"While research on flagging misinformation and disinformation has received much attention, we know very little about how the flagging of propaganda sources could affect news sharing on social media. Using a quasi-experimental design, we test the effect of source flagging on people’s actual sharing
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behaviors. By analyzing tweets (N=49,126) posted by 30 China’s media accounts before and after Twitter’s practice of labeling state-affiliated media, we reveal the corrective role that flagging plays in preventing people’s sharing of information from propaganda sources. The findings suggest that the corrective effect occurs immediately after these accounts are labeled as state-affiliated media and it leads to a long-term reduction in news sharing, particularly for political content. The results contribute to the understanding of how flagging efforts affect user engagement in real-world conversations and highlight that the effect of corrective measures takes place in a dynamic process." (Abstract)
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"This book is the result of a conference that could not take place. It is a collection of 26 texts that address and discuss the latest developments in international hate speech research from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. This includes case studies from Brazil, Lebanon, Poland, Nigeria,
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and India, theoretical introductions to the concepts of hate speech, dangerous speech, incivility, toxicity, extreme speech, and dark participation, as well as reflections on methodological challenges such as scraping, annotation, datafication, implicity, explainability, and machine learning. As such, it provides a much-needed forum for cross-national and cross-disciplinary conversations in what is currently a very vibrant field of research." (Back cover)
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"With the growth of new social media users across the Sahel, existing conflict dynamics are increasingly manifesting. Sahelians are entering a complex digital space. The ability of individuals and communities to adapt to online/offline conflict dynamics will define the future of conflict in the regi
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on. Search for Common Ground convened West African academics and practitioners in Bamako, Mali in October 2021, to analyze conflict trends and opportunities for peacebuilding in digital spaces in the central Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger)." (At a glance, page 1)
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"This publication describes the many ways in which public authorities and private enterprises empower users against disinformation online. The first chapter sets the scene by discussing relevant concepts, such as mis-, dis- and malinformation, empowerment, and media literacy. It further discusses th
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e way in which disinformation affects users, why it has become such an issue, and how to measure it. Chapter 2 presents the international and EU legal and policy framework, with special emphasis on the different measures introduced by the European Union to fight disinformation. Chapter 3 covers responses at national level, highlights some examples of legislative and non-legislative responses to online disinformation in Europe, and shows how states are placing user empowerment at the centre of their approach to the issue. Chapter 4 focuses on self- and co-regulation, providing an overview of the Strengthened EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, delving into the role of national regulatory authorities, and looking at the practical implementation of measures by Big Tech platforms. Chapter 5 presents relevant judgments of both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in which they had to rule on cases that are connected, directly or indirectly, to the issue of disinformation. Wrapping up the publication, Chapter 6 presents stakeholders’ reactions to the 2022 Code and recent developments at EU level." (Foreword)
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"1. Institutionalisation: Governments should consolidate interventions into coherent approaches guided by official communication and data policies, standards and guidelines [...] 2. Public interest driven: Public communication should strive to be independent from politicization in implementing inter
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ventions to counteract mis- and disinformation [...] 3. Future-proffing and profressionalisation: Public institutions should invest in innovative research and use strategic foresight to anticipate the evolution of technology and information ecosystems and prepare for likely threats [...] 4. Governments should strive to communicate in an honest and clear manner, with institutions comprehensively disclosing information, decisions, processes and data within the limitations of relevant legislation and regulations [...] 5. Timeliness: Public institutions should develop mechanisms to act in a timely manner by identifying and responding to emerging narratives, recognising the speed at which false information can travel [...] 6. Prevention: Government interventions should be designed to pre-empt rumours, falsehoods, and conspiracies to stop mis- and disinformation narratives from gaining traction [...] 7. Evidence-based: Government interventions should be designed and informed by trustworthy and reliable data, testing, and audience and behavioural insights [...] 8. Inclusiveness: Interventions should be designed and diversified to reach all groups in society [...] 9. Whole-of-society collaboration: Government efforts to counteract information disorders should be integrated within a whole-of-society approach, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including the media, private sector, civil society, academia and individuals." (Good practice principles overview, page 4)
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"The OECD convened a first-of-its kind international partnership on behavioural science and misinformation between the Canadian and the French governments to develop and disseminate behaviourally-informed and evidence-based solutions that can guide government response to misinformation. The study te
