"Social media allow ordinary people, civic groups, and journalists to reach a vast audience at little or no cost, but they have also provided an extremely useful and inexpensive platform for malign influence operations by foreign and domestic actors alike. Political leaders employed individuals to s
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urreptitiously shape online opinions in 38 of the 65 countries covered in this report—a new high. In many countries, the rise of populism and far-right extremism has coincided with the growth of hyperpartisan online mobs that include both authentic users and fraudulent or automated accounts. They build large audiences around similar interests, lace their political messaging with false or inflammatory content, and coordinate its dissemination across multiple platforms. Cross-border influence operations, which first drew widespread attention as a result of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential contest, are also an increasingly common problem. Authorities in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a growing list of other countries have expanded their efforts to manipulate the online environment and influence foreign political outcomes over the past year." (Page 1)
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"A luta contra a desinformação não é nova, mas atingiu proporções inimagináveis há algumas décadas. O volume de conteúdos, a velocidade e o alcance conferiram mudanças qualitativas ao problema, exigindo um esforço para a descoberta de novas formas de enfrentá-lo. Longe de esgotarmos o a
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ssunto nesta publicação, procuramos destacar alguns dos aspectos que nos parece ser mais relevantes para a compreensão do fenômeno e para buscar soluções para confrontá-lo. São poucas as soluções globais, mas já existem princípios e dispositivos suficientes para nos orientar no bom caminho da manutenção dos direitos fundamentais, do fortalecimento dos dispositivos democráticos e da imprescindibilidade da transparência. Fortalecer as soluções coletivas, a busca de regulação dos agentes privados a partir dos dispositivos democráticos e o amplo debate crítico com a sociedade ainda nos parecem ser a melhor abordagem para avançarmos no combate a este problema em consonância com a garantia do direito à comunicação, compreendido em sua interdependência com os demais direitos fundamentais." (Conclusão, página 46)
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"The websites creating misinformation content in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classified into four categories based on their financial and/or political motivations and the extent to which they provide valuable journalistic contributions. The majority of misinformation websites are motivated solely
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by profit which they generate via Google AdSense. Established media outlets engage in misinformation practices either to compete for readers' attention or on behalf of their political patrons. Two relatively secretive websites have established themselves as influential leaders in misinformative propaganda, primarily preoccupied with benefiting their political patrons rather than obtaining profits. Due to secrecy and lack of regulation, it is extremely difficult to establish the financial background of these websites." (Main findings, page 1)
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"The dynamism of Russia’s information warfare is best illustrated by the fact that over the last decade it underwent at least two strategic shifts—after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and in 2014 when Russia went from being risk-averse and stealthy to increasingly aggressive and risk-taking. E
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ffective countermeasures, especially those applied in Central and Eastern Europe, must reflect this reality by being highly adaptable and agile—a factor that local anti-information-warfare capacities often lack." (Executive summary)
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"Efforts to fight the spread of disinformation have had mixed results. Self-regulation by online platforms such as Twitter or Facebook puts a great deal of power in their hands, with potentially negative effects on independent news outlets that depend on social media for their outreach. State regula
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tion, meanwhile, raises concerns of censorship. There is a danger that methods intended to reduce disinformation, implemented clumsily or without sufficient regard for their effects, will actually exacerbate the anti-establishment feeling that drives disinformation in the first place. Just as the disinformation problem can, to a great extent, be traced back to wider structural faults in the political system, the solution, too, must be partly structural. There must be a shift in commercial practices to disrupt the commercial motivations driving disinformation, make online platforms more fair, transparent and open, and reduce the pressure on media outlets to compete for attention." (Executive summary)
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"Facebook is the Internet in Myanmar, and it presents both opportunities for and challenges to the government, the opposition, and the people in a country that is in transition. Facebook has gained notoriety as a platform for hate speech and fake news in Myanmar over the past seven years. Facebook h
