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Politics of Fake News: How WhatsApp Became a Potent Propaganda Tool in India

Gowhar Farooq

Media Watch, volume 9, issue 1 (2018), pp. 106-117

"While the Internet and multimedia applications have made it easy to produce and spread media, they have also made it possible to distribute fake news to masses. With over 200 million active users in India and growing, WhatsApp's reach and features make it a top choice to spread fake news. This not ... more

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Measuring the Reach of 'Fake News' and Online Disinformation in Europe

Richard Fletcher, Alessio Cornia, Lucas Graves, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen

Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2018), 10 pp.

"The purpose of this RISJ factsheet is to provide toplevel usage statistics for the most popular sites that independent fact-checkers and other observers have identified as publishers of false news and online disinformation in two European countries: France and Italy. We focus specifically on sites ... that independent fact-checkers have shown to publish demonstrably false news and information, whether for profit or for ideological/political purposes. This constitutes a more clearly defined subset of a wider range of issues sometimes discussed using the broad, vague, and politicized term “fake news”. We examine France and Italy as two particularly important cases, as both are widely seen as facing serious issues with forprofit and ideologically/politically motivated online disinformation. Based on a starting sample of around 300 websites in each country that independent fact-checkers have identified as publishers of false news (which, on this basis, we refer to as “false news sites”), we focus on measuring these sites’ reach, attention, and number of interactions on Facebook. We provide context by comparing these figures with equivalent data for a small selection of the most widely-used French and Italian news brands. We find that: • None of the false news websites we considered had an average monthly reach of over 3.5% in 2017, with most reaching less than 1% of the online population in both France and Italy. By comparison, the most popular news websites in France (Le Figaro) and Italy (La Repubblica) had an average monthly reach of 22.3% and 50.9%, respectively; • The total time spent with false news websites each month is lower than the time spent with news websites. The most popular false news websites in France were viewed for around 10 million minutes per month, and for 7.5 million minutes in Italy. People spent an average of 178 million minutes per month with Le Monde, and 443 million minutes with La Repubblica—more than the combined time spent with all 20 false news sites in each sample; • Despite clear differences in terms of website access, the level of Facebook interaction (defined as the total number of comments, shares, and reactions) generated by a small number of false news outlets matched or exceeded that produced by the most popular news brands. In France, one false news outlet generated an average of over 11 million interactions per month—five times greater than more established news brands. However, in most cases, in both France and Italy, false news outlets do not generate as many interactions as established news brands." (Pages 1-2) more

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Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation and 'Fake News'

Dean Jackson

Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2018), 5 pp.

"Disinformation is a relatively new word. Most observers trace it back to the Russian word dezinformatsiya, which Soviet planners in the 1950s defined as “dissemination (in the press, on the radio, etc.) of false reports intended to mislead public opinion.” Others suggest that the earliest use o ... more

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Fakten statt Fakes: Verursacher, Verbreitungswege und Wirkungen von Fake News im Bundestagswahlkampf 2017

Alexander Sängerlaub, Miriam Meier, Wolf-Dieter Rühl

Berlin: Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (2018), 102 pp.