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sted 1,872 Canadians’ intentions to share false COVID-related headlines online with two behavioural interventions: an accuracy evaluation prompt and digital media literacy prompt. The data generated by this partnership show that the digital media literacy tips reduced intentions to share fake news online by 21% compared to the control group – having the greatest impact on online users. These insights can enable policy makers to enact measures that defend and empower online users against environments designed to exploit certain natural but maladaptive tendencies and place the control back into the hands of online users. Relying solely on traditional top-down approaches that aim to regulate content are insufficient at limiting the immediate dangers of misinformation. Innovative policy-making tools such as behavioural science can help provide immediate and long-term solutions to misinformation and should be considered as part of a holistic and comprehensive strategy to offset the threats of misinformation. Governments should conduct rigorous policy experiments in collaboration with other countries, like the one presented here, before enacting policy that affects a larger population to address the crossborder nature of misinformation." (Key policy messages, page 4)
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"The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/227. In it, the Secretary-General describes the challenges posed by disinformation and the responses to it, sets out the relevant international legal framework and discusses measures that States and technology enterprises re
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ported to have taken to counter disinformation. The Secretary-General notes that countering the different manifestations of disinformation requires addressing underlying societal tensions, fostering respect for human rights, online and offline, and supporting a plural civic space and media landscape." (Summary)
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"This paper examines responses to disinformation, in particular those involving automated tools, from a human rights perspective. It provides an introduction to current automated content moderation and curation practices, and to the interrelation between the digital information ecosystem and the phe
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nomenon of disinformation. The paper concludes that an unwarranted use of automation to govern speech, in particular highly context-dependent disinformation, is neither in line with states’ positive obligation to protect nor with intermediaries’ responsibility to respect human rights. The paper also identifies required procedural and remedial human rights safeguards for content governance, such as transparency, user agency, accountability, and independent oversight. Though essential, such safeguards alone appear insufficient to tackle COVID-19 online disinformation, as highly personalized content and targeted advertising make individuals susceptible to manipulation and deception. Consequently, this paper demonstrates an underlying need to redefine advertising- and surveillance-based business models and to unbundle services provided by a few dominant internet intermediaries to sustainably address online disinformation." (Abstract)
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"This study discusses how and to what extent peace operations are affected by digital disinformation and how international organisations (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO) as mandating bodies for peace operations have responded to limit the effect of disinformation or even prevent it. Based on this assessment
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of the current situation, the study identifies areas in need of action and suggests options for peace operations. These focus on four areas [Situational awareness; Response; Resilience; Cooperation] and include both short- and long-term measures." (Introduction)
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"The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) Inform, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) Empower, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electora
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l process; and (iii) Respond, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects. For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) chatbot – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court’s action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” prebunking actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates). The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners’ media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation. Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints." (Presentation, page 5-6)
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"The Digital Enquirer Kit is an e-learning course focused on preventing the spread of misinformation. The course covers media literacy, verification, as well as how to navigate the internet and research safely. This e-learning course was written for civil society activists, human rights defenders, i
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nvestigators, citizen journalists, and consumers of online information and media—so-called ‘Digital Enquirers’. The course contains simple explanations and real-world examples, illustrating secure research and information-gathering methods. The modules feature engaging and creative formats such as tutorials, quizzes, and interactive games." (Page 3)
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"This paper offers a critical overview of anti-war propaganda in the Russian language during the first six months of the war and identifies the reasons for its limited success. After a review of the challenges to current forms of propaganda, the paper offers practical recommendations to improve the
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work in this area." (Page 3)
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"In light of the role played by state-aligned actors, the private sector and lawmakers in countries with strong democratic institutions should adopt policies that mitigate the ability of state actors to manipulate AI and weaponize communication platforms. Efforts to combat disinformation must recogn
