"The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) Inform, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) Empower, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electora
...
l process; and (iii) Respond, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects. For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) chatbot – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court’s action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” prebunking actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates). The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners’ media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation. Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints." (Presentation, page 5-6)
more
"This report examines the characteristics and consequences of influence operations in the 2022 presidential election in the Philippines. The report makes three main claims: a) the term "influence operations" provides a broader frame to identify personalities, platforms, and practices that hack publi
...
c attention, mobilize publics, and influence electoral out; b) influence operations build on cumulative impacts of longitudinal disinformation; c) The main consequence of influence operations in 2022 is the creation of parallel public spheres or two separate information ecosystems aligned with hardened political identities. The document concludes with pathways forward as the nation seeks to rebuild today's distorted public sphere." (Executive summary, page 7)
more
"En este documento presentamos una secuencia didáctica para que las y los docentes trabajen en el aula sobre las desinformaciones en contextos electorales teniendo en cuenta que las y los adolescentes son parte fundamental de los debates públicos e incluso en varios países pueden ejercer el derec
...
ho al voto. Si bien es de esperar que los contenidos específicos de las desinformaciones puedan variar a lo largo del tiempo y de país en país (y en niveles subnacionales), hay algunos elementos del fenómeno que son comunes en toda la región y en todos los períodos electorales. Proponemos abordar estos elementos en las aulas como una estrategia para mitigar la masiva circulación de estos contenidos y propiciar que jóvenes tomen decisiones informadas, un desafío que, por supuesto, tenemos también las personas adultas. En el Programa de Educación de Chequeado sabemos que la escuela en general y los docentes en particular pueden promover espacios de participación que fomenten la construcción de habilidades de pensamiento crítico para que, al momento de votar, las y los jóvenes lo hagan a partir de información verificada. Entendemos que enseñar en la escuela estas habilidades, especialmente aquellas vinculadas con la identificación de desinformación, como parte de la Alfabetización Mediática e Informacional (AMI) es prioritario para el fortalecimiento del sistema democrático." (Introducción)
more
"Analisamos uma amostra do conteúdo denunciado ao TSE, a fim de verificar se, de fato, a Meta removeu ou indicou a presença de desinformação nestas publicações. Os resultados apontam que parcelas expressivas das publicações denunciadas e já diagnosticadas como nocivas por checadores de fato
...
s não foram removidas das redes da Meta e/ou não receberam o rótulo de desinformação. A Meta está permitindo a circulação de conteúdo nocivo à democracia brasileira no Facebook e Instagram, sem cumprir de forma efetiva com as suas políticas e a parceria com o TSE." (Apresentação)
more
"Neste relatório, o NetLab UFRJ reúne os principais resultados do monitoramento de redes de desinformação multiplataforma a partir dos aplicativos de mensageria. Analisando 115,3 mil mensagens veiculadas em grupos públicos do Whatsapp e 180,9 mil em grupos e canais públicos do Telegram, identi
...
ficamos o compartilhamento de links externos, narrativas segmentadas, e tendências que podem contribuir para compreender e mitigar os efeitos da desinformação no segundo turno das eleições." (Netlab Blog)
more
"Narrativas de desinformação - principais achados: 1. Entre alegações de fraude e apelos moralistas, a Integridade Eleitoral e os Valores Cristãos despontam como as principais pautas do segundo turno. 2. Parte da relevância dos valores cristãos se dá pelo reenquadramento de outras pautas ger
...
ais da campanha permanente pela ótica e moral religiosas. 3. A pauta de Gênero e Família cresce nas plataformas durante o período do 2º turno, graças à discussão sobre aborto, comumente associada à moral religiosa. 4. A discussão sobre integridade eleitoral aumenta em momentos estratégicos, como o 7 de setembro e a votação do primeiro turno. Cresce o risco associado à pauta, com “previsões” de fraude que abrem espaço à contestação no segundo turno. 5. No Facebook e Instagram, predomina a atividade regular e institucionalizada de organizações e lideranças que trabalham com gênero e meio ambiente." (Página 2)
more
"This research scrutinizes the content, spread, and implications of disinformation in Brazil’s 2018 pre-election period. It focuses specifically on the most widely shared fake news about Lula da Silva and links these with the preexisting polarization and political radicalization, ascertaining the
...
role of context. The research relied on a case study and mixed-methods approach that combined an online data collection of content, spread, propagators, and interactions’ analyses, with in-depth analysis of the meaning of such fake news. The results show that the most successful fake news about Lula capitalized on prior hostility toward him, several originated or were spread by conservative right-wing politicians and mainstream journalists, and that the pro-Lula fake news circulated in smaller networks and had overall less global reach. Facebook and WhatsApp were the main dissemination platforms of these contents." (Abstract)
more
"In this article, we analyze the spread of political disinformation in events of discursive struggles on Twitter, during the 2018 presidential election in Brazil. These were disputes for the hegemonic narrative between two stories based on opposed hashtags: one based on news from mainstream media an
...
d the other, based on disinformation, mostly from hyperpartisan outlets. Our goal was to understand how hyperpartisan outlets created and shaped these discursive struggles and the strategies used to spread disinformation to create an “alternative narrative” to the facts. Our case study is focused on two discursive struggles, for which we will use critical discourse analysis and social network analysis. Our findings suggest that (1) the structure of the hashtag wars was very polarized and right-wing groups had higher exposure to hyperpartisan content and disinformation, while traditional media discourse circulates more among other different ideological clusters; (2) rightwing hyperpartisan media mostly used biased framing and polarized ideological discourse structure as manipulative strategies to reframe the events and create a counter-narrative (and thus, to create the dispute); and (3) opinion leaders were major spreaders of disinformation among far-right users, as they reinforced hyperpartisan content and became key actors in the discursive struggles (and thus, reinforced the dispute)." (Abstract)
more
"For analysing populist and dis- and minformation-driven campaigning, three sub-groupings of South African Twitter deserve particular attention. A) A community of radical populists made of black consciousness voices emphasising the struggle against 'white monopoly capital,' using this phrase as a di
...
