"This book focuses on the politics, ethics and stereotypical pitfalls of representational practices surrounding Gender-Based Violence (GBV) from a global perspective. The originality of the volume is linked to its cross-disciplinary perspective as the topic of representing GBV is analyzed across the
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domains of philosophy/epistemology, fiction and the arts (including literature, film, television series and music) and non-fictional representations in the media (including broadcast media, online/print journalism, transmedia activism). The volume identifies contemporary representational practices and the theoretical and critical responses, examining various aspects of popular culture from around the world. In doing so, the editors put feminism in conversation with global trends to identify its cultural frontline." (Publisher description)
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"Hate speech is more complex and diverse on social media. It spreads at high speed and can impact behaviors beyond the borders where it originates. Hate is ubiquitous, interactive, and multimedia. It is available 24/7, reaching a much larger audience. On social media, haters can be anonymous and fin
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d support from individuals with the same aggressive mindset. This is just a brief characterization and certainly presents many theoretical gaps that need improvement. This book explores the nature of hate speech on social media. Readers will find chapters written by 21 authors from 18 universities or research centers. It includes researchers from 11 countries, prioritizing a diversity of approaches from the Global North and Global South – Brazil, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA. The analyses herein involve the realities in an even larger number of countries, given the transnational approach of some of these studies." (Preface, page 13)
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"In many countries, especially outside Europe and the United States, we find a significant further decline in the use of Facebook for news and a growing reliance on a range of alternatives including private messaging apps and video networks. Facebook news consumption is down 4 percentage points, acr
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oss all countries, in the last year.
• News use across online platforms is fragmenting, with six networks now reaching at least 10% of our respondents, compared with just two a decade ago. YouTube is used for news by almost a third (31%) of our global sample each week, WhatsApp by around a fifth (21%), while TikTok (13%) has overtaken Twitter (10%), now rebranded X, for the first time.
• Linked to these shifts, video is becoming a more important source of online news, especially with younger groups. Short news videos are accessed by two-thirds (66%) of our sample each week, with longer formats attracting around half (51%). The main locus of news video consumption is online platforms (72%) rather than publisher websites (22%), increasing the challenges around monetisation and connection.
• Although the platform mix is shifting, the majority continue to identify platforms including social media, search, or aggregators as their main gateway to online news. Across markets, only around a fifth of respondents (22%) identify news websites or apps as their main source of online news – that’s down 10 percentage points on 2018. Publishers in a few Northern European markets have managed to buck this trend, but younger groups everywhere are showing a weaker connection with news brands than they did in the past.
• Turning to the sources that people pay most attention to when it comes to news on various platforms, we find an increasing focus on partisan commentators, influencers, and young news creators, especially on YouTube and TikTok. But in social networks such as Facebook and X, traditional news brands and journalists still tend to play a prominent role.
• Concern about what is real and what is fake on the internet when it comes to online news has risen by 3 percentage points in the last year with around six in ten (59%) saying they are concerned. The figure is considerably higher in South Africa (81%) and the United States (72%), both countries that have been holding elections this year.
• Worries about how to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy content in online platforms is highest for TikTok and X when compared with other online networks. Both platforms have hosted misinformation or conspiracies around stories such as the war in Gaza, and the Princess of Wales’s health, as well as so-called ‘deep fake’ pictures and videos." (Executive summary, page 10)
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"Desinformation begleitet den russischen Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine und erreicht auch ein deutsches Publikum. Sie dient der Stärkung russischer Propaganda und ist geeignet, die deutsche und europäische Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfähigkeit in Bezug auf den Krieg zu stören und negativ zu beein
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flussen. Zwischen Frühjahr und Herbst 2022 ist die Zustimmung zu pro-russischen Propagandanarrativen in der deutschen Bevölkerung signifikant gestiegen. Seit Beginn des russischen Überfalls im Februar 2022 hat sich die Landschaft der Desinformations-Sender:innen fragmentiert. Wo zu Beginn RT DE (Russia Today Deutsch) dominierte, hat dessen Abschaltung durch die EU im März 2022 Raum für andere Akteur:innen gemacht. Dazu gehören russische Botschaften sowie die sogenannten „Alternativmedien“ und pro-russische Influencer:innen. Desinformationskampagnen richten sich auch gezielt gegen ukrainische Geflüchtete. Es kursiert wiederholt und in vielfältigen Variationen Desinformation, die geeignet ist, die Solidarität mit der Ukraine und den von dort Geflüchteten zu zersetzen. Thematisch behaupten diese Beiträge fälschlich etwa die Veruntreuung von Hilfsgütern, aggressives Verhalten von Geflüchteten oder stellen die Unterstützung des angegriffenen Landes als Bedrohung der eigenen Grundbedürfnisse dar. Falsche Behauptungen über Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine verbleiben dabei nicht im digitalen Raum, sondern werden auch in die analoge Welt übertragen. Im verschwörungsideologischen Milieu traf die Nachricht des russischen Angriffs auf die Ukraine auf eine bereits seit 2014 etablierte pro-russische und anti-amerikanische Grundhaltung. Entsprechend wurde sich zu Kriegsbeginn fast durchweg anti-ukrainisch positioniert und der Angriffskrieg Russlands verharmlost bis legitimiert." (Zentrale Erkenntnisse, Seite 1)