"Ziel dieser Studie ist es, empirische Fakten und Hintergründe zum Phänomen Fake-News in Deutschland zu liefern. Der Fokus der Untersuchung liegt darauf, wer an der Entstehung und Verbreitung von Fake News in der digitalen Öffentlichkeit beteiligt ist, wie groß die Reichweiten und wie erfolgreic ... h die Gegenmaßnahmen, zum Beispiel das sogenannte “Debunking” der Fact-Checker, sind. Über einen Zeitraum von sechs Monaten bis zur Bundestagswahl am 24. September 2017 wurden dafür zehn Fake-News-Fälle mit nationaler Reichweite beobachtet, ausgewählt und untersucht. Die Datenbasis war dabei umfassend; untersucht werden konnte ein Großteil der deutschen Online-Öffentlichkeit: öffentlich zugänglichen Facebook-Seiten waren demnach ebenso Bestandteil, der deutschsprachige Twitterraum, aber auch Online-Nachrichtenseiten, Blogs, Foren und die Videoplattform YouTube. Die Untersuchung der Fake News, die zur Bundestagswahl 2017 in Deutschland geteilt wurden, birgt Überraschungen. Einige zuvor medial geäußerte Befürchtungen traten so nicht ein. Weder zeigte unsere empirische Untersuchung viele Fake News aus Russland, die in der Öffentlichkeit signifikante Verbreitung fanden, noch zeigten sich bedeutende Vorgänge aus dem linkspopulistischen Raum. Auch inhaltlich gab es kaum erfolgreiche Desinformation, die sich beispielsweise mit den beiden Spitzenkandidat:innen von SPD und CDU/CSU befassen. Fake News, so wie sich das Phänomen in Deutschland empirisch darstellt, werden vor allem von Rechten, Rechtspopulist:innen und Rechtsextremen verbreitet. Dabei bildet die AfD die Speerspitze der Verbreitung, in sieben von zehn von uns dokumentierten Fällen ist sie unter den Top-10 der reichweitenstärksten Verbreiter. Das rechtspopulistische Netzwerk ist jedoch größer und besonders in den sozialen Netzwerken (allen voran: Facebook) aktiv. Hierzu zählen Medien, wie die Epoch Times, genauso wie rechte Blogs. Doch nicht alle Fake News gehen allein auf das Konto der Social-Media-Kanäle à la Facebook und Twitter: Auch redaktionelle, “klassische” Medien spielen eine Rolle. Mal als versehentlicher Katalysator, mal als bewusster Auslöser, zumeist allerdings als kritisches Korrektiv und Richtigsteller falscher Informationen, wie Süddeutsche.de oder der Faktenfinder der ARD. Andere Medien dagegen machen sich auffallend oft zum Verbreiter von Fake News, wie Bild.de oder Welt.de. Unsauberes Arbeiten betrifft in zwei Fällen auch die dpa, die Deutsche Presse-Agentur, die vor allem eine unrühmliche Rolle bei der Verbreitung der Fake News zum Volksfest in Schorndorf einnahm. Neben Medienhäusern sind zudem staatliche Stellen oder Behörden bei der Verbreitung beteiligt und können selbst zum Auslöser von Fake News werden. Schuld daran ist oft unprofessionelle oder mindestens sorglose Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, ob von der Polizei auf Twitter oder bei der Auskunft staatlicher Stellen gegenüber Medien. In allen von uns dokumentierten Fällen nutzen rechtspopulistische Akteure diese Ungenauigkeiten und instrumentalisieren diese für ihre ideologische Kampagne als Teil ihrer Kommunikationsstrategie. Thematisch bewegen sich die untersuchten Falschinformationen vor allem im Themenfeld “Flüchtlinge und Kriminalität”. Die Flüchtlingskrise, die auch eines der großen Themen der letzten Bundestagswahl war, dominiert demnach unsere Cases: 8 der 10 Fake News haben das Thema „Flüchtlinge“. Insgesamt erzielen Fake News im Vergleich zu regulären Nachrichten klassischer Medien in der Regel nur überschaubare Reichweiten, es sei denn, klassische Medien sind bei der Verbreitung beteiligt. Die große Fake News – das ist die gute Nachricht – blieb in Deutschland aus. Gründe dafür sind zum einen hohe Vertrauenswerte in das hiesige Mediensystem, aber auch die weitaus geringere Bedeutung der Social-Media-Kanäle als Informationsquelle im Vergleich zu den USA. Die stärkste im Rahmen dieser Studie gemessene Fake News betraf eine Meldung über ein Volksfest in der badenwürttembergischen Stadt Schorndorf, auf dem “angeblich 1.000 Migranten randaliert hätten”, so das Narrativ der Fake News. Sie erzeugte ein Engagement von etwa 500.000, dies bedeutet, dass allein eine halbe Million Nutzer:innenaktivitäten in Form von Shares, Likes oder Comments in den Sozialen Netzwerken messbar waren." (Executive summary) more

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Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe

Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Mdeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega, Zev Winkelman

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation (2018), xvii, 130 pp.

"A RAND Corporation study examined Russian-language content on social media and the broader propaganda threat posed to the region of former Soviet states that include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Moldova and Belarus. In addition to employing a state-funded multilingu ... more

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Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature

Joshua A. Trucker, Andrew Guess et al.

Hewlett Foundation (2018), 95 pp.

"The following report is intended to provide an overview of the current state of the literature on the relationship between social media; political polarization; and political “disinformation,” a term used to encompass a wide range of types of information about politics found online, including � ... more

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Fake news: Ambiência digital e os novos modos de ser

Rafael Zanatta, Sergio Amadeu et al.

IHU Online , volume 18, issue 520 (2018), pp. 12-51

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Media effects: Ensaios sobre teorias da comunicação e do jornalismo. Vol. 4: Reflexividade, hermenêutica e Fake News

Gilson Pôrto Jr., Nelson Russo de Moraes, Daniela Barbosa de Oliveira, Vilso Junior Santi, Leila Adriana Baptaglin (eds.)

Porto Alegre; Boa Vista: Editora Fi; Editora da Universidade Federal de Roraima (UFRR) (2018), 224 pp.

"Neste volume trabalhamos com Reflexividade, hermenêutica e Fake News adentrando em questões específicas do contexto social, político e cultural vivenciadas na contemporaneidade. Com um olhar atento para as teorias da comunicação, este volume adentra as peculiaridades das distintas regiões br ... more

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Dangerous Disinformation

D+C: Development and Cooperation, issue May (2018), pp. 23-38

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#DigitalDeceit: The Technologies Behind Precision Propaganda on the Internet

Dipayan Ghosh, Ben Scott

New America (2018), 37 pp.

"This analysis of digital advertising technology and its relevance to disinformation online is designed to broaden the focus in the current public debate beyond Russian operatives buying ads on social media. The problem is much bigger than that and the issues of concern are more diverse. Our analysi ... more

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State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine: Citizen curators of digital disinformation

Yevgeniy Golovchenko, Mareike Hartmann, Rebecca Adler-Nissen

International Affairs, volume 94, issue 5 (2018), pp. 975-994

"This article explores the dynamics of digital (dis)information in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. International Relations scholars have presented the online debate in terms of ‘information warfare’—that is, a number of strategic campaigns to win over local and global public opinion, ... more

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Anti-Western Propaganda

Tamar Kintsurashvili

Tblisi: Media Development Foundation (MDF); UN Association of Georgia; USAID (2018), 38 pp.

