political processes and promoted peaceful messaging by using media spaces to contribute to the prevention - of violence. AVF utilized its existing Common Social Accountability Platform (CSAP) to deliver the project. The project aimed to contribute to RVI's Somali Dialogue Platform program by facilitating dialogue amongst Somalis on contentious political issues. At the end of the radio programming, AVF analyzed the rich audience engagement that emerged from the six interactive radio shows to generate insight from public opinion on the election and political processes from different demographic groups. The insights were synthesized to generate actionable recommendations for our partner, RVI, based on citizens' experiences and feedback on elections." (Executive summary)
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