"This joint report from OpenMinds and the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) analyzes the activity of a network of 3,634 automated accounts that posted pro-Russian comments on Telegram channels between January 2024 and April 2025 targeting Ukrainian populations inside Russian-occupied territorie
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s. These accounts crafted tailored messages to target the occupied territories, differentiating their content from that aimed at other audiences across Russia and Ukraine. Our investigation found that automated Telegram comments targeting local audiences in Ukraine fell into three overarching categories: pro-Russian propaganda, anti-Ukrainian propaganda, and abstract anti-war messaging and calls for peaceful coexistence. Individual narratives were often tailored to respond to current events and changes in local conditions, such as power or water outages, but there was also evidence of proactive narratives initiated by the network unrelated to external events.
The bot network used similar messaging when targeting channels based in Russia; however, a significantly larger share of comments targeting the occupied territory channels emphasized positive portrayals of Russian culture and government. Across the sixty-nine narrative themes identified (see appendix), the bot network pushed essentially the same menu of talking points in both Russia-wide and occupied territory channels. What differentiates the content aimed at the occupied territories from that aimed at a wider Russian audience is the proportion of talking points: themes that praised Russian culture, social services, and governance dominated in occupied territory-based channels, accounting for a markedly higher share of content than in Russia-based channels. The pattern points to an effort to cultivate the appearance of local consensus in favor of occupation and Russian administrative control, but not necessarily to create genuine agreement." (Executive summary)
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"The Trump administration’s freeze on U.S. foreign aid will lead to a surge in Russian disinformation across Eastern Europe, experts warn, as independent media outlets across the region will be forced to shutter, leaving a vacuum of credible information in their wake. “Russian disinfo will have
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it easier, just like they have it easier every time they or their allies manage to weaken another one of the counter-disinformation activities,” explained Jakub Kalensky, deputy director of the Hybrid Influence community of interest at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. “The Russians have made it clear they consider civil society their enemy; every effort to defund civil society is helping the Kremlin." (Introduction)
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"Through the prism of the first comprehensive account of RT, the Kremlin's primary tool of foreign propaganda, Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order sheds new light on the provenance and nature of disinformation's threat to democracy. Interrogating the communications strategies pursued by aut
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horitarian states and grassroots populist movements, the book reveals the interlinked nature of today's global media-politics pathologies. Stephen Hutchings, Vera Tolz, Precious Chatterje-Doody, Rhys Crilley, and Marie Gillespie provide a systematic investigation into RT's history, institutional culture, and journalistic ethos; its activities across multiple languages and media platforms; its audience-targeting strategies and audiences' engagements with it; and its response to the war in Ukraine and associated bans on the network. The authors' analysis challenges commonplace notions of disinformation as something that Russia brings to the West, where passive publics are duped by the Kremlin's communications machine, and reveals the reciprocal processes through which Russia and disinformation infiltrate and challenge the liberal order. Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order provides provocative insights into the nature and extent of the challenge that Russia's propaganda operation poses to the West. The authors contend that the challenge will be met only if liberals reflect on liberalism's own internal tensions and blind spots and defend the values of open-minded impartiality." (Publisher description)
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"In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt
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dialogue and drown-out dissent. In the first study of its kind, this open-access book presents a range of case studies of these emerging dynamics across Africa, mapping and analyzing disinformation operations in ten different countries, and using innovative techniques to determine who is producing and coordinating these increasingly sophisticated disinformation machines. Drawing on scholars from across the continent, case studies document the actors and mechanisms used to profile citizens, manipulate beliefs and behaviour, and close the political space for democratic dialogue and policy debate. Chapters include examinations of how the Nigerian government deployed disinformation when the #EndSARS campaign focused attention on police brutality and corruption; insights into how pro-government actors responded to the viral #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign; and how misogynists mobilized against the #AmINext campaign against gender-based violence in South Africa." (Publisher description)
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"After the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, the peninsula experienced a progressive transition of telecommunication and broadcasting infrastructure under Russian influence, followed by a wave of repression of Ukrainian media. Between 2014 and 2015, dozens of Ukrainian media organization