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"In many parts of the world, journalists work in increasingly hostile environments. To better understand the characteristics and implications of hostility against the press in a hybrid regime, this study explores how journalists in Serbia perceive and experience anti-press hate speech. Based on 20 i
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nterviews with diverse reporters, we describe hate speech against journalists as an ad hominem attack triggered by the very nature of journalistic conduct. We discuss two identified mechanisms of hate speech propagation. The first, machinery of hate speech, refers to orchestrated attacks on independent journalists by ruling party officials, pro-government news outlets, and troll armies. In contrast, the lone-wolf-haters mechanism refers to authentic and sporadic expressions of hate by extreme partisan audiences to which all journalists are susceptible, regardless of their affiliation. Describing their personal experiences, the participants report various responses to encountering hate speech, ranging from immediate emotions to less immediate psychological reactions to physical health problems. To prevent hateful acts from interfering with their journalistic performance, they rely on a variety of coping strategies and mechanisms, including psychological and professional strategies, as well as social and institutional support." (Abstract)
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"This report builds off research conducted in Czechia, Romania, and Serbia by an international team of media experts. The research aimed to identify inspiring and impactful ways that the private sector in these countries is engaging in efforts to counter disinformation and bolster independent journa
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lism. It sought to draw out what motivates the business community to meaningfully support information integrity, and what prevents greater involvement of this group." (Page 1) [...] "The research identified one promising example of a pooled fund created to support independent journalism—the Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism (NFNŽ) in Czechia. Established in 2016 by 12 businessmen who were all part of a local business club, the NFNŽ emerged as a reaction to the negative impact that oligarchization of the Czech media had begun to exert on the country’s democracy, a common concern of all its founders. The declared goal of the endowment’s founders is to maintain media pluralism and independence in Czechia, which they view as a key condition for meaningful political deliberation. The endowment has played a key role both in the philanthropic and journalistic communities in Czechia. A set of internal governance mechanisms ensures transparency of the fund’s actions and accountability of its decisions. As a result of the rigorous procedures, the NFNŽ has attracted financial contributions from around 200 small business donors. The endowment has played a central role in strengthening the health of the local journalistic culture by financing 110 journalistic initiatives to date that received a combined CZK 31 million ($1.4 million). Its projects aim to improve the work of various media outlets, such as the launch of a podcast section by Deník N. The fund also promotes independent journalism in the country. Since 2018, the endowment has organized the Journalist Forum, an annual event that has become the go-to networking venue for many of the country’s journalists." (Page 13)
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"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. D
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iplomatic channels are an integral part of FIMI incidents. Russia's diplomatic channels regularly serve as enablers of FIMI operations. They are deployed across wide range of topics. China also uses diplomatic channels, mostly targeting the US. Impersonation techniques become more sophisticated. Impersonations of international and trusted organisations and individuals are used by Russian actors particularly to target Ukraine. Print and TV media are most often impersonated, with magazines seeing their entire style copied. FIMI actor collusion exists but is limited. Official Russian actors were involved in 88 analysed FIMI incidents. Chinese actors were involved in 17. In at least 5 cases, both actors engaged jointly. FIMI is multilingual. Incidents do not occur in just one language; content is translated and amplified in multiple languages. Incidents featured at least 30 languages, 16 of which are EU-languages. Russia used a larger variety of languages than Chinese actors but 44% of Russian content targeted a Russian-speaking populations, while 36% targeted English-speaking populations. FIMI is mostly intended to distract and distort. Russia (42%) and China (56%) mostly intend to direct attention to a different actor or narrative or to shift blame ('distract'). Russia attempts to change the framing and narrative ('distort') relatively more often (35%) than China (18%). FIMI remains mostly image and video based. The cheap and easy production and distribution of image and video material online makes these formats still the most commonly used." (Executive summary)
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"Increased understanding of the root causes, scale, and impact of online harmful content and the effectiveness of the existing frameworks and tools: 10 research reports examining the national legal frameworks governing harmful content [...] Local stakeholders empowered and new cooperation and practi
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cal tools and mechanisms developed to counter harmful content online: 3 National Multistakeholder Coalitions for Content Moderation and Freedom of Expression launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (with 17 stakeholders), Indonesia (with 12 stakeholders), and Kenya (with 30 stakeholders) [...] Enhanced support and promotion of peacebuilding narratives through digital technologies, in particular social media: 194 representatives from 121 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) trained (60 from 20 CSOs in BiH, 50 from 44 CSOs in Kenya, 31 from 20 CSOs in Indonesia, and 53 from 20 CSOs in Colombia) [...]" (Pages 1-2)
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"The three countries [Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, and Kenya] provide evidence of online hate speech and disinformation affecting human rights offline. The evidence is not comprehensive yet clear enough to raise serious concerns. Online gender-based violence is also reported as critical in the
