"Through the prism of the first comprehensive account of RT, the Kremlin's primary tool of foreign propaganda, Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order sheds new light on the provenance and nature of disinformation's threat to democracy. Interrogating the communications strategies pursued by aut
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horitarian states and grassroots populist movements, the book reveals the interlinked nature of today's global media-politics pathologies. Stephen Hutchings, Vera Tolz, Precious Chatterje-Doody, Rhys Crilley, and Marie Gillespie provide a systematic investigation into RT's history, institutional culture, and journalistic ethos; its activities across multiple languages and media platforms; its audience-targeting strategies and audiences' engagements with it; and its response to the war in Ukraine and associated bans on the network. The authors' analysis challenges commonplace notions of disinformation as something that Russia brings to the West, where passive publics are duped by the Kremlin's communications machine, and reveals the reciprocal processes through which Russia and disinformation infiltrate and challenge the liberal order. Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order provides provocative insights into the nature and extent of the challenge that Russia's propaganda operation poses to the West. The authors contend that the challenge will be met only if liberals reflect on liberalism's own internal tensions and blind spots and defend the values of open-minded impartiality." (Publisher description)
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"Rather than selling authoritarianism as such, authoritarian narratives focus on themes that have popular appeal—while attributing a wide range of visceral grievances to the shortcomings of democracy. Authoritarian narratives fall into four broad categories: 1. Noninterference, Choice, and Threats
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to Sovereignty: Narrative attempts to invoke universal themes such as sovereignty, noninterference, and choice which are presented as under threat from the spread of democracy. 2. Exploiting Grievances in the Global South: Tactics designed to attribute the numerous grievances in the Global South to exploitation by the West. 3. Democracies Failing to Deliver: A narrative that takes aim at the efficacy of democracy and, by implication, amplifies the ill-informed narratives about effectiveness of authoritarian governance. 4. Need for a New World Order: Collectively, the claims of Western interference, exploitation, and governance failures are intended to generate disillusionment with democracy and receptiveness to nondemocratic rule. Autocrats use a variety of channels to disseminate these preferred narratives at scale. The four following methods are particularly noteworthy: 1. Social Media: Authoritarians have taken advantage of the enormous—and still growing—social media sphere to promote narratives legitimizing autocracy. They exploit many users’ limited digital literacy skills through information influence campaigns and the employment of bots and online “troll farms” to peddle their preferred worldview. 2. State Broadcasters: Authoritarian actors also disseminate narratives through state media like RT, Sputnik, Xinhua, and China Global Television Network (CGTN). These outlets have the tone and imprimatur of an official news service, giving them a veneer of credibility that expands their reach. 3. Partnerships with Local Media: Authoritarian state-backed outlets aim to embed their content within national information environments. By disseminating preferred narratives through local media outlets and training foreign journalists, authoritarian actors are able to propagate norms of state control over the public information sphere. 4. Foreign Media Cooptation: Finally, authoritarian states are forging partnerships with other state broadcasters. These relationships have the indirect effect of incentivizing self-censorship and enable the intimidation of journalists and activists who criticize authoritarian leadership." (Executive summary, page 1-.2)
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"Between 2015 and 2017, the Internet Research Agency (IRA) – a Kremlin-backed “troll farm” based in St. Petersburg – executed a propaganda campaign on Twitter to target US voters. Scholarship has expended relatively little effort to study the role of Islamophobia in the IRA’s propaganda ca
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mpaign. Following critical disinformation research, this article demonstrates that Islamophobia, affect, and white identity played a crucial role in the IRA’s targeting of rightwing US voters. With an official release of tweets and associated visual content from Twitter, we use topic modeling and visual analysis to explore both how, and to what extent, the IRA used Islamophobia in its propaganda. To do so, we develop a multimodal distant reading technique to study how the IRA aligned users with contemporary far right social movements by deploying racial and emotional appeals that center on narrating a transnational white identity under threat from Islam and Muslims." (Abstract)
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"This report examines political communication and media trust in the age of generative artificial intelligence systems (AI). Firstly, it provides a brief explainer of generative AI tools and techniques, looking separately at systems that generate text and those that generate or manipulate images, vi
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deos and audio. By reference to real-world examples, the paper then surveys the ways in which generative AI systems have recently been used by political actors, distinguishing between three different use-cases: political campaigning, entertainment and disinformation campaigns. Building on this empirical analysis, the paper distils important insights for policymakers, which highlight the need to: refrain from falsely labelling content as AI-generated to avoid overstating the technical capabilities and persuasive power of those spreading disinformation; acknowledge the multimodality of threats posed by generative AI, in particular voice-generation; delimit fair-use cases of generative AI for political campaigning, given these technologies are already widely used for legitimate political communication purposes; raise awareness of how seemingly non-political uses of generative AI can be exploited for politics, in particular the creation of non-consensual intimate content. This is followed by an evaluation of emerging technical and policy solutions, namely the detection and labelling of deepfakes as well as the development of systems to certify content authenticity and provenance. The section concludes with a discussion of the emerging legal landscape, including the European Union’s AI Act." (Executive summary)
