"Voraussetzung dafür, dass (politische) Fake News Wirkung entfalten, sind gewisse Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren auf Seiten der Userinnen und User. Laut den Studien von Daunt und anderen (2023) sowie von Gupta und anderen (2023) gehören dazu zum Beispiel der Glaube an Verschwörungserzählungen, Patriot
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ismus, Konservatismus und die Tendenz zu kollektivistischen Ideen von Gesellschaft. Die Analysen von Schnaudt (2024) zeigen, dass Verschwörungserzählungen nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch in den europäischen Ländern eine Herausforderung für demokratische Prozesse (z. B. Wahlen) darstellen, wenn Menschen die falschen Informationen für glaubwürdig halten. Auch Mauk und Grömping (2024) fanden in ihrer Studie heraus, dass Autoritarismus und Verschwörungsmentalität, also die Neigung, sich die Welt über Verschwörungstheorien zu erklären, das Vertrauen in Wahlen mindern, weil Informationen motiviert, das heißt in Richtung einer bestehenden Voreinstellung, verarbeitet werden. Fake News können diese motivierte Verarbeitung unterstützen und damit einen destabilisierenden Effekt erzeugen. Laut Stachofsky, Schaupp und Crossler (2023) besteht gerade bei Wählergruppen, die ihre Informationen aus Quellen beziehen, die häufig (politische) Fake News verbreiten, eine besondere Anfälligkeit, die Integrität von Wahlen in Zweifel zu ziehen. Besonders interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Erkenntnis, dass die Herausforderung durch Falschinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen ironischerweise gerade in denjenigen Ländern hoch ausgeprägt ist, in denen die Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische und unbeeinflusste Wahlen objektiv am günstigsten sind (vgl. auch die Studie von Vliegenthart und anderen, 2024). Und selbst wenn keine tatsächlichen Erkenntnisse über Anomalien bei der Durchführung von Wahlen vorliegen, können Informationen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unregelmäßigkeiten die oben erwähnte motivierte Informationsverarbeitung in Gang setzten und das Vertrauen in die Integrität von Wahlen bedrohen (vgl. die Studie von Kuk, Lee und Rhee (2024)). Studien, die den direkten Einfluss von Fake News auf Wahlentscheidungen untersuchen, sind methodisch schwierig und selten zu finden. Iida und andere (2024) konnten nur geringe Effekte feststellen und betonen, dass eine entsprechende Wirkung eher bei Personen entsteht, die keine ausgeprägten politischen Überzeugungen haben und/oder politisch weniger gut informiert sind. Auch Cantarella, Fraccaroli und Volpe (2023) konnten nur kleine Effekte ermitteln, die jedoch signifikant zum Wahlergebnis zugunsten populistischer Parteien in Italien beigetragen haben." (Zusammenfassung, Seiten 1-2)
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"Recent technological developments have raised concerns about threats to democracy because of their potential to distort election outcomes: (a) data-driven voter research enabling political microtargeting and (b) growing news consumption via social media and news aggregators that obfuscate the origi
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n of news items, leading to voters’ unawareness about a news sender’s identity. We provide a theoretical framework in which we can analyze the effects that microtargeting by political interest groups and unawareness have on election outcomes in comparison to “conventional” news reporting. We show which voter groups suffer from which technological development (a) or (b). While both microtargeting and unawareness have negative effects on voter welfare, we show that only unawareness can flip an election. Our model framework allows the theory-based discussion of policy proposals, such as to ban microtargeting or to require news platforms to signal the political orientation of a news item’s originator." (Abstract)
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"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more
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times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation.
Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors.
Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front.
African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights)
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"This study observes content-related indicators of the editorial decisions made by factcheckers during the 2022 Brazilian run-off election. Specifically, it aims to investigate factcheckers’ outputs regarding verification genres, scrutinized actors, types of verified falsehoods, and inspected plat
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forms. The focus on Brazil stems from its reputation as a disinformation hub, owing to social polarization, populist communication, high social media use, low media trust, and intense WhatsApp penetration. Consequently, factchecking agencies have proliferated within Brazil’s media landscape. To provide some hints about the fact-checkers’ editorial choices, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of verification articles (n = 349) published during the second round of the presidential election by four leading fact-checking organizations: Lupa and Aos Fatos (independents), Estadão Verifica (press), and AFP Checamos (global news agency). The results reveal a prioritization of combating online falsehoods (82.2%) spread by anonymous sources, as opposed to verifying public figures’ statements (5.5%), a trend already observed in other media systems. Although Meta’s social networks and Twitter are primarily monitored, other platforms such as TikTok, Kwai, and Telegram are increasingly gaining fact-checkers’ attention. Fact-checkers predominantly scrutinized anonymous disinformation agents. Moreover, they primarily debunked falsehoods targeting the opposition, legacy media, social networking companies, and the Supreme Electoral Court. Despite the anonymity, 77.4% of the verified falsehoods were found to be beneficial to Bolsonaro, while 12% were advantageous to Lula da Silva." (Abstract)
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"This report investigates the political economy of covert influence in the 2022 Philippine Elections, with a focus on social media influencers involved in covert political campaigning. This interdisciplinary research (1) examines political influencers and peripheral actors in the field engaged in po
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litical campaigning using qualitative field research methods, (2) maps and evaluates evidence of their participation in covert influence operations through computational social science methods, and (3) estimates political spending on the presumed commissioned influencers through economic modeling. Our research is the first empirical work to produce an assembly of data-informed approximations of the scope and scale of the political economy of covert influence operations. Specifically, it is the first to estimate the economic ‘cost’ of commissioned influencers for electoral influence operations in the Philippines. It also provides a complex but nuanced account of influencers as ‘gray’ political actors who exercise agency in their complicity to covert political campaigning given commensurate economic and political incentives. Amidst undocumented transactions and opaque operations, our research establishes multiple, cross-platform proxy measures of malicious political influencing, beyond established detection mechanisms. We find that thousands of political influencers are presumed to be commissioned to perform covert political campaigning in the 2022 Philippine Elections for top national positions, funded by massive financing by political intermediaries in a largely unstructured and unregulated economic market characterized by asymmetrical political relations." (Executive summary, page 11)