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three countries. In the three countries, national legislation to address harmful content shows some degree of inconsistency in comparison to international standards, notably in relation to the protection of freedom of expression. The reasons for such inconsistency vary among countries. The effective enforcement of legal frameworks is uneven in all three countries. Social and cultural inequalities are often reproduced in government or judicial decisions, and vagueness in legislation opens space for discretionary decisions. Platform companies have offices in Indonesia and Kenya, but not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the three countries, there is a lack of transparency in how companies allocate the roles of moderation tasks, including the number of different language moderators and their trusted partners and sources. Companies do not process content moderation in some of the main local languages and community standards are not entirely or promptly available in local languages." (Executive summary)
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"Ukraine has been building its capacity to use humour as a strategic communications tool since Russian first invasion in 2014. After Russia launched the full-scale war in February 2022, this often grassroots effort was multiplied by many new actors joining it. Foreign supporters of Ukraine stepped i
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n to expose lies of Russian officials in social media, resulting in a creation of NAFO movement. The use of humour by the Ukrainian government officials also pushed the boundaries of what is considered acceptable in digital diplomacy. Numerous jokes and memes have been created that will remain in the historical record of this war, such as the “Russian warship” meme, “sunflower seeds in a pocket”, “bavovna”( cotton), and others. However, humour should not overshadow the terrible reality of war Ukrainians have to face daily until this day. It should not distract attention from the need for Ukraine to win and Russia to be held accountable for its war crimes. Humour helped Ukrainians cope with the trauma of war and preserve mental health. For foreign audiences, especially in the West, it helped to introduce Ukraine as a country that is a part of the same cultural space, has similar values, and is worthy of support. Witty jokes and creative memes opened a window for many to discover Ukrainian history and culture. Satire helped to expose the absurdity of Russian imperialist ideology and propaganda narratives the Kremlin used to launch its invasion of Ukraine." (Conclusion)
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"Social media platforms have a wide and influential reach, and as such provide anopportunity to increase vaccine uptake. To date, there is no large-scale, robust evidence on the offline effects of online messaging campaigns. We aimed to test whether pre-tested, persuasive messaging campaigns from UN
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ICEF, disseminated on Facebook, influenced COVID-19 vaccine uptake in Ukraine, India, and Pakistan. In Ukraine, we deployed a stepped-wedge randomized controlled trial (RCT). Half of the 24 oblasts (provinces) received five weeks of the intervention, the other half ten weeks of the intervention. In India, an RCT with an augmented synthetic control was conducted in five states (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan), whereby 40 out of 174 districts were randomized to receive six weeks of intervention. In Pakistan we deployed a pre-post design, whereby 25 city districts received six weeks of the intervention. Weekly COVID-19 vaccination data was sourced through government databases. Using Poisson regression models, the association between the intervention and vaccine uptake was estimated. In Ukraine we conducted a survey among Facebook users at three time points during the RCT, to ascertain vaccination intentions and trust in vaccines. The campaigns reached more than 110 million Facebook users and garnered 2.9 million clicks. In Ukraine, we found that the intervention did not affect oblast-level vaccination coverage (Relative Risk (RR): 0.93, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 0.86-1.01). Similarly, in India and Pakistan we found no effect of our intervention (India: RR 0.85, 95% CI 0.70-1.04; Pakistan: RR 0.64, 95% CI 0.01-29.9). The survey among Facebook users in Ukraine showed that trust in vaccines and information sources was an important predictor of vaccination status and intention to get vaccinated. Our campaigns on Facebook had a wide reach, which did not translate in shifting behaviours. Timing and external events may have limited the effectiveness of our interventions." (Abstract)
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"In order to spread Russian narratives about Ukraine that create a false impression of the country among external and internal audiences, the Russian Federation uses a whole complex of information and communication channels. Their main task is to replace the target audience's existing ideas about th
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e real, factual state of affairs with ideas that are considered to be more beneficial to the aggressor country. Russia rejects democratic principles and Ukraine's desire for a European future. Depending on the tasks and results (successes/failures) of operations to influence the internal politics of Ukraine and the formation of its image among the Western audience, Russian narratives changed from a presentation of Ukrainians and Russians as “brotherly” peoples or even one people to the importance of the complete extermination of "Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis," denial of the very existence of Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group (thereby “justifying” genocide), returning supposed "historical territories of Russia," and promoting the idea that Ukraine has never really been a proper state or is a historic mistake. The narratives of Russian propaganda intertwine, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes contradicting each other. But whatever the Russian narrative may be, its main goal is to undermine Ukraine’s democratic development and its integration into the Western world, to weaken the desire of Ukrainians to determine their future outside Russian influence, within the European family, as well as to weaken international support for Ukraine. The Kremlin's disinformation campaign led to the emergence of a number of stereotypes that influenced the decision-making of Ukraine's partners at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which led to numerous human casualties, the destruction of Ukrainian economy and infrastructure, and a real threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fortunately, Ukraine has persevered. Unbreakable people of an unbreakable country continues its fight not only for itself but the whole democratic world." (Summary)
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