"This paper has demonstrated that the benefits for the general Afghan and Iraqi public derived from the ‘promotion of independent media’ by institutions like the NED are questionable, especially for parties interested in encouraging more deliberative or participatory forms of democracy. Instead,
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the promotion of ‘independent’ media in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to be playing a key role in the promotion of low-intensity democracy or polyarchy. Additionally, it also appears that countries of greater geostrategic value need more ‘democratization’, for example, both countries have roughly the same population but ‘oil rich Iraq received 20 times more American media development assistance per year than war-ravaged Afghanistan, one of the poorest nations on earth’ (Rohde, 2005: 29). With such large amounts of money being wielded by ‘democracy promoters’, their short term influences may impact heavily on both countries, yet perhaps the most significant effects of these media interventions will be felt in the long term. Previous case studies have shown that groups or individuals supported by ‘democracy promoters’ are expected to move on to fill leading roles within their societies." (Conclusion, page 124)
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"U.S. funding for international media development in 2006—public and private—exceeded $142 million; U.S. government funding totaled nearly $69 million; U.S. private sector funding totaled over $60 million; and Funding from government-supported nonprofit organizations—the National Endowment for
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Democracy and U.S. Institute of Peace—totaled $13 million." (Executive summary)
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"Aiding and training journalists and media managers, along with civil society groups, paid off in Georgia. The American and Western investment helped to generate the Rose Revolution, and resulted in a potentially more democratic, open and Western-leaning society. It was a comparatively economical, a
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nd certainly more peaceful, way of inducing democratic change than most other forms of intervention." (Conclusion, page 27)
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"The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 for the development of independent media, including activities such as journalism and business management training and support for legal and regulatory frameworks. About 60 p
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ercent of the fiscal year 2004 USAID and State obligations we identified supported independent media development projects in Europe and Eurasia. However, precise funding levels are difficult to identify due to a lack of agencywide budget codes to track media development obligations, differing definitions of independent media development, and complex funding patterns. State and USAID face challenges in designing performance indicators and accurately measuring and reporting results directly tied to the performance of U.S. independent media efforts. The tools most frequently used by State and USAID as performance indicators—Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press survey and the IREX Media Sustainability Index—are useful for determining the status of the media in selected countries but are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of U.S.-sponsored programs and activities toward developing independent media in countries when used alone. Several country-specific and programmatic challenges can impede the implementation of media development efforts, including a changing political condition, sustainability of local media outlets, and coordination between donors and providers. Specifically, a country’s changing political condition or lack of adequate civic and legal institutions can create challenges for a mission to plan, implement, and measure the results of its efforts. The sustainability of program recipients can also impede the overall success of efforts or specific activities at the country level. In addition, when coordination of activities is unstructured or informal, redundancies and confusion of responsibilities can impact project implementation." (Summary)
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"1. USAID media assistance was effective in promoting and strengthening independent media [...] 2. Comprehensive training programs had multiplier effects on upgrading the professional skills of journalists and instilling the norms of free press. But they suffered from implementation problems [...] 3
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. The economic sustainability of the independent media outlets remained a major problem [...] 4. Progress promoting legal and regulatory reforms was slow and halting [...] 5. Donor coordination of media assistance was limited except in crisis situations [...] 6. USAID has not focused on community radio stations, which can promote both democracy and development in poor countries [...] 7. Built-in safeguards to ensure the independence and integrity of media programs from political manipulation and interference worked well [...] 8. Independent media building has served U.S. national interests." (Executive summary)
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"When the Communist barricades collapsed in 1989, hundreds of Americans rushed to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to spread the gospel of democracy. Among them were some of America’s most altruistic journalists, who hoped to midwife a newly independent press. Since then, the U.S. go
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vernment and private agenc ies have spent more than $600 million on media development. The payoff for these millions has been the training and empowerment of thousands of journalists, the establishment of numerous television and radio networks, the resurrection and creation of newspapers and, in some countries, the toppling of corrupt governments due to reporting that was unimaginable before 1989. Balancing these successes, though, is a second wave of repression and censorship in many places, including the core post-Communist societies where most of the money was spent. In much of the former U.S.S.R, for example, millions of dollars in aid have not produced a viable independent media." (Introduction)
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"Serbian media assistance programs reflect two approaches to media development. Though they occasionally created friction, the differing approaches produced positive results. The goal of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) was to fund programs and media outlets that could dissemin
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ate messages pushing immediate political change. USAID/OTI characterized its activities as “pushing the reform agenda.” This approach contrasted with but complemented that of USAID’s Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (USAID/E&E), which supported long-term, sustainable media development projects. While USAID/E&E’s projects contributed to the short-term goal of regime change in Serbia, they were also designed to aid the democratic transition that followed. Despite—or perhaps because of—this dynamic tension, the overall USAID program was very successful. Democratic elements in Serbia received— and still have—the media tools to effect democratic change. NGOs, media outlets, and democratic activists also received the topical programs and emergency infusions funded by USAID/OTI and USAID/E&E. Two years after the fall of Milosevic, personnel and basic media infrastructure remain in place to serve the ongoing democratic transition and broaden coverage of issues in public discourse." (Executive summary, page xi-xii)