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as removed hundreds of accounts and pages allied with or supportive of the Myanmar military, or engaged in coordinated deceptive behaviour. The National League for Democracy government has sought to control and regulate social media by establishing a social media monitoring body and preparing a cyber law, but without much impact to date. Both Facebook’s close monitoring of accounts and defamation suits have made Facebook users in Myanmar more cautious, but supporters of the National League for Democracy, the military and opposition parties still rely heavily on Facebook for partisan political communication." (Executive summary)
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"Our analysis of millions of Russian tweets over 2014-2018 reveals that bots make up a large proportion of the Russian political Twittersphere. However, an important lesson from our region is that one cannot assume that simply because there are bots present in the Russian political Twittersphere tha
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t they are pro-Kremlin. Instead, as it turns out, pro-opposition, pro-Kiev, and neutral bots proliferate as well. We therefore also developed machine learning models that allow us to distinguish between three major groups of political bots in Russia at scale, including pro-Kremlin, pro-opposition, and pro-Kyiv bots. It is worth noting, though, that the fourth residual category of bots that we call neutral actually make up a plurality of these bot-orientation types. Our preliminary analysis of bot activity shows that across the entire data set, bots mainly seem to be being used to amplify political messages. In the case of neutral bots, amplification is conducted via tweeting repetitive texts, whereas non-neutral bots achieve this via retweeting. It appears that the sources of retweets from Russian political bots are either mass media with strong political orientation or prominent political figures. Exciting topics for future research would include more deeply diving into the topics of the messages shared by bots, better understanding whether the target audience for these shared messages are humans or other computer algorithms (e.g., to influence search rankings), and testing hypotheses related to over-time variation in the use of political bots, both in Russia and beyond." (Conclusion)
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"The central focus of this study is the dynamic and complex relationship between elections and (digital) media. This choice of focus is explained by the need to safeguard the integrity and credibility of electoral processes, as well as the role of the news media during election periods, in the face
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of new issues related to the digital environment. These issues include (i) online disinformation; (ii) the digital dimension of the safety of journalists and other media actors, and (iii) disruptive practices in election campaigning and communications." (Introduction)
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"The presented report looks at 49 major Slovak disinformation and misinformation websites and sketches out their ownership as well as financial background. The report succeeds in identifying the ownership or operational structure behind 35 websites. In terms of financial data, the report canvasses f
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our sources of income: tax designation, e-commerce, crowdfunding, and advertising. In conclusion, the Slovak misinformation and disinformation website scene appears to be run by multiple independent entities using various business models to sustain operation. Transparency and accountability remain an issue in most of the cases: Most of the websites with an unclear or concealed background are health and lifestyle related; 57% of websites were established during 2013-2016; Out of 14 health and lifestyle websites only one does not display ads or sells goods and services; Out of 49 websites, 38 either display ads or sell goods and services." (Main findings, page 1)
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"Convergence of services usually affects the quality and price of services offered by providers. However, this has not been the case in Romania yet. People benefit from a very competitive market and enjoy fairly cheap services, but the implications of convergence on the content made available to con
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sumers are less beneficial for citizens. If three major companies start controlling both the infrastructure and the media content, the production of good quality journalism is likely to be affected and tastes and ideas could be shaped in unexpected ways. If these companies establish ties with the political elites as well and start endorsing certain ideologies, they can start having an unwarranted impact on society. Although these concerns are now hypothetical, they are grounded in practices that could be observed already for years in Romania. Social media is becoming increasingly influential as a source of information, with more than two-thirds of Romanians getting their news from Facebook, YouTube and other social media platforms. Recent debates surrounding fake news have prompted calls for regulation of the online media in a similar way broadcast activities have been regulated for decades. Civil society organizations have been critical of such initiatives, fearing that they could pave the way to the reintroduction of censorship disguised as user protection." (Page 4)
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"In this chapter we begin by surveying the digital political landscape, which has provided a fertile breeding ground for trolling as a state tool for suppression of dissenting ideas. We observe the tactical move by states from an ideology of information scarcity to one of information abundance, whic
