"Die Zustimmungswerte zu pro-russischen Verschwörungserzählungen in der deutschen Gesamtbevölkerung steigen. Im Vergleich zu den Umfrageergebnissen einer CeMAS-Analyse aus April 2022 stiegen sowohl alle Zustimmungswerte als auch alle Werte der teils-teils-Antworten im Hinblick auf die Haltung zu
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pro-russischen Verschwörungserzählungen in der deutschen Bevölkerung signifikant an. Mit 19 % stimmte fast jede:r Fünfte der Aussage zu, dass der russische Angriffskrieg eine alternativlose Reaktion Russlands auf die Provokation der NATO wäre. 21 % stimmten dieser Aussage teilweise zu. Im April lag die Zustimmung hier bei 12 % und die teils-teils-Antwort bei 17 %. Den zweithöchsten Zustimmungswert der abgefragten Items erreichte die Aussage, Putin würde gegen eine globale Elite vorgehen, die im Hintergrund die Fäden zöge. Mit 18 % im Vergleich zu 12 % im April nahm diese Aussage um 6 Prozentpunkte zu. Die teils-teils-Antworten stiegen mit 26 % im Vergleich zu 20 % im April um 6 Prozentpunkte an." (Seite 1)
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"Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine im Februar 2022 nutzen Rechtsextreme die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen für ihre Propaganda. Dabei lassen sich sowohl pro-ukrainische als auch prorussische Positionierungen beobachten. Insbesondere werden gezielt Desinformationen und Versch
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wörungserzählungen verbreitet. Eine zentrale Plattform stellt Telegram dar: Rechtsextreme und verschwörungsideologische Akteur:innen können hier ungestört ihre Propaganda betreiben, meist ohne Löschungen befürchten zu müssen." (Seite 2)
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"The spread of disinformation around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects wider challenges related to the shift in how information is produced and distributed. Platform and algorithm designs can amplify the spread of disinformation by facilitating the creation of echo chambers and confirmation bi
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as mechanisms that segregate the news and information people see and interact with online; information overload, confusion and cognitive biases play into these trends. A particular challenge is that people tend to spread falsehoods “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth”; this is particularly the case for false political news. For example, one study found that tweets containing false information were 70% more likely to be retweeted than accurate tweets. Another study found that false information on Facebook attracts six times more engagement than factual posts. In addition, feedback loops between the platforms and traditional media can serve to further amplify disinformation, magnifying the risk that disinformation can be used to deliberately influence public conversations, as well as confuse and discourage the public. The flow of – and disruption caused by – Russian disinformation has significantly increased since Russia's invasion in February 2022. In turn, Ukraine’s response to the Russian disinformation threat has built upon progress made in strengthening the information and media environment since 2014 and in establishing mechanisms to respond directly to information threats. These include efforts to provide accurate information, ensure that media organisations can continue operations, and policy efforts to combat the threats posed by Russian state-linked media." (Page 2)
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"In posts by Chinese diplomats, the US, NATO and the West were almost exclusively blamed or criticised for Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Russia was not specifically blamed. The most common posts shared news relating to the conflict (including readouts of Xi Jinping’s calls with world
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leaders), primarily from Chinese state media. Those articles usually presented China’s and, where they aligned, Russia’s views of the conflict. They frequently reported on the actions of Chinese officials reiterating China’s position. Chinese diplomats repeated Russian conspiracy theories about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine with gusto and linked the alleged activities to conspiracy theories about the origin of Covid-19. Posts about Ukraine on Facebook mostly underperformed compared to regular posts, except in Europe. On Twitter, Ukraine material appeared to broadly perform better than non-Ukraine material, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. Chinese diplomats did not appear to specifically target the Chinese diaspora (by posting in Chinese) in posts about Ukraine to any significant extent on Facebook or Twitter. A selection of CGTN content on YouTube largely mirrored the narratives of the Chinese officials on Twitter and Facebook." (Executive summary)
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"This study used Twitter advertisements to solicit survey participation from the most-influential members of pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia communities of Twitter users identified in an analysis of 25 million Russian language tweets emanating from Eastern Europe. Survey results suggest that pro-Ukraine
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activists are eager to counter Russian influence. Large percentages of respondents reported using Twitter to help counter Russian influence, and they take this activism to other social media accounts and offline channels, including talking to family members or friends and.to a lesser extent.participating in advocacy groups. At least half of the sample reported being open to receiving additional social media training, and most did not seem opposed to taking this support from the European Union, United States, or Ukraine. However, a hypothetical agreement to receive funding or participate in training does not mean that participants actually would do so. Following a brand ambassador model would help connect influential users with training and content. This model would involve reaching out, building an initial relationship, and establishing trust with these activists. It might be possible to help such users join together to advocate for a unified and democratic Ukraine, increase awareness of particular Russian influence campaigns, disseminate memes or video content addressing media literacy, or identify Russian bots and trolls." (Key findings)
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"This article investigates the use of social media for visual framing of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Using a large set of visual data from a popular social networking site, Vkontakte, the authors employ content analysis to examine how the conflict was represented and interpreted in pro-Ukrainia
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n and pro-Russian online communities during the peak of violence in summer 2014.The findings point to the existence of profound differences in framing the conflict among pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian online communities. The former tended to interpret the conflict as a limited military action against local insurgents, whereas the latter presented it as an all-out war against the Russian population of Eastern Ukraine. The article suggests that framing the conflict through social media facilitated the propagation of mutually exclusive views on the conflict and led to the formation of divergent expectations in Ukraine and Russia concerning the outcome of the war in Donbas." (Abstract)
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