sinformation strategy initially run by Bell Pottinger back in 2017, which had the effect of polarising white and black South Africans. This community was the audience the EFF and RET audience appealed to. B) A community galvanised around the #PutSouthAfricansFirst hashtag and movement and its über-nationalism and xenophobia - disdain for primarily African foreign nationals. Influencers used this hashtag to demonise foreign nationals for crime, unemployment, homelessness and other disinformation. Political parties such as ATM and ActionSA used the same hashtag to campaign for votes under the guise of calling for the integrity of South Africa's borders and jobs. Their nationalist calls continued to form a crucial part of these parties' messaging, even as they benefited from the negative sentiment generated towards foreigners by the more strident anonymous accounts. C) A community of minority ideologies and groups predominantly made up of South Africa's white body politic polarised from the rest of South African Twitter influenced by overlapping harmful iterations of Libertarianism and Conservatism. Conspiracy theorists, Covid-19 denialists, anti-institution, anti-vaxxers reside within this community with imported overt MAGA-style Trumpian Alt-Right. The DA, Cape Party, ACDP appealed to this community. An analysis of tweets generated in the lead up to the election showed that one in four tweets were generated by the EFF community, underscoring the extent to which that party dominated the platform. However, it also highlights the disconnect between Twitter and the 'real world'. The EFF was only the third-largest party with roughly 10% votes." (Lessons learned and conclusion, page 99)
more
"The playbook approach consists of how to (1) identify ongoing information manipulation campaigns; (2) develop real-time and short-term responses; and (3) build long-term resilience to information manipulation. While we outline three distinct steps in this playbook, the process for combating informa
...
tion manipulation is circular, with each step overlapping and reinforcing the others. Planning timelines will vary based on context, but—if at all possible—we encourage proactive rather than reactive planning to effectively counter electoral information manipulation. The playbook’s three-part strategy can help you develop rapid and real-time responses, as well as establish long-term and sustainable approaches to building resilience in order to maintain the integrity of elections and strengthen democratic processes." (Page 3)
more
"The Multistakeholder Dialogue on Electoral Disinformation (MDED) project sought the perspectives of pro-democracy actors and key agents in the electoral process to map out election integrity initiatives, assess organizational capacities for disinformation mitigation, and identify influence operatio
...
ns trends for 2022. Phase 1 of the project cast a wide net in sampling diverse participants both old and new players to fair elections projects. This report summarizes common themes from the focus groups and individual interviews with my own critical assessment of important gaps in coalition work and donor programming that MDED aims to enhance." (Page 8)
more
"This article brings the results of an investigation into the role of WhatsApp audio messages in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, proposing that instant voice messaging borrows elements from radio language. We started from a broader research, conducted by the Brazilian National Institute o
...
f Science and Technology in Digital Democracy (INCT.DD, in its Portuguese acronym), which identified a network composed of 220 WhatsApp groups – all of them with open-entry links – supporting six different candidates. Those groups put together thousands of anonymized profiles linked through connections to similar groups, configuring an extensive network. More than 1 million messages, including 98,000 audios, were gathered and downloaded during 2018 Brazilian electoral period (from June to October). We focused on eighteen audios with major circulation (totalling 3622 appearances) among the ones shared at least 100 times, which were extracted and analysed. The use of radio content analysis techniques pointed out strong evidence that audio messaging remediate radiophonic elements such as intimacy and colloquial language to accelerate disinformation campaigns." (Abstract)
more
"This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engag
...
ed in making the digital landscape safe for democracy. Effective democracies require that citizens have access to accurate and impartial electoral and political information. Disinformation campaigns spread cynicism, distort political processes and hinder citizens’ ability to make sound political decisions. Together we seek to identify what works, and expand the community engaged in this effort." (Publisher description)
more
"Este artigo visa analisar a cobertura dos meios de comunicação brasileiros nas eleições presidenciais realizadas no país a partir da redemocratização, começando com a de 1989 e finalizando com a de 2018. O estudo tomou como base teórica reflexões sobre desinformação, manipulação, fake
...
news e democracia, sob a ótica de autores como Serrano (2008; 2010), Abramo (2003), Ramonet (2007), Luhmann (2005), Mello (2020), Bucci (2019), Bobbio (2006) e Casara (2018). A pesquisa mostra que historicamente a mídia tenta interferir no resultado das eleições, recorrendo a estratégias de manipulação e deturpação dos fatos, o que enfraquece o sistema democrático." (Abstract)
more
"The 2018 general election represented one of the first times digital disinformation occurred on a massive scale in Pakistan. This report examines different forms of disinformation that circulated online in the lead up to the 2018 elections and its impact on the country’s political discourse, and
...
considers methods to counter disinformation in Pakistan and elsewhere. Ultimately, combating this growing problem will require a variety of stakeholders to work toward a multi-pronged, collaborative response. Around 65 percent of Pakistanis aged 16-34 consume news through the internet. The rapid spread of disinformation online enables an arsenal of falsities, then used by individuals or groups to target a political candidate. Setting the record straight once disinformation begins circulating online is incredibly hard to do." (Key findings)
more