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h sees "speech itself as a censorial weapon" (Wu 2017). This era of information abundance has enabled states to sponsor and execute trolling attacks using ordinary internet users as well as volunteer, amateur and professional trolling institutions. Under the heading "The Anatomy of Patriotic Trolling," we outline salient patterns from more than 15 case studies across seven countries illustrating the common tools and tactics in state-sponsored trolling attacks. Drawing on campaigns across Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador, the Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela and the United States, we are able to establish the existence of a broader trend within which national variations occur. We then offer a framework for conceptualizing the responsibility of states for such attacks. We argue attribution is critical to elucidating remedies to state-sponsored trolling. As long as the role of governments in instigating or leveraging such campaigns is obscured, it will be impossible to advance effective technological or regulatory solutions. We conclude by offering some preliminary policy proposals, hoping this chapter will prompt a further debate about effective and necessary interventions." (Pages 503-504)
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"Esta guía instruccional está diseñada para el uso de periodistas, facilitadores, académicos y estudiantes con el fin de contextualizar la crisis de las ‘noticias falsas’ del siglo 21. Por medio de algunos casos relevantes y un cronograma, los usuarios podrán informarse de manera más efect
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iva sobre las causas y consecuencias del ‘desorden informacional’—desde ataques periodísticos de ‘trolls,’ hasta la manipulación de elecciones y crisis diplomáticas. Aunque históricamente los medios también se han visto involucrados en la desinformación, esto no se considera un legítimo paradigma contemporáneo en los diferentes medios de comunicación. Es por esto que las manifestaciones contemporáneas de la desinformación son más fácilmente vistas en las redes sociales—un fenómeno que pone en riesgo el periodismo auténtico y a las sociedades de manera general." (Página 2)
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"Disinformation existed in the past, but the growing ubiquity of social media grants political actors increasing capacity to spread dangerous rhetoric and imagery in their pursuit of power. Incendiary content has the potential to catalyze mob violence, riots, and vigilantes taking the law into their
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own hands. Disinformation and fostered distrust in legitimate news sources can lead to threats and violence against journalists, further undermining the institutions that could provide accurate information. In the cases we discuss here—the U.S.-Mexico border, India and Sri Lanka, and three Latin American 2018 elections—disinformation inflamed existing cleavages and caused violence. While these illustrative cases are spread across the world, and the violence in each place is related to distinct histories, close analysis highlights five common challenges for addressing disinformation in areas vulnerable to violence. These common challenges include: • The growing ubiquity of social media, usually combined with low trust in traditional forms of media, creating a situation in which disinformation can spread quickly. • Low or declining trust in government institutions, causing a rise in vigilantism—which social media encourages and fuels. • Low levels of media literacy, and sometimes also low levels of general literacy, among perpetrators who do not have consistent access to formal school systems. • No transparency in social media company policies, making it difficult to evaluate and improve upon content moderation policies that could quell or spur violence. • Finally, government actors that could legislate change have an interest using disinformation to their own ends." (Page 2)
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"At the heart of the challenges to democracy posed by digital media are three core problems: 1. Platform monopolies: two or three corporations control not only our means of communication, but also the content which is distributed, both of which are core aspects of our democracy. Whilst the market po
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wer and global mobility of these companies make it possible for them to avoid national regulatory measures, either by moving operations elsewhere or simply ignoring them; 2. Algorithmic opacity: algorithmic engines are using huge quantities of personal data to make ever more precise predictions about what we want to see and hear, and having ever increasing influence over what we think and do, with little transparency about how they work or accountability for their impact; and 3. Attention economy: the dominant business model of digital media prioritises the amplification of whatever content is best at grabbing our attention, while avoiding responsibility for the impact that content has on our collective wellbeing and our democracy. The negative impact is brutally clear from both the literature and the world around us." (Introduction, page 14)
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"This document serves as a reading list and primer on digital disinformation. While the proliferation of literature on the subject is a positive reaction to an otherwise vague yet troubling threat, it can be difficult to grasp how much has been accomplished and what questions remain unanswered. This