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"Determining that the time had come to derive lessons from past efforts, think afresh about media assistance, and perhaps add some new models - including approaches for Africa and Asia, where the cultural preconditions and economic prospects are quite different from those of Europe - USAID’s Burea
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u for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) undertook a year-long evaluation and review of USAID’s media assistance programs. The goal of the review was to develop a set of learning tools and promote a more aggressive media development agenda. The media assistance review was launched in July 2002 by PPC’s Dr. Krishna Kumar, who convened about 30 USAID and public diplomacy officials, congressional aides, journalists, and NGO media development practitioners to assess what has worked, what has not, and what might be done differently. Much of the discussion focused on the need to create professional, independent media that can give voice to different sectors of society, provide useful information, and hold powerful institutions and individuals accountable. The candid discussion also revealed areas of tension. Media development practitioners cited tensions arising from the possibility that the goals of public diplomacy were sometimes incompatible with the goals underlying the promotion of the development of independent, indigenous media. Another tension related to the competing priorities and methods of media work in conflict zones versus those of long-term media development in more stable developing democracies." (Introduction, page 7)
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"The international mission, as U.S. and Western representatives saw it, was to reconstruct a viable multi-ethnic media, as well as to prevent further conflict. NATO was seeking to build, under the Dayton Accords, a plural society out of pieces that seemed fractured beyond repair. The OHR believed th
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at a pluralistic, peaceful media was an indispensable part of the rebuilding process. The Office proclaimed its desire to "use the opportunity to remove one of the most serious obstacles bedeviling our efforts to re-establish civil society in Bosnia" - the fact that the media was ethnically based.358 NATO and OHR actions must be judged after a reasonable period of time elapses to see if a more democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported by the pluralism that comes from a free and independent press, emerges. Still, one of the great dangers of information intervention is that it provides apparent democratic justification for any nation to use its police power to close down media outlets. Each time the international community intervenes to shut down a media outlet that it does not like, the line between information intervention and censorship becomes blurred. The real test is not only whether an information intervention transforms a society but also whether the intervention comports with the spirit of democratic change. Ends can justify means, but it is helpful if the means themselves are compatible with those ends." (Conclusion, page 111-112)
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"As such, support for media is an important prong of U.S. democracy and governance assistance. USAID’s objective of the increased development of a politically active civil society provides a strategic rationale for mediarelated activities. In addition, a desired result of an enhanced free flow of
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information broadly states the Agency's target for media activities. [...] The strategic approach presented in this paper offers guidance to USAID missions, rather than any blueprint, for making choices about which media activities might be most appropriate in a given context. In addition to suggesting a goal to guide USAID media programs, the approach provides examples of successful media assistance activities and discusses factors influencing their success." (Introduction, page 1-2)
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"Essentiel des exposés faits au 19e Congrès de la F.I.E.J. sur le thème de l'assistance à la presse des pays en voie de développement — Les formes de l'aide africaine, latino-américaine, belge, française, américaine, anglaise et allemande y sont successivement exposées." (Jean-Marie Van B
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ol, Abdelfattah Fakhfakh: The use of mass media in the developing countries. Brussels: CIDESA, 1971 Nr. 50, topic code 122)
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"The state of the communications media in tropical Africa — Radio, which lends itself to a system of collective listening, is the medium which should be borne most in mind — What are the possibilities of developing radio (broadcasting, reception, training of specialist staff, production of progr
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ammes, especially educational programmes)? — The work will serve as a basic study for American aid to this region, involving 14 countries." (Jean-Marie Van Bol, Abdelfattah Fakhfakh: The use of mass media in the developing countries. Brussels: CIDESA, 1971 Nr. 1080, topic code 051)
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"Training of personnel for work with the communication media in Latin America — The importance of technical training in this field — Technical assistance from the United States — Need to set up a communication media centre particularly for the training of personnel — Where should such a cent
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re be set up?" (Jean-Marie Van Bol, Abdelfattah Fakhfakh: The use of mass media in the developing countries. Brussels: CIDESA, 1971 Nr. 2300, topic code 442.2)
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"Moving knowledge and proved techniques from the more developed to the developing countries is the essence of the economic and technical cooperation programs. Wtihin this broad framework, communication media have two different but mutually complementing functions: one, to create or increase competen
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ce in the communications media in the participating countries-thus serving as a substantive program; and two, to support programs in agriculture, health, industry and the like-thereby performing a service function. The development of camnunications media, particularly in its service function, is essential to the effectiveness of technical cooperation programs, inasmuch as it enables them to move more knowledge more rapidly and to more people at less cost. This development is desirable since the need to reach and teach vast numbers of semi-literate and illiterate people-and to do so in such a way that the new-acquired knowledge is translated into action and into new behavior patterns is becoming more urgent every day. To foster the communications media, a conference of technicians engaged in this field throughout Latin America was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from the 24 of February through the first of March 1958." (Introduction)
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