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s and independent journalists left the peninsula to continue working in exile. This paper explores the phenomenon of informational annexation using a mixed methods approach consisting of in-depth interviews with media and IT professionals as well as digital ethnography and network measurements. It argues that, besides pressure from pro-Russian authorities, journalistic work in the area is challenged by legal and infrastructural factors such as the absence of legal and financial protections for Ukrainian journalists traveling to Crimea, lack of holistic digital security within media organizations, and increased Internet censorship in Crimea. By analyzing the risk perceptions and digital security practices of exiled and Crimean civic journalists, this paper explores how informational annexation challenges journalistic work on the infrastructural and organizational level, enabling the rise of civic journalism, and how it affects journalists' individual digital security practices. In the context of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, this research provides insights into some of the informational annexation tactics used by Russians in the occupied Ukrainian territories." (Abstract)
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"Nations use media to disseminate stories about their culture, history, and values. This study explored Russian public-diplomacy efforts by examining news content exported to its neighbors, Ukraine and Georgia, from February 2021 to July 2021, approximately one year before Russia’s invasion of Ukr
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aine. We looked at pro-Russia media that targeted Russian-speaking Georgians and Ukrainians showing that Russian public-diplomacy messaging was not so much about Russia, as it was about anti-Western frames. Local pro- Russia media in Ukraine and Georgia repeated these anti-Western frames in their news coverage. These anti-Western frames provide insight into the messaging before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, thus contributing unique insights into public-diplomacy messaging for theorizing soft and hard power." (Abstract)
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"On March 9, 2022, the maternity and children’s hospital number 3 in Mariupol, Ukraine, was bombed as part of Russia’s full-scale war efforts in Ukraine. However, Russian statealigned media promoted a different narrative: namely, that the bombing itself, as well as the victims on site, were fake
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. Thus, combining concerns of war, gender, and disinformation, I analytically unfold the state-aligned news media coverage of the Mariupol case in Russia within the framework of multimodal critical discourse analysis. The analysis demonstrates how female agents are stripped of victimhood and symbolically annihilated across the material, introducing the concept of false agency. Meanwhile, the experts in the coverage are solely male and predominantly Russian, pointing to an intersectional and unequal divide based on gender and nationality. Moreover, the analysis illuminates how fact-checking is used as a deliberate tool to legitimize the disinformative coverage within the discourse of information warfare in Russian state-aligned media." (Abstract)
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"This report provides an overview of how Russian state and pro-Kremlin propaganda undermining international support for Ukraine has evolved over the two years since the beginning of the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. It outlines a range of semi-covert tactics through which Russian state an
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d pro-Kremlin outlets continue to reach substantial audiences despite European Union sanctions. Finally, this report highlights four key areas of vulnerability of the Western alliance that Russian state and pro-Kremlin actors are likely to exploit over the coming year." (About this report)
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"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more
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times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation.
Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors.
Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front.
African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights)
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"Während innerhalb Russlands das Verbot kritischer Medien und die Gleichschaltung der verstaatlichten Sender eine beinahe karikaturhafte Erzählung über traditionelle Werte und die Notwendigkeit der "Militärischen Spezialoperation" hervorbringen, arbeiten sorgfältig geplante Propagandaaktionen i
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m Rest der Welt an der Destabilisierung demokratischer Gesellschaften. Ein planmäßiger Wahnsinn überzieht das Land. Er zeigt sich in inflationär gebrauchten Euphemismen und Hassrede, als Denunziation und in einem bis ins Subtilste durchdachten Strafregime. Und es ist ein Wahnsinn mit Geschichte. Denn die Gewalt, die die russische Gesellschaft unerbittlich im Griff hat, ist eine Fortführung der paranoiden Suche nach Feinden, der nächtlichen Verhaftungen, Durchsuchungen und Folterungen sowie der Gulags aus dem Sowjetregime - in grellem, neuem Gewand und verschmolzen mit dem Gangstertum der Neunzigerjahre. "Der Comic in der Mitte zeugt von bitterem Humor. Der Ernst der Lage zeigt sich im Text, der so einige Rätsel löst, die sich seit dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine angestaut haben. Irina Rastorgueva seziert die Gesellschaft, indem sie die Sprache analysiert. Was sie Pop-up-Propaganda nennt, ist eine Art LTI für Putins Russland, eine Bestandsaufnahme diktatorischen Sprechens in dem Sinne, wie Victor Klemperer es einst tat" (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Desinformation begleitet den russischen Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine und erreicht auch ein deutsches Publikum. Sie dient der Stärkung russischer Propaganda und ist geeignet, die deutsche und europäische Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfähigkeit in Bezug auf den Krieg zu stören und negativ zu beein