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"Increasingly, social media has become a major source of fake news, with disinformation used as a tool in manipulating public opinion and delegitimizing opposing voices. This study explores the influence of the content of social media on traditional media, and the proliferation of disinformation in
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the context of elections and accountability in Nigeria. Data were collected from 60 interviews and 18 focus group discussions with key stakeholders across Nigeria’s geo-political zones. The result shows the content of social media as shaping traditional media in addition to exacerbating pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions. The study recommends strengthening the positive elements of social media to weaken the threat posed by digital disinformation." (Abstract)
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"Trust is the foundation on which democracy is built. Not coincidentally, it is the main victim of attacks by disinformation merchants bent on undermining the electoral process and the democratic environment. This article outlines the efforts of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to tackle
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the effects of ‘information disorder’ on its democratic process, discussing its partnerships with digitalplatforms and civil society to guarantee transparency and to build trust and integrity in electoral processes in Brazil. The TSE aims to increase the electorate’s access to information and its resilience to disinformation, as well as build official mechanisms to respond to these threats. Related decisions issued by the court will also be analysed. The article demonstrates how these initiatives have helped the TSE to reduce disinformation in the electoral information ecosystem and enabled a more informed exercise of the right to vote." (Abstract)
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"Disinformation represents a danger to the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. From our research based on the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections, we introduce a model for measuring the resilience of citizens to disinformation. This model is then used to draw conclusions about the impa
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ct of disinformation on their voting behaviour. We argue that it is important to understand this impact in the context of pre-existing beliefs and opinions, and therefore in terms of disinformation reinforcing rather than changing existing views. In particular, we demonstrate how feeling disappointed with one political party can make people more inclined to endorse disinformation that targets it." (Abstract)
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"On average in the 16 countries surveyed, 56% of internet users frequently use social media to stay informed about current events, far ahead of television (44%). However, it is worth noting that differences exist among population groups: television is the primary source in the most developed countri
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es (55% compared to 37% for social media), while it lags significantly in countries with high (42% vs 63%) or medium/low levels of Human Development Index (HDI) (37% vs 68%) [...] The significance of social media as a source of information, especially during election campaigns, is even more crucial given that citizens believe disinformation is highly prevalent there. Across all 16 countries, 68% of internet users told us that social media is the place where disinformation is most widespread, far ahead of groups on online messaging apps (38%) and media websites/apps (20%). This sentiment is overwhelmingly prevalent in all countries, age groups, social backgrounds, and political preferences. This is even more important and citizens feel that the issue of disinformation is a real threat: 85% express concern about the impact and influence of disinformation on their fellow citizens." (Analysis of key results)
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"The purpose of this report is to gain a better understanding of the pertinent dynamics and to bolster the design of programming to support the information ecosystem around elections. In aid of this, UNDP sought information through a number of channels, in a review of the relevant literature, a seri
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es of regional consultations, expert meetings and a survey [...] The various sources all conclude there remains no single panacea to the ills that information pollution brings upon elections. Rather, there is a variety of information pollution programming around elections, each with its own benefits and deficiencies. In order to support the design of a holistic information integrity strategy, this report suggests that programmes seek to address one or more of the following three concerns (1) prevention—to address the supply side of information pollution by preventing or deterring the creation of information pollution, (2) resilience—building public resilience to information pollution limiting the ability of users to be influenced or co-opted by information pollution and (3) countering—identifying and attempting to counter information pollution." (Summary, page 8-9)
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"[This publication] outlines how organised disinformation campaigns or Information Operations have become the latest variable to impact the quality of elections in the kingdom [...] Drawn from past evidence, the report identifies four forms of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns that are likely
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to impact the quality of the 2023 elections. First, the creation and dissemination of one-sided pro-establishment campaigns. Second, the online harassment of those who hold alternative political views. Third, the spread of disinformation to distort the election process. Fourth, the use of disinformation to polarise and divide society. Together these state-sponsored actions stand to decrease electoral integrity and shape the outcome of the 2023 general election. To address the impact of state-sponsored disinformation and other forms of disinformation, this report recommends the following multi-stakeholder action: call for a cease to Information Operations; identify, monitor and call out agencies and actors who engage in and endorse disinformation; review the country’s regulatory framework to ensure that its provisions are on par with international standards and support electoral integrity; and improve fact-checking mechanisms and provide digital literary to Thai people." (Executive summary)
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"This paper examines the influence of international political actors in perpetuating disinformation in fragile states, using Iraq as a case study. The advent of modern technology and social media has transformed the global information landscape, providing new avenues for the dissemination of disinfo
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rmation. This study delves into the history of disinformation in Iraq, particularly during and after the fall of the Baathist regime, and investigates how national and international actors utilise disinformation as a political tool. Through three case studies, the overlapping interests of regional, international, and local actors are explored, focusing on their use of social and legacy media platforms to execute influence operations targeting the Iraqi public. The first case study examines the Iranian-aligned Iraqi Radio and Television Union and their deployment of disinformation narratives during the 2021 national election. The second case study investigates unofficial Iranian-aligned Telegram media outlets and their promotion of the Russian narrative in the Russia-Ukraine War. The final case study analyses Pro-China and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Facebook influencers in Iraq and their engagement in coordinated inauthentic behavior. By connecting the interactions of these actors, this paper reveals a complex web of disinformation in the Iraqi digital information ecosystem, emphasising the role played by national and international actors in perpetuating it. The findings contribute to a better understanding of disinformation dynamics, enabling more effective strategies to combat disinformation and foster informed and democratic societies." (Abstract)
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"Since its Joint Communication on Hybrid Threats, the EU has publicly recognized the risks to its security posed by non-traditional means aimed at undermining its legitimacy. The propagation of disinformation including misleading political advertising serves as a key example of how the Commission’
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s perception of the EU’s vulnerability to hybrid threats in times of geopolitical instability is shaping its regulatory policies. This article uses the framework of regulatory mercantilism, which argues that in conditions of perceived vulnerability, a state-like actor will reassert regulatory control based on a security logic in areas previously characterized by self-regulatory regimes. This article considers the Commission’s 2019–2024 priorities, and how the spheres of technology, security, and democracy policies are intersecting as a response to hybrid threats. As a result, online platform governance in the EU is being substantially restructured with a move from systems of selfregulation to co-regulation backed by sanction as a means of combating hybrid threats online. The Commission’s “taking back control” from platforms in the context of a digital sovereignty agenda serves as an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy, which sees the Commission seek to promote regulatory strength in response to perceived vulnerability." (Abstract)
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"How has the Philippine disinformation landscape evolved since 2016? How different was the 2022 presidential election from previous electoral cycles? And what lessons can we learn from electoral triumphs and defeats often associated with disinformation? This report goes to the heart of these questio
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ns. Our aim is to understand the evolving character of disinformation—the tactics used, actors involved, the wider context in which disinformation unfolds, and the responses of the government, tech platforms, and civil society to these trends. In doing so, we hope to generate actionable insights on impactful responses to disinformation, with a view of preparing for the 2025 midterm election." (Introduction)
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"Social media have led to profound transformations in the media ecosystem and new communication dynamics. Such platforms have become a competitive source of information and played a decisive role in facilitating the dissemination of false or misleading content, with a particular impact on recent ele
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ctions. This study analyses the formats and the spread of disinformation during Brazil’s 2018 election on social media, considering the countermeasures adopted that year by the platforms to reduce its circulation. Disinformation occupies a central space in the public debate in Brazil, where there is massive use of social media. Based on a content analysis of the 153 false or misleading narratives most shared during the campaign period, the results show that contents changed formats to overcome platforms’ countermeasures. Results also highlight a majority of images and a blend of false and accurate information that reshape the phenomenon definition and suggests the inefficacy of current regulations." (Abstract)
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"Through this research we gained insight into tactics employed by state-backed social media disinformation. With that goal, we explored user interactions with inauthentic Twitter accounts. We used multiple procedures to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by t
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he Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We found that users were overwhelming supportive of the IRA accounts, a fact that calls into question the standard representation of these accounts as “trolls.” Users were particularly supportive of the accounts that pretended to be part of a particular ideological group (on both the left and right), supporting arguments that a strategy of building connections with like-minded people was central to the IRA campaign. This strategy seems to work—on days that the Russian accounts received more support they also received more engagement." (Lay summary)
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"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media
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and online campaigns to be deployed by political parties, sometimes at an expense of authenticity, to reach out to these young voters. However, legal and non-legal measures implemented to date have yet to effectively address disinformation. Hence, youth and other voters remain potentially exposed to the risk of online manipulation during the election. This baseline study identifies the risks from 5 recurring patterns of disinformation related to: sexual orientation and promiscuity; corruption; electoral integrity; women politicians and foreign interference. The 2022 Johor Bahru State Election confirms this trend. To mitigate disinformation and build trust in the electoral system and process, Asia Centre has complied some recommendations for key stakeholders in educational institutions, the election commission, government, media, NGOs, political parties, technology companies and youth groups who can implement them as practical safeguards to ensure that first-time and other voters are not subjected to manipulation through disinformation campaigns." (Conclusion, page 34)
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