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ize that a range of private companies beyond just tech firms are implicated in information manipulation and must put safeguards in place. For example, registration and financing limits on paid PR firms, domestic and foreign, and better oversight by tech platforms on how their platforms are used by state actors is essential. Furthermore, greater transparency about all types of advertising and paid content promotion is needed, not just about political advertising in a handful of Western countries. This could be implemented through existing election laws and paid advertising regulations [...] Any meaningful efforts to combat disinformation will need to address the politicization of social media manipulation and influence operations, and their integration into electoral politics. Lawmakers should implement restrictions on the use of moderation mercenaries, black PR firms, and social media manipulation by those entrusted with public office. Countries should not only require great transparency for the platforms themselves, but should also practice what they preach by adopting transparency requirements for state and government entities related to advertising and outreach on social media and messaging platforms. Tech platforms must reduce the profitability of intentional and opportunistic disinformation efforts, including by reducing the prevalence and ease of plagiarism or the “recycling” of news content for clickbait. Reducing the economic incentives for click-bait, "churnalism", and regurgitated journalistic content would help deter the profit-driven non-ideological actors in these disinformation networks." (Conclsuions and recommendations, page 24-25)
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"Publication and dissemination of harmful content are constituted as criminal offenses according to Indonesian regulation. Consequently, all harmful content could be criminally prosecuted [...] Several terms used in the regulations are too broad (e.g., morality, public order, etc.) and may cause mul
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tiple interpretations, misinterpretations, and controversy [...] Indonesia is adopting a punitive approach of online content regulation [...] Trends and concerns: disparity in harmful content regulation between government ...; neglect and transparency ...; regulations on content disproportionately affect the marginalized community." (Key findings, page iv-vi)
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"[This is] a series of short issue briefs for funders on potential priority areas for funding activities or initiatives that would bring the work of digital rights organisations and environmental justice actors closer together. Each brief states the key problem from the perspective of the APC networ
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k, suggests mechanisms or processes for engagement and actors we feel are worth engaging, and includes specific recommendations for donors." (Overview, page 3)
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"Russia and China have created and amplified disinformation and propaganda about COVID-19 worldwide to sow distrust and confusion and to reduce social cohesion among targeted audiences. The United States government, the European Union, and multinational organizations have developed a series of inter
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ventions in response. These include exposing disinformation, providing credible and authoritative public health information, imposing sanctions, investing in democratic resilience measures, setting up COVID-19 disinformation task forces, addressing disinformation through regulatory measures, countering emerging threat narratives from Russia and China, and addressing the vulnerabilities in the information and media environment. Digital platforms, including Twitter, Meta, YouTube, and TikTok, have stepped up to counter COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation via policy procedures, takedowns of inauthentic content, addition of new product features, and partner with civil society and multinational organizations to provide credible and reliable information to global audiences. In addition, digital platforms are addressing COVID-19-related disinformation and misinformation stemming from a variety of state and non-state actors, including China and Russia. Several of these initiatives have proven to be effective, including cross-sectoral collaboration to facilitate identification of the threat; enforcement actions between civil society, governments, and digital platforms; and investment in resilience mechanisms, including media literacy and online games to address disinformation. Despite some meaningful progress, gaps in countering COVID-19 disinformation and propaganda stemming from Russia and China and unintentional misinformation spread by everyday citizens still exist. Closing these gaps will require gaining a deeper understanding of how adversaries think; aligning and refining transatlantic regulatory approaches; building coordination and whole-of- society information-sharing mechanisms; expanding the use of sanctions to counter disinformation; localizing and contextualizing programs and technological solutions; strengthening societal resilience through media, digital literacy, and by addressing digital authoritarianism; and building and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions." (Executive summary)
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"In many parts of the Global South, coordinated political disinformation campaigns, rumor, and propaganda have long been a part of the social fabric, even before disinformation has become an area of scholarship in the Global North. The way disinformation manifests in this region, and responses to it
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, can therefore be highly instructive for readers around the world. Through case studies and comparative analyses, the book explores the impact of disinformation in Africa, Latin America, the Arab World and Asia. The chapters in this book discuss the similarities and differences of disinformation in different regions and provide a broad thematic overview of the phenomenon as it manifests across the Global South. After analyzing core concepts, theories and histories from Southern perspectives, contributors explore the experiences of media users and the responses to disinformation by various social actors drawing on examples from a dozen countries." (Publisher description)
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"Democracies are at a critical juncture, under growing internal and external pressures. This publication sheds light on the important public governance challenges countries face today in preserving and strengthening their democracies, including fighting mis- and disinformation; improving government
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openness, citizen participation and inclusiveness; and embracing global responsibilities and building resilience to foreign influence. It also looks at two cross-cutting themes that will be crucial for robust, effective democracies: transforming public governance for digital democracy and gearing up government to deliver on climate and other environmental challenges. These areas lay out the foundations of the new OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, which has also involved the development of action plans to support governments in responding to these challenges." (Publisher description)
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