"As many as 1,967 anti-Western comments were detected in the 17 monitored media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016 and 2015, when negative messages targeted human identity and rights, in 2017, a dominant topic was the foreign policy with the messages aimed at increasing the polarization on the for ... eign policy orientation of the country. This change in the strategic communication of pro-Kremlin actors shows that “loss of identity” was a rather tactical message that prepared the ground, while the messaging aimed at demonizing Georgia’s strategic partners (USA, NATO, EU) is of strategic nature. The United States of America accounted for the highest share of negative comments (25.9%), up by almost three times as compared to the previous year, followed by NATO (18,4%) and the West (14,1%). Compared to 2016, messages against the European Union have almost doubled (13.4%) whereas the comments about the loss of identity and human rights in anti-Western context have almost halved (12.9%). Comments against nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the US philanthropist George Soros have trebled, as compared to 2016, and comprised 7.3%; this increase can be explained by a stepped up activity of far-right groups and their campaign to smear Open Society Georgia Foundation. Yet another change as compared to the previous years were clearer messages showcasing Russia as an alternative to the West and idealizing the Soviet system (7.2%). Comments against Great Britain (0,8%) have been mainly detected in two pro-Kremlin online media outlets – Georgia and the World, and Sakinformi. Alike previous years, the main source of anti-Western messages was media (827), followed by politicians (463), society (411), civil organizations (230) and the clergy (37). The structure of the Kremlin narrative in the Georgian discourse consists of three stages and aims at: 1. Creating threats; 2. Sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; 3. Ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats and that authoritative/Soviet-style governance is necessary. Four major threats were emphasized by pro-Kremlin actors: threat of war; threat of loss of territories; threat of bio subversion; threat of loss of identity." (Key findings, page 7) more

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Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe

Kyiv: Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” (Prismua); Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center) (2018), 335 pp.

"This research is aimed at assessing national vulnerabilities and preparedness to counteract foreign-led disinformation in 14 countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The Visegrad states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), Eastern Partnership countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia ... more

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Disinformation in Elections

Max Bader

Security and Human Rights, volume 29, issue 1/4 (2018), pp. 24-35

"In recent years there has been increasing attention to the potentially disruptive influence of disinformation on elections. The most common forms of disinformation in elections include the dissemination of ‘fake news’ in order to discredit opponents or to influence the voting process, the falsi ... more

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A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation
Top Insights

Luxembourg: European Union (2018), 39 pp.

"In this report, we favour the word “disinformation” over “fake news.” Disinformation, as used in the Report, includes all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit. Our main message is that the bes ... more

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"Nichts ist, wie es scheint": Über Verschwörungstheorien

Michael Butter

Berlin: Suhrkamp (2018), 270 pp.

"Seit 2015 Hunderttausende Flüchtlinge in die Bundesrepublik kamen, kursiert im Netz die Theorie vom »Großen Austausch«: Das Land solle von einer globalen »Finanzoligarchie« mittels der »Migrationswaffe« ausgeschaltet werden. Neben mangelndem Vertrauen in die Politik ist der Glaube an Versch ... more

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The Oxygen of Amplification: Better Practices for Reporting on Extremists, Antagonists, and Manipulators Online

Whitney Phillips

Data & Society Research Institute (2018), 128 pp.

"Part One, 'In Their Own Words: Trolling, Meme Culture, and Journalists’ Reflections on the 2016 US Presidential Election,' provides a historical overview of the relationship between the news media and far-right manipulators during the 2016 US presidential election. Part Two, 'At a Certain Point Y ... more

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Désinformation 2.0: Comment défendre la démocratie?

Boris Barraud

Paris: L'Harmattan (2018), 253 pp.

"Les nouvelles technologies permettent aux diverses formes de manipulation de l’information de toucher de vastes publics. Chaque citoyen-internaute devient un acteur des manoeuvres de désinformation, en particulier en les relayant sur les réseaux sociaux. Internet constitue ainsi une révolution ... more

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Fake News, Filter Bubbles, Post-Truth and Trust: A Study Across 27 Countries

Ipsos (2018), 35 slides

"Fake news, post-truth and filter bubbles are other people’s problems, not ours…: 65% think that other people live in a bubble on the internet, mostly looking for opinions they already agree with – but only 34% say they live in their own bubble; 63% are confident they can identify fake news - ... more

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The fake news game: Actively inoculating against the risk of misinformation

Jon Roozenbeek, Sander van der Linden

Journal of Risk Research, volume 22, issue 5 (2018), pp. 570-580

"The rapid spread of online misinformation poses an increasing risk to societies worldwide. To help counter this, we developed a ‘fake news game’ in which participants are actively tasked with creating a news article about a strongly politicized issue (the European refugee crisis) using misleadi ... more

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation Top Insights

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation
Top Insights