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document will therefore give readers a foundational understanding of the immense amount of work that has been done in the last few years on digital disinformation and where future research may be heading. The sources are divided into nine categories of interest and include articles and reports from academic journals, research institutes, non-profit organizations, and news media, reflecting the multidisciplinary and sociotechnical nature of the subject. Although many of the sources can fit into more than one category, having a classification framework is useful for conceptualizing the kinds of research being done and provides direction for those new to the literature. And finally, like a well-run state-sponsored troll farm, the scholarship of digital disinformation continues to produce new content every day. We would be remiss if we did not stress that this document is only a snapshot of a particular moment in this expanding field. As such, we’ve included a list of additional resources that are regularly updated with research and news on disinformation and media manipulation more broadly." (Introduction)
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"El módulo explora la importancia crítica de la ética para medios tradicionales, como el periodismo, y para medios modernos, como las redes sociales. La presencia de las redes sociales y las noticias digitales ha aumentado la responsabilidad ética de la gente que opera en este campo, especialmen
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te teniendo en cuenta el alcance global y el poderoso impacto de estos nuevos tipos de medios de comunicación. Estos cambios, junto con las noticias falsas y el aumento de las restricciones a los medios de todo el mundo, hacen que este módulo sea importante y relevante para alumnos de cualquier disciplina. Reconociendo este panorama cambiante, el módulo extiende la discusión de las responsabilidades éticas más allá de los periodistas profesionales hasta la gente que consume las noticias, los usuarios de las redes sociales y los llamados "periodistas ciudadanos". Está diseñado para ayudar a los ponentes a ampliar la comprensión de sus alumnos de quién es exactamente un proveedor o un consumidor de medios de comunicación, y qué tipo de consideraciones éticas deben tener en cuenta quienes desempeñan estas funciones. Este módulo también busca hacer que los alumnos comprendan el efecto perjudicial que puede tener la falta de integridad y ética en la provisión y el consumo de medios de comunicación." (Introducción)
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"It is almost impossible to obtain information about who is behind Hungarian misinformation websites; financial information about them is even harder to come by; Hungarian misinformation websites fall on the spectrum from purely ideological sites to simple moneymaking machines; Facebook appears to b
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e the almost exclusive source of traffic for misinformation websites in Hungary; Misinformation websites focusing on generating income are often abandoned and then brought back to life using a different domain name; The Facebook page of misinformation websites is stable and keeps directing users to the ever-changing urls of the websites; The websites’ posts are spread via Facebook pages and groups that often bear names unrelated to the website. In a lot of cases, this can be because the websites’ names have changed. But we also found signs of an underground trade of Facebook groups and pages; The revenue generated by placing ads on a website may not be significant, but Hungarian misinformation websites appear to have at least a couple of sister-sites; At the money-making end of the spectrum, lots of misinformation websites appear to be controlled by few individuals/groups, and some individuals/groups appear to run a high number of misinformation websites; One of the groups identified as operating a number of misinformation websites can be linked to a network of political organizations that have been accused of fraud in the 2014 and 2018 general elections in Hungary." (Main findings, page 1)
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"Our research revealed that the deepfake phenomenon is growing rapidly online, with the number of deepfake videos almost doubling over the last seven months to 14,678. This increase is supported by the growing commodification of tools and services that lower the barrier for non-experts to create dee
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pfakes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we observed a significant contribution to the creation and use of synthetic media tools from web users in China and South Korea, despite the totality of our sources coming from the English-speaking Internet. Another key trend we identified is the prominence of non-consensual deepfake pornography, which accounted for 96% of the total deepfake videos online. We also found that the top four websites dedicated to deepfake pornography received more than 134 million views on videos targeting hundreds of female celebrities worldwide. This significant viewership demonstrates a market for websites creating and hosting deepfake pornography, a trend that will continue to grow unless decisive action is taken. Deepfakes are also making a significant impact on the political sphere. Two landmark cases from Gabon and Malaysia that received minimal Western media coverage saw deepfakes linked to an alleged government cover-up and a political smear campaign. One of these cases was related to an attempted military coup, while the other continues to threaten a highprofile politician with imprisonment. Seen together, these examples are possibly the most powerful indications of how deepfakes are already destabilizing political processes. Without defensive countermeasures, the integrity of democracies around the world are at risk."
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