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"The study presented here [...] is not limited to generalised theses and descriptions of the Balkan media scene under Russian influence that only scratch the surface. Rather, the focus is on documenting the effectiveness of Russian state media in the region with a focus on Serbia, which also has an
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impact on its neighbours Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro (NATO member), all three of which are EU accession candidates. From this, strategies and recommendations for action are derived as to how the politically poisonous influence of Kremlin propaganda could be curbed after years of futile endeavours." (Introduction)
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"Political technology' is a Russian term for the professional engineering of politics. It has turned Russian politics into theatre and propaganda, and metastasised to take over foreign policy and weaponise history. The war against Ukraine is one outcome. In the West, spin doctors and political consu
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ltants do more than influence media or run campaigns: they have also helped build parallel universes of alternative political reality. Hungary has used political technology to dismantle democracy. The BJP in India has used it to consolidate unprecedented power. Different countries learn from each other. Some types of political technology have become notorious, like troll farms or data mining; but there is now a global wholesale industry selling a range of manipulation techniques, from astroturfing to fake parties to propaganda apps. This book shows that 'political technology' is about much more than online disinformation: it is about whole new industries of political engineering." (Publisher description)
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"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more
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times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation.
Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors.
Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front.
African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights)
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"This policy paper provides an overview of Russian information warfare in the Middle East. It includes a brief overview of Russian information warfare methods and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. It then delves into Russian information warfare in the Middle East, evaluates its effectivenes
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s and differentiates Russia’s strategy towards Israel and the Arab states. The report ends with a list of recommendations that any state and organization can adopt to fight disinformation and Russian information warfare in particular. The paper focuses on a very recent time frame, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. To ensure a comprehensive report, a wide variety of sources was used: academic research, think tank reports, military intelligence reports, news articles and interviews with topic experts. It includes many real examples (screenshots) of Russian content." (Executive summary)
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"During the six months of the gender-based disinformation study (January 1 – June 30, 2023), the following trends were revealed: A total of 42 cases of gendered disinformation were identified, of which 24 were homophobic and 18 were sexist or attacked women based on moral criteria. In most cases,
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the target of homophobic or gendered disinformation was the West, while false content related to Ukraine was predominantly homophobic. In connection with internal socio-political processes in Georgia, disinformation was directed against politicians, persons associated with them, journalists, and civic activists, who, in addition to disinformation, were targeted in discrediting campaigns." (Key findings, page 8)
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"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. D
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iplomatic channels are an integral part of FIMI incidents. Russia's diplomatic channels regularly serve as enablers of FIMI operations. They are deployed across wide range of topics. China also uses diplomatic channels, mostly targeting the US. Impersonation techniques become more sophisticated. Impersonations of international and trusted organisations and individuals are used by Russian actors particularly to target Ukraine. Print and TV media are most often impersonated, with magazines seeing their entire style copied. FIMI actor collusion exists but is limited. Official Russian actors were involved in 88 analysed FIMI incidents. Chinese actors were involved in 17. In at least 5 cases, both actors engaged jointly. FIMI is multilingual. Incidents do not occur in just one language; content is translated and amplified in multiple languages. Incidents featured at least 30 languages, 16 of which are EU-languages. Russia used a larger variety of languages than Chinese actors but 44% of Russian content targeted a Russian-speaking populations, while 36% targeted English-speaking populations. FIMI is mostly intended to distract and distort. Russia (42%) and China (56%) mostly intend to direct attention to a different actor or narrative or to shift blame ('distract'). Russia attempts to change the framing and narrative ('distort') relatively more often (35%) than China (18%). FIMI remains mostly image and video based. The cheap and easy production and distribution of image and video material online makes these formats still the most commonly used." (Executive summary)