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flussen. Zwischen Frühjahr und Herbst 2022 ist die Zustimmung zu pro-russischen Propagandanarrativen in der deutschen Bevölkerung signifikant gestiegen. Seit Beginn des russischen Überfalls im Februar 2022 hat sich die Landschaft der Desinformations-Sender:innen fragmentiert. Wo zu Beginn RT DE (Russia Today Deutsch) dominierte, hat dessen Abschaltung durch die EU im März 2022 Raum für andere Akteur:innen gemacht. Dazu gehören russische Botschaften sowie die sogenannten „Alternativmedien“ und pro-russische Influencer:innen. Desinformationskampagnen richten sich auch gezielt gegen ukrainische Geflüchtete. Es kursiert wiederholt und in vielfältigen Variationen Desinformation, die geeignet ist, die Solidarität mit der Ukraine und den von dort Geflüchteten zu zersetzen. Thematisch behaupten diese Beiträge fälschlich etwa die Veruntreuung von Hilfsgütern, aggressives Verhalten von Geflüchteten oder stellen die Unterstützung des angegriffenen Landes als Bedrohung der eigenen Grundbedürfnisse dar. Falsche Behauptungen über Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine verbleiben dabei nicht im digitalen Raum, sondern werden auch in die analoge Welt übertragen. Im verschwörungsideologischen Milieu traf die Nachricht des russischen Angriffs auf die Ukraine auf eine bereits seit 2014 etablierte pro-russische und anti-amerikanische Grundhaltung. Entsprechend wurde sich zu Kriegsbeginn fast durchweg anti-ukrainisch positioniert und der Angriffskrieg Russlands verharmlost bis legitimiert." (Zentrale Erkenntnisse, Seite 1)
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"Ukraine has been building its capacity to use humour as a strategic communications tool since Russian first invasion in 2014. After Russia launched the full-scale war in February 2022, this often grassroots effort was multiplied by many new actors joining it. Foreign supporters of Ukraine stepped i
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n to expose lies of Russian officials in social media, resulting in a creation of NAFO movement. The use of humour by the Ukrainian government officials also pushed the boundaries of what is considered acceptable in digital diplomacy. Numerous jokes and memes have been created that will remain in the historical record of this war, such as the “Russian warship” meme, “sunflower seeds in a pocket”, “bavovna”( cotton), and others. However, humour should not overshadow the terrible reality of war Ukrainians have to face daily until this day. It should not distract attention from the need for Ukraine to win and Russia to be held accountable for its war crimes. Humour helped Ukrainians cope with the trauma of war and preserve mental health. For foreign audiences, especially in the West, it helped to introduce Ukraine as a country that is a part of the same cultural space, has similar values, and is worthy of support. Witty jokes and creative memes opened a window for many to discover Ukrainian history and culture. Satire helped to expose the absurdity of Russian imperialist ideology and propaganda narratives the Kremlin used to launch its invasion of Ukraine." (Conclusion)
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"In order to spread Russian narratives about Ukraine that create a false impression of the country among external and internal audiences, the Russian Federation uses a whole complex of information and communication channels. Their main task is to replace the target audience's existing ideas about th
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e real, factual state of affairs with ideas that are considered to be more beneficial to the aggressor country. Russia rejects democratic principles and Ukraine's desire for a European future. Depending on the tasks and results (successes/failures) of operations to influence the internal politics of Ukraine and the formation of its image among the Western audience, Russian narratives changed from a presentation of Ukrainians and Russians as “brotherly” peoples or even one people to the importance of the complete extermination of "Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis," denial of the very existence of Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group (thereby “justifying” genocide), returning supposed "historical territories of Russia," and promoting the idea that Ukraine has never really been a proper state or is a historic mistake. The narratives of Russian propaganda intertwine, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes contradicting each other. But whatever the Russian narrative may be, its main goal is to undermine Ukraine’s democratic development and its integration into the Western world, to weaken the desire of Ukrainians to determine their future outside Russian influence, within the European family, as well as to weaken international support for Ukraine. The Kremlin's disinformation campaign led to the emergence of a number of stereotypes that influenced the decision-making of Ukraine's partners at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which led to numerous human casualties, the destruction of Ukrainian economy and infrastructure, and a real threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fortunately, Ukraine has persevered. Unbreakable people of an unbreakable country continues its fight not only for itself but the whole democratic world." (Summary)
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"Most scholars working on Russia’s use of strategic narratives recognize the importance of the Russian state. Nevertheless, the authors argue that much of the attention on strategic narratives has given insufficient appreciation for how Russia has developed its military and media policies in a coo
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rdinated manner: learning from its mistakes and failures as it went along, and becoming more efficient each time. In making their case, they examine three theatres of Russian military activity and their accompanying media coverage: the wars in Chechnya in 1994–1995 and 1999– 2000; war with Georgia in 2008 over the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and Ukraine, especially Crimea, since 2014. The Russian leadership addressed the shortcomings on each occasion, with the news media being increasingly weaponized as time went on. The authors argue that scholars should see Russia’s evolving uses of those military and media power resources as part of a single strategic process. How the Russian state goes about its media policy can accentuate the military intervention for better or for worse as far as its image is concerned." (Abstract)
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"This report highlights adaptations and innovations by Ukrainians in their struggle against Moscow’s disinformation machine. As part of the project, the International Forum on Democratic Studies conducted more than fifty expert interviews and hosted a series of convenings with experts from Ukraine
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and across Europe which inform the analysis. Companion essays—one from Ukraine, the other from Central Europe—provide more context and details on the ways in which locally based organizations are learning to meet the challenge. The research identified three advantages—deep preparation, open networks of cooperation, and active utilization of new technology—that have allowed civil society organizations and governments in Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe to build trust and tell Ukraine’s story, unite Ukrainians and their allies, and ensure resilience in the face of authoritarian disinformation campaigns." (Executive summary, page 1)
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"This article examines the multilingual audiences of Russian outlet RT on Facebook. RT is a state media outlet known for spreading strategic Kremlin narratives and disinformation in support of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy objectives to large and multilingual global audiences. RT serves as
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a central pillar of the Russian information influence apparatus, and an instrument of both ‘soft’ and ‘sharp power’, the latter describing the use of information manipulation to interfere with foreign public spheres. While many studies have concentrated on the English-language content of RT to understand its impact on Western democracies, in this article, we examine the sharing of RT content across all six RT languages, and we investigate what audiences from the six language communities share RT content on Facebook. We find ideologically diverging patterns across these communities, with particular resonance for RT content targeting the political faultlines in different regions and countries and conclude that RT’s role as a tool for sharp power is now dominant." (Abstract)
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"Can residents of Ukraine discern between pro-Kremlin disinformation and true statements? Moreover, which pro-Kremlin disinformation claims are more likely to be believed, and by which audiences? We present the results from two surveys carried out in 2019—one online and the other face-to-face—th
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at address these questions in Ukraine, where the Russian government and its supporters have heavily targeted disinformation campaigns. We find that, on average, respondents can distinguish between true stories and disinformation. However, many Ukrainians remain uncertain about a variety of disinformation claims’ truthfulness. We show that the topic of the disinformation claim matters. Disinformation about the economy is more likely to be believed than disinformation about politics, historical experience, or the military. Additionally, Ukrainians with partisan and ethnolinguistic ties to Russia are more likely to believe pro-Kremlin disinformation across topics. Our findings underscore the importance of evaluating multiple types of disinformation claims present in a country and examining these claims’ target audiences." (Abstract)
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"This paper examines the influence of international political actors in perpetuating disinformation in fragile states, using Iraq as a case study. The advent of modern technology and social media has transformed the global information landscape, providing new avenues for the dissemination of disinfo
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rmation. This study delves into the history of disinformation in Iraq, particularly during and after the fall of the Baathist regime, and investigates how national and international actors utilise disinformation as a political tool. Through three case studies, the overlapping interests of regional, international, and local actors are explored, focusing on their use of social and legacy media platforms to execute influence operations targeting the Iraqi public. The first case study examines the Iranian-aligned Iraqi Radio and Television Union and their deployment of disinformation narratives during the 2021 national election. The second case study investigates unofficial Iranian-aligned Telegram media outlets and their promotion of the Russian narrative in the Russia-Ukraine War. The final case study analyses Pro-China and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Facebook influencers in Iraq and their engagement in coordinated inauthentic behavior. By connecting the interactions of these actors, this paper reveals a complex web of disinformation in the Iraqi digital information ecosystem, emphasising the role played by national and international actors in perpetuating it. The findings contribute to a better understanding of disinformation dynamics, enabling more effective strategies to combat disinformation and foster informed and democratic societies." (Abstract)
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"The two essays in this report highlight ways in which two global authoritarian powers, Russia and China, provide surge capacity to kleptocratic networks in Africa. In his essay J.R. Mailey dissects the Wagner Group’s illicit activities in key parts of Africa. The Wagner Group’s activities are c
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omplex, but Mailey zeroes in on the fact that the military support offered to African kleptocrats has little to do with providing security and stability for the African people. Rather it is focused on extracting resources, advancing geopolitical goals, and serving as a brutal cog in the authoritarian mutual support machinery. Even if the ultimate fate of the Wagner Group remains unclear, these trends are unlikely to abate. The opaque economic relationships that the Wagner Group has developed on the continent no doubt are too lucrative for the Kremlin to surrender [...] Andrea Ngombet Malewa’s essay highlights the ways in which Beijing facilitates Congo-Brazzaville’s deeply kleptocratic regime. In addition to long-standing Chinese involvement in the timber and extractive industries, Ngombet’s analysis spotlights the establishment of a Sino-Congolese Bank for Africa that could allow kleptocrats to bypass the transparency requirements of Western-linked banks, thereby affording opportunities to launder money with impunity. This development has significant implications for accountability norms worldwide." (Executive summary)
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