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"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a
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theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for conducting influence operations. This framework indicates a relative advantage for television in both dissemination and persuasiveness. We test this framework against the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (before the 2022 escalation), contributing new data from a national survey and a new dataset of Telegram activity. We identify fifteen disinformation narratives, and, using statistical analysis, examine correlations between media consumption, audience exposure to, and agreement with, narratives, and foreign policy preferences. To explore causal mechanisms, we follow up with content analysis. Findings strongly support our theoretical framework. While consuming some partisan social media channels is correlated with narrative exposure, there is no correlation with narrative agreement. Meanwhile, consumption of partisan television channels shows clear and consistent correlation. Finally, agreement with narratives also correlates with foreign policy preferences. However, and importantly, findings indicate the overall limitations of influence operations." (Abstract)
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"As Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, social media was rife with pro-Kremlin disinformation. To effectively tackle the issue of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, this study examines the underlying reasons why some individuals are susceptible to false claims
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and explores ways to reduce their susceptibility. It uses linear regression analysis on data from a national survey of 1,500 adults (18+) to examine the factors that predict belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives regarding the Russia–Ukraine war. Our research finds that belief in Pro-Kremlin disinformation is politically motivated and linked to users who: (1) hold conservative views, (2) trust partisan media, and (3) frequently share political opinions on social media. Our findings also show that exposure to disinformation is positively associated with belief in disinformation. Conversely, trust in mainstream media is negatively associated with belief in disinformation, offering a potential way to mitigate its impact." (Abstract)
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"Pro-Russian disinformation networks and American anti-science websites are pushing anti-vaccine content that is reaching large West African Facebook Pages and Groups. These networks are spreading social media posts and articles that contain misleading messages about Covid-19 vaccines. These message
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s are amplifying wider narratives that could erode trust inkey actors and institutions connected to vaccines. Networks of French disinformation websites are playing a crucial role in enabling this content to reach West African social media. These websites are artificially amplifying English-language articles by publishing translated versions. Each version features slight modifications to the title, imagery or source quoted. The resulting variety of articles increases the chance that these messages will reach diverse online communities. North American and European conspiracy theories are reaching both Anglophone and Francophone West Africa on social media and are a key feature of online vaccinemisinformation in the region. These include conspiracy theories about depopulation programs, a totalitarian, one-world government known as the New World Order, and even certain elements of QAnon, such as the idea that former US President Donald Trump was secretly fighting a corrupt political and financial establishment." (Ke findings)
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"The Media Manipulation Casebook is a research platform [launched in 2019] that advances knowledge of misinformation and disinformation and their threats to democracy, public health, and security. The Casebook is a resource for building the field of Critical Internet Studies by equipping researchers
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with case studies, theory, methods, and frameworks to analyze the interplay of media ecosystems, technology, politics, and society. Though the Technology and Social Change project (TaSC) project has ended as of September 2023, the Casebook site will remain live as a research resource." (About us)
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"Russia uses a strategy of gendered disinformation in Ukraine to silence women journalists and create a certain negative image of gender equality and the role of women in democratic societies. Online violence can take on a variety of worms: doxxing, sectoring, trolling, cyberstalking, threats of vio
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lence and cyberbullying, as well as certain forms of disinformation and malinformation. There are essentially no data or research about the nature and scope of gendered disinformation as a phenomenon in Ukraine. This subject is not yet the focus of the Center for Combating Disinformation or the The Center for Strategic Communication under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. It can be assumed that this problem is erroneously believed to be insignificant. Content analysis of the information space of Ukraine and Russia (media, social networks, radio, television) using the information and analytical service Attack Index in the period from February 24, 2022 to August 2023 showed the presence of gendered disinformation about Ukrainian journalists." (Key findings)
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"This paper examines the influence of international political actors in perpetuating disinformation in fragile states, using Iraq as a case study. The advent of modern technology and social media has transformed the global information landscape, providing new avenues for the dissemination of disinfo
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rmation. This study delves into the history of disinformation in Iraq, particularly during and after the fall of the Baathist regime, and investigates how national and international actors utilise disinformation as a political tool. Through three case studies, the overlapping interests of regional, international, and local actors are explored, focusing on their use of social and legacy media platforms to execute influence operations targeting the Iraqi public. The first case study examines the Iranian-aligned Iraqi Radio and Television Union and their deployment of disinformation narratives during the 2021 national election. The second case study investigates unofficial Iranian-aligned Telegram media outlets and their promotion of the Russian narrative in the Russia-Ukraine War. The final case study analyses Pro-China and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Facebook influencers in Iraq and their engagement in coordinated inauthentic behavior. By connecting the interactions of these actors, this paper reveals a complex web of disinformation in the Iraqi digital information ecosystem, emphasising the role played by national and international actors in perpetuating it. The findings contribute to a better understanding of disinformation dynamics, enabling more effective strategies to combat disinformation and foster informed and democratic societies." (Abstract)
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"Im Ringen um die globale Deutungshoheit setzt die russische Regierung seit Jahren auf die Verbreitung von Desinformation. Die finnische Journalistin Jessikka Aro hat nicht nur derartige Propagandataktiken aufgedeckt, sie wurde auch selbst zur Zielscheibe orchestrierter Drohungen durch vom Kreml unt
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erstützte Internettrolle. Sie zeigt, mit welch aggressiven Strategien die russische Seite schon lange vor dem Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine versucht hat, die öffentliche Meinung in anderen Staaten in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen, sei es in Europa oder in den USA, im Baltikum oder auf dem Balkan. Durch vorgeblich unabhängige Nachrichtenseiten, durch massive Stimmungsmache in sozialen Medien und durch gezielte Hasskampagnen wird versucht, kritische Berichterstattung zu diskreditieren, Journalistinnen und Politiker einzuschüchtern und Zweifel an Fakten zu säen. Aro zeigt dieses Vorgehen beispielsweise anhand der Angriffe gegen sie selbst, aber auch anhand von Recherchen zur russischen Einflussnahme in Nachbarländern oder zum Abschuss des Passagierflugzeugs MH17. Die Autorin verdeutlicht einerseits die Gefahren dieses Informationskrieges für demokratische Gesellschaften und beschreibt andererseits, welchen Preis mutige Einzelpersonen zahlen, die sich der russischen Propagandamaschinerie entgegenstellen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) researchers identified key pro-Putin accounts with two or more duplicates engaged in administering, moderating, and contributing to large public Facebook groups with hundreds of thousands of members fawning over the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russia
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n military, and occasionally spreading Kremlin disinformation, all while generating millions of posts across the platform. This briefing note outlines the mechanics, narratives, and linkages of the pro-Putin power users — producing content at a high-rate day in and day out since the start of the invasion — on Facebook to pro-Kremlin groups and pages, painting a picture of a coordinated, seemingly inauthentic campaign intended to buttress the image of Putin in a range of languages and geographies. While research is still ongoing, ISD has identified emerging linkages between this network and the Kremlin media apparatus, which provides much of the content used. Pro-Putin support has long been a staple of several pages, groups, and networks on Facebook. The role of what appear to be inauthentic networks, however, has been under-reported outside of election cycles. This briefing note highlights a different reality, where disparate yet connected micro-networks of duplicate pro-Putin power users are always active, evading moderation and detection for years." (About this publication)
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"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider
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ed attempts to influence public opinion in the affected states and, in some cases, beyond them. Our main conclusions are: Crises help the Kremlin. Even if public opinion in the EU is currently unfavorable to the Kremlin, the onset of high, permanent inflation, soaring energy prices and the looming danger of an EU-wide recession could create a more favorable environment for the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. Most (covertly) Kremlin-friendly forces will adopt a rhetoric blasting sanctions for harming Europe more than Russia. Importing disinformation narratives. Three out of the four narratives found in Hungary were imported into the country from abroad. One doubting Ukraine’s existence as a country started from an organization connected to Ukrainian pro-Putin oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, taken over by the so-called “news agency” of separatists. Another narrative detailing a new, dictatorial world order based on, among others, COVID-19 restrictions, and led by NATO was aimed at developing countries where Russia can hope to hold more sway. The third essentially took over a trend in the Russian media space: users tried to discredit anti-war voices by asking them “where they were in the past eight years” when Ukraine committed atrocities against minorities. Strategies in Germany: Divide and Rule. The six relevant narratives we found in Germany employed three different strategies. The first was anti-Westernism, where the US and NATO are to blame for Russia’s attack. The second aimed clearly at generating debates by spreading a Kremlin-critical narrative. Some profiles involved in this were caught disseminating both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin narratives, which indicates it is not intended to counter the Kremlin’s information operation but to be a part of it. The third strategy was about exploiting contemporary events - such as heightened discussions on sanctions and rising inflation." (